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ABSTRACT 
This study is primarily aimed at examining the impact of World Bank / IMF, structural 
adjustment programmes in the SADC region. However, the main focus of the study was on 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. These World Bank / IMF-influenced perestroikas, are believed to be 
viable panacea, for the state of economic malaise prevalent in the SADC region. 
In undertaking this research, vanous methods were utilised to acqUire data. A case study 
approach was used. However, the main method of data collection which was heavily relied 
upon was document study. The collected data was analysed and presented in both graphical and 
tabular form. This study, inter alia, established that the implementation ofIMF / WB structural 
adjustment programmes in the SADC region has precipitated a plethora of insurmountable 
socio-economic problems for the citizenry of both Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Furthermore, the research has revealed that IMF / WB influenced structural adjustment 
programmes have culminated in large-scale unemployment, retrenchments, an acute decline in 
educational and health standards, ever-skyrocketing food prices, rents, taxes, mass exodus of 
qualified human resources to greener pastures, big debts, inflation and labour strikes in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Finally, the study recommends that, the World Bank / IMF should revisit their modus operandi 
in terms of fostering socio-economic development in the SADC. Adjusting countries should be 
viewed as partners rather than simple aid recipients. The World Bank /IMF should cancel the 
debts of "Adjusters" in the SADC, in order to allow them to focus on development rather that 
debt-servicing. Some useful policy·options have been propounded in the study. 
These policy options include development of human resources, fostering regional intergration 
and co-operation, improving international trade and embarking on public investment 
programmes. In order to improve the socio-economic life of the citizens the government of 
these countries should implement poverty reduction programmes. The World Bank / IMF 
should also cut down the number of its conditionalities from 117 to less. This will give aid 
recipient countries enough carle blanche to run their socio-economic lives. It should be noted 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The British South African Company (B.S.A.c.) established the erstwhile colony of Southern 
Rhodesia, which now forms the Republic of Zimbabwe, on the strength of its numeral mineral 
potential in 1890. However, disappointed by the limited scale of gold discoveries, the BSAC 
encouraged commercial farming and an alienation of land to individual settlers and to speculative 
companies. In 1965, the settlers in Rhodesia, made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(LIDl). Of significance is the fact that Northern Rhodesia ( now Zambia) Nyasaland (now Malawi) 
and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), once were united together by their colonial master and 
formed (CAF) Central African Republic, with Malawi supplying labour force, Zambia supplying 
copper to Harare. During that epoch Zambian copper was selling very well on the international 
market. 
After 10 years of independence the country commenced to face socio-economic problems. When 
the government implemented economic structural adjustment programme, results were detrimental 
to the citizens. As a guiding principle, because of their link to the Socialist Eastern Block during 
the war of liberation, the Zimbabwean government adopted socialism like Zambia. It became a 
practicing welfare state, until 1985, when the then Prime Minister confessed to Linda Chalker, that 
Zimbabwe now welcomed free market forces. Already many economic distortions on macro level 
had been incurred by the Zanu (PF) led government in the de faCIO one party state, of Zimbabwe. 
The then Prime Minister promised "my government, committed as it is to socialism recognizes the 
existing phenomenon of capitalism as a historical reality which because it cannot be availed has to 
be purposefully harnessed, regulated and frustrated as a partner ... " (Stoneman 1989) 
However, the problem which the Zimbabwe economy was confronting when it resolved to adopt 
IMFIWorld Bank, conditionalitites "were a result of some fundamental structural features which 
date to the colonial epoch" (Kadenge: 1992). Furthermore, according to IMFIWorid Bank it is 
useful to view the structure of the Zimbabwe economy in terms of foregoing inefficiencies 
(technical, allocative and destructive inefficiencies) which are underpinned by structural factors ... 
9 
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the structural context in which these inefficiencies are manifested in the Zimbabwe economy is that 
of enclavity delusion and dependency; all of which are mutually reinforcing and are a legacy of the 
colonial and settler history of the society" (IMFIWorld Bank, 1994). 
Furthermore on the same note it should be noted that "the notion of enclavity refers to the fact that 
the most dynamic and efficient part of the Zimbabwe economy which accounts for the greater part 
of gross domestic product is the formal sector and this section, however, only accounts for about 
one-fifth (1 million) of the labour force, while the majority of the labour force consisting about 
four-fifths are variously under employed in the informal and communal sectors, or openly 
unemployed" (IMFIWorid Bank, 1994). 
Ever rising unreliable interest rates, lack of foreign currency, ever spiralling unemployment ratio, 
low investment levels, high levels of inflation, infrastructural putrescence - all these facts were 
symptoms of a state of economic morass, which needed immediate attention. The cash strapped 
and inflation ridden, Republic of Zimbabwe, had no option except to adopt the IMFIWorid Bank 
policy prescription. It should always be remembered that Zambia adopted structural adjustment 
policies earlier than Zimbabwe and the results, just like in Zimbabwe, impacted severely on the 
citizenry. 
The IMF0Vorld Bank recommends cutting military spending, as one of the measures to improve the 
economy, but on the part of Zimbabwe one wonders if "spending US$ 300 000 a day (some 
economists say even more)" in the troubled Democratic Republic of Congo is cutting military 
. spending (Focus on Africa Jan - March 1999). The political will, in the post colonial SADC, is not 
just adequate if not lacking completely, as far as improving socio-economic life is concerned, 
10 
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Table 1. Membership ofIMFlWorld 
Bank. Membership and Quotas in 
Africa South of The Sahara (Million 
SDR) 
Just like many independent countries in 
SADC, Zimbabwe became a member of 
IMFlWorld Bank in 1980 after attaining 
its independence. That is why, after 
being faced with manifold economic 
pro blems she went to negotiate 
adoption of IMFlWorld Bank policy 
prescription in the form of economic 
structural adjustment programme. 
Zambia also did exactly the same thing 
that is why some scholars often talk of 
"The Zambianization of Zimbabwe". 
Zambia adopted structural adjustment 
policies, during the reign of Dr. K. 
Kaunda and even after his reign. The 
results of adopting these policies, were 









1 .  
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
Contemporaneous economic trends in the SADC region have "in 1010" shown that the IMFlWorld 
Bank initiated structural adjustment policies have cutminated in the region facing insurmountable 
~ 
~. 
problems, ranging from loss of "carte hlanche" in the management of the economy on the part of 
the governments in the region, large scale unemployment, high levels of inflation, ever spiralling 
cost of living, retrenchments, let alone incessant closure of industries in the region. Zimbabwe and 
Zambia are clear cases of countries, which have been hit detrimentally by the wave of IMFlWorld 
Bank policy prescriptions. 
1.2. Purpose of the study 
The fundamental objectives of this study is to, inter alia, examine: 
1. The impact of- Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes in the SADC region with 
specific emphasis on Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
2. The effects of adjustment policies on different levels and categories of people. 
3. How the implementation of these adjustment policies have impacted on the public and 
private sector in Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
4. The negative results of such policy programmes on the Zambian people. 
5 Zimbabwean case study as the main focus of analysis, although Zambia will be used also as 
indicated above. 
6. Draw future lessons on policy making in the SADC region. 
7. The other purpose of this study finally is to find mechanisms policy wise, which can reverse 
the negative impact precipitated by adjustment policies within the SADC region. (It is 
12 
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realize that while this study adopts a re210nal focus Zimbabwe and Zambia will 
as case studies). 
1.3. The for the study 
abuse of economic resources most LJrL.LI"-' it is of 
paramount SlgrutllCaJlce at the very least to explore Economic 
SADC region (with' and Zambia). 
and acutely, the impact IMF/World policies on the 
U"",,,;),)UOl,,U in this study. Large poor education 
,",VAjU"AVU.:>, poor health, ever striking workers, companies 
closures, ........ ll ........... human resources, loss of business 'Vv., ............. u,.., ..... , poor governance 
are all ""rr ....... i'''' ..... ''' of an and political malaise. Yet, in substance 
"in toto" "" ..... '" ... "'+.,.ri IMFlWorld Bank policy packages. The foregoing 
to critically 
should not 
profoundly out the study. The need to come up po licy options 
1.4. The Significance of 
The significance 
L 
evaluation of economic policy 
2. It clearly will to 
region and anywhere else around 
3. It highlights how IMF/World 
of the following framework. 
this study marks, a stepping stone towards 
Zambia 
structural adjustment policies in the SADC 
impacted on the lives of both 






t llI1  t  Tr".,':n· .... 
lllUJ(J."L'WU.
4. It seeks to find avenues which can be efficiently and cost efficiently used to re-cycle the 
retrenched so as to upgrade their standard of living. 
5. It seeks to reflect on how the current governments of Zimbabwe and Zambia can restructure 
the economic quagmire. 
6. The significance of this study lies in its endeavor to explain loss of "carte blanche" by the 
government of Zimbabwe and Zambia as far as economic policy making is concerned. 
7. This study is significant in that it seeks to examine the suitability and conducivity of the 
IMFlWorld Bank policies to SADC region. 
8. It is important to realize that this study aims to give some recommendations as far as future 
policy making is concerned. At the same time, this study seeks to examine some policy 
/ 
options, which SADC should also give a chance. 
9. This study seeks to show that rather than strictly becoming recipients SADC reglOn 
countries should be partners with the developed world as far as formulating viable policies 
for socio-economic development is concerned. 
10. Lessons for countries like South Africa who have not yet adopted these policies are also 
drawn in this study. 
14 
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1.5. Zimbabwe: A Case Study 
1.5.1. Post-Independence, pre-E.S.A.P. Policies 
On the attainment of independence, the government made a major commitment to create a socialist 
society largely based on state led intervention and planned strategy of conscious transformation. 
The fundamental starting point of the new government was its realization and appreciation of 
disturbing inefficiencies prevalent on the economic landscape. 
Policies like Growth with Equity (1981) were the order of the day. The welfare policies 
implemented while being applauded by the citizenry, became a bone of contention in economic 
circles. While notable achievements were made in the social sphere particularly in the provision of 
health, education and welfare support for vulnerable groups, very little economic progress was 
achieved by the so called socialist initiative and although the government was able to negotiate and 
intervene in the economy, it did not transform inherited economic structures and their attendant 
inefficiencies. 
Apparently at the close of the first decade of independence, it was manifest that the government --.. ~ 
was promoting socialism not economic development because the gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew just at an average annual rate of 3,2%, just about the same level as population growth during 
the period and worse still formal sector employment either remained stagnant or only increased 
slightly over the same period, with youth unemployment rising. Summarily the main reason for the 
poor performance of the economy were: 
1.5.2. Summary of reasons for poor economic performance 
o Government did not have a comprehensive development strategy to deal with the inherited 
structural, rigidities. 
o Depressed state of investment arising from excessive regulation and controls that were not 




... "' .... T".n lcOIlorm
mcl tl lde . 'U<JUJUJ,.., 
() c) , 
o Government diverted enonnous resources to counter the effects of not only drought, but 
also destabilization emanating from South Africa, especially as regards to conflict in 
Mozambique which blocked Zimbabwe's key trade routs to the sea. 
o Resources were deployed in the social sector where they had a long gestation period and 
~ 
o Huge resources were provided to parastatals in a non-targeted manner without any 
performance criteria to ensure that these were productively utilized. 
According to the WBIIMF as .the economic crisis deepened and proved increasingly intractable as 
the new decade of the 1990's dawned, the government succumbed to pressure from the World 
Bank and the IMF, which claimed that the fundamental problem in Zimbabwe was the pervasive 
government regulation and intervention in the economy. Thus in 1991, the government signalled its 
fundamental shift in policy by adopting the policy prescriptions of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
and between 1991 to 1995 implemented them (World Bank, 1995). 
1.6. IMFIWorid Bank Conditionalities 
One of the most serious complexities for the SADC regions when dealing with the IMF/World 
Bank is the phenomenon of conditionalities. This is the yoke which the aid recipient countries have 
to shoulder. It should be noted that in exchange for structural adjustment the recipient country will 





The IMFfWorid Bank conditionalities are seen as 
anathema by all the southern African adjusters. 
The focus of the section is to discuss these 
conditionalities because they have a bearing on 
the implementation of policies in the SADC 
regions. 
1.6.1. Trade Liberalization 
The World BankIIMF believed that trade 
liberalization steps like the elimination of price 
controls on the commodities has an effect of 
~ 
increasing the amount of goods produced, 
thereby providing more employment for the 
people and multiply productivity, earns more 
foreign currency from exportation. 
In a free market economic system, which the IMFfWorld Bank preaches, the principle of collective 
bargaining works. Thus, there has been a growing propensity by most countries adopting structural 
adjustments to restructure the Labour Relations Act. Hence, it can be seen that the policy 
regarding wage restraint enables employers to pay workers only what they can manage and by so 
doing companies will then obtain greater profits and be in a position to increase production and the 
result of all this will be to create more jobs and more goods both for domestic consumption and 
exportation. Such policies have led to the disputes that have arisen in the recent histories of 
Zimbabwe and Zambia in which the working classes became at loggerheads with the owners of the 
means of production. It is also argued that such system affords producers to sell their products at 
their market value, thus in this way removal of subsidies provides an stimuli to producers to 
produce more, sell more, earn more profit, earn more foreign currency and provide more 
employment. 
17 
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Clearly from the forgoing it should be noted that trade liberalization relies heavily on market forces 
in order to correct the economic imbalances troubling the continent. It is also argued that these 
supply and demand based steps tend to overlook the fact that market imperfections require to be 
corrected by state intervention. It can be viewed that there are multiple powerful forces from 
without the market that would result in deviations from marginal cost pricing. 
At independence Zimbabwe adopted a socialist stance, therefore protection of its citizens was at the 
heart of socialism. Most governments in Africa have tended to regulate prices on commodities so 
as to prevent merchants from over exploiting the citizenry. In a structural adjustment situation this 
would mean the acceleration of poverty, the people living below the poverty line will increase and 
the people in the opulent category of the society will get richer and richer at the detriment of the 
general citizenry. Because of the implementation of the structural adjustment policies the rich are 
getting ever richer on a daily basis the majority of the poor are also fast becoming poorer in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. In Harare and Bulawayo in Zimbabwe and Lusaka and the copper belt 
province in Zambia, people have felt the pinch of structural policies. 
At independence most governments have implemented a minimum wage policy to cater for the 
workers, but in the new economic dispensation the minimum wage talk just has died down because 
workers ... can now accept anything from their bosses, they can accept very low rates just to keep 
them going. 
The fundamental problem inherent in decontrolling prices is the scourge of inflation. Inflation 
cause, generally, prices to go up, thus worsening the< plight of the poor. Thus it is significant to 
note that in a free for all situation merchants have a tendency to raise prices every time. The raising 
of prices as a result of decontrolling of prices had a sharp impact on the Zambians and 
Zimbabweans and the SADC citizens as a whole. 
1.6.2. Cutting Public Expenditure 
The concept of cutting of public expenditure in the developing countries is linked to the idea that 
government is too big. The IiVIFlWorld Bank argues that for structural adjustment to succeed, 
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Third World governments must reduce the amount they spend on public services such as public 
education, health and social services. In the same light it should be noted that the governments 
should retrench employees because their bureaucracies are unnecessarily too big. That is why 
retrenchments are common place in Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Evidently, because of this clause, during the implementation of the structural policies a lot of people 
were left jobless in Zimbabwe and in Zambia after these retrenchments had been effected. The 
principle of cutting down government expenditure' was and is the complete opposite of what 
happened after independence, when governments in the post independence era extended their 
merciful hands on the poor by providing free education, health and services. Most governments 
especially the Zimbabwean government felt obliged to deliver all these goods to the people because 
of their promises during their long war for independence, which took place before the attainment of 
independence. Free services consumed a lot of government revenues and did not generate profit. 
IMF/World Bank believes that all these free services should be cut, people should pay for their own 
health, education, services etc. This was a catastrophe to the majority poor in the SADC region. 
With the cutting of expenditure in the health and education services the living standards of people 
were drastically affected. It is the belief of this study that an unhealthy and uneducated nation is 
unlikely to contribute to a self-sustaining economic growth in either the short or the long run. 
Ekpo and Jeggan C. Senghor as cited in (Chakaodza 1993), denoted that structural adjustment 
policies imposed excessive demands on public services, rcsulting in overloads and in the similar 
view, Ekpo and Senghor (Chakaodza 1993) points out that in countries like Nigeria much 
unemployment is increasing and that this was never the case during the pre adjustment era. 
Viewing the post ESAP developments one can say that the provision of quality food, health, clean 
water and other basic needs are below pre-adjustment levels. It is one of IMF/World Bank 
principles that adjusters should effect removal of import controls such as tariff and quotas. The 
idea basically is to attain as much foreign investment as possible. The underlying assumption is that 
investment generates employment to the poor masses of the country and it boosts foreign currency 
reserves of the country. The Zambian and Zimbabwean governments believed and still believes in 
that way. 
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Most proponents of structural adjustment programmes have argued that foreign investment result in 
the transfer of knowledge, skills and technology vital for national development from rich countries 
to poor countries. It is suggested, for example that multi-national corporations (MNC) not only 
bring with them financial resources and erect new plants in poor countries, but also transfer 
managerial experiences and expertise to indigenous managers through on-the-job-training. 
In opposition to the foregoing argument some schools of thought argue that foreign investment can 
drive weak infant domestic industries to the wall in the face of stiff competition from foreign 
investors and it is also doubtful as to whether foreign investment can improve the foreign exchange 
position in the long-run as Todaro pointed out. Although the initial impact of MNC investment is 
to improve the foreign exchange position of the recipient nation, its long-run impact maybe to 
reduce foreign exchange earnings on both current and capital accounts. The current account may 
deteriorate as a result of substantial importation of intermediate products and capital growth, while 
the capital account may worsen because of overseas repatriation of profits, interests, royalties and 
high fees (Chakaodza 1993 :21). 
The Bretton Woods has advocated devaluation of the currency. The principle behind that idea is to 
improve the balance of payment position. When a country's currency is devalued it means that the 
exports are now less expensive and external traders will increase their propensity to buy the 
country's products in huge quantities hence enabling the exporting country to remove balance of 
payments constraints. It is also assumed that the problems of the Third World economics are partly 
caused by an over-valued exchange rate, therefore devaluation or depreciation of a countries 
currency arguably needs to increase exports and reduce imports. 
Devaluation of currency on the part of developing countries has always been associated with high 
levels of inflation, increase in interest rates over loans. Incomes sharply decline while exports will 
become cheaper, local life becomes very expensive to maintain because transport fares will be high, 
housing rents, rates, all these become very expensive at local levels that is why the poor people 
finds structural adjustment policies as anathema and wholly ruinous to their lives. They argue that 








Ekpo (cited in Chakaodza 1993) depicted that " to reap the benefits of devaluation these 
(devaluing) countries must export manufactured or semi-manufactured goods which must compete 
in the world market. If the price and output of an export commodity is determined by a cartel like 
OPEC, then a country cannot expect much from devaluation. In addition, the need for trade 
liberalization derives from the classical theory of comparative advantage, which is not compatible 
with situations in which imports elasticities far exceed export elasticities. Hence in the African 
present situation, excessive trade liberalization's in not a feasible policy because of the protection of 
practices of industrialized countries against exports of African countries and in view of the negative 
effects of foreign competition on import industries in Africa". However, the preceding view 
encapsulates the merits and demerits of devaluation in the frame work of liberalization and looking 
at the fact that African economies rely on exports of primary products to earn foreign exchange and 
taking into account the fact that such exports are sold below the market price devaluation becomes 
a non-starter. Domestic investment is at risk with investment by foreign companies that is why 
Zimbabwe recently blocked a South African bank, which wanted to come to Zimbabwe "unless a 
substantial chunk of the investment would go to the members of (IBDC), indigenous businesses", 
(Business Day, 10107/1998). The greatest fear is simply that infant indigenous banks, which have 
recently emerged, would be swallowed or stifled by these new foreign based banks. 
One of the IMF/World Bank conditionalities imposed on financial and recipient countries, is the use 
of interest rate policy. However, it is common knowledge that a high interest regime is a 
disincentive to investment since industrialists are reluctant to borrow form the financial markets due 
to high interest payments and at the same time it is difficult to save during structural adjustment 
because real income of people tend to decrease as a result of inflation. The Z.C.T.U. has recently 
staged nation-wide strikes to reduce tax increases in Zimbabwe. Since the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies, the people in Zimbabwe have suffered greatly owing to the gradual 
erosion of their incomes by inflation. That explains why workers in the Z.C.T.U. always are on the 
roads demonstrating against the government. Just like in Zambia labour has became right at the 
front of politics. Z.C.T.U. vowed to continue fighting (Focus on Africa Jan - March 1999:5). 
Privatization refers to the sale of government owned equity in nationalized industry, parastatal or 
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the organizations. Generally, at least 50% of the shares are subsequently sold to the private 
shareholders. The World Bank and to a lesser extent the IMC advocate that privatization of 
parastatals improves industrial performance by enhancing the role of market forces. It is the belief 
of the Bretton Woods bureaucrats that privatization enhances economic freedom, increases 
efficiency, eases the problem of public sector pay and reduces public sector borrowing. Advocates 
of privatisation believe that it is a tool to help government to cut costs because government will 
now not be directly involved in the running of the firm. Most of the public sector in Zimbabwe has 
been privatized or commercialized for example City Council Department of Rufaro Marketing, the 
DMB and in Zambia the bandwagon of privatization and seemingly is focusing on mining sector. 
The idea of privatization was first mounted by the Chicago school of thought under Milton 
Friedman. The Adam Smith Institute an economic think tank closely associated with the British 
Conservative Party adopted the theory, which subsequently influenced Mrs. M. Thatcher, the leader 
of the Conservative Party. It should be noted that privatization featured prominently in Elliot 
Berg's 1981 report which was the West's response to the 1980 OAD summit. Apparently the main 
objective of privatization is to alter the industrial aspect from a service and non-profit oriented 
situation towards a profit maximization direction! In theory, this will promote economic growth. It 
is argued that the management and employees of privatized industries will have a greater incentive 
to work more efficiently as their wages will be on the basis of performance. Privatization places 
emphasis on the employee's performance and rewards, in other words lays emphasis on a direct 
relationship between an employee's salary and his productivity. When examining the notion of 
selling off public sector assets; it can be deduced that it is wholly fraught of problems. The most 
important question to ask is to whom are the public assets to be sold? 
It is argued that in' the poorest countries indigenous capital accumulation may be lacking and 
resources and infrastructure so inadequate that outside interest is minimal. .. Privatization inevitably 
raises the fear of concentration of ownership. External investment may be undesirable but it may 
also lead to the transfer of control and profits outside the country yet limitation and regulation of 
these are precisely what the evangelists of privatization claim discourage interest. This is certainly 
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Another consequence of privatization is unemployment with its attendant social ills. In Africa 
today, where unemployment and poverty are already at alarmingly high levels, privatization which 
leads to retrenchment of workers is no solution at all. Although privatization can Improve 
efficiency it does that at the expense of the people socially, politically and economically. 
In Zambia and Zimbabwe, privatization faces serious challenges smce there is a lack of 
entrepreneurs and capital to run the newly privatized firms or industries. What ends up happening 
is that most senior government officials indirectly purchase shares through relatives or friends 
especially in most developing countries. 
One of the detrimental effects of privatization is the issue of staff discharge, alteration of wage 
payments at anytime and owners of the means of production can choose to discontinue certain 
sections of the industry, yet that has a sharp impact on the employees. In both the public and the 
private sector privatization victimizes the employees. It should be borne in mind that privatization 
works well in developed economies but in under developed economies, the political and economic 
milieu which obtains in these third world countries is not conducive for privatization to take place. 
The nature and character of any privatization programme in the Third World is different from that 
of the developed world. In the Third World privatization programs are very difficult and they 
culminate in suffering of people. 
1.6.3. Governance and Human Rights 
It must be noted that the issue of good governance and its linkage to development aid became part 
of the World Bank's list of conditionalities following the political revolutions that swept across the 
continent of Africa in mid - 1989. Together with the human rights issue the basis of the good 
governance test as a linkage policy must be explained against the background of the demise of 
super-power rivalry in the Third World especially Africa and Latin America where human rights are 
extremely bad. 
In these countries political opponents face mysterious disappearances, opposition politics is stifled 
most of these countries are either dejacto one party states or de jure one party states, but it was not 
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until recently that the wave of democracy has swept across the region, that the leaders are now 
unwillingly forced to accept realities of life. In the past the World BanklIMF, did not worry about 
good governance issues and human rights, they simply supported economic development in these 
countries. Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, abused human rights, grossly and had a poor 
governance record. 
In Zambia during the First Republic under Dr. K Kaunda, the ruling UNIP party was nothing other 
than tantamount to a defensive and abusive political dinosaur, which jealously guarded its 
monopoly of power for 30 years at the expense of human rights and governance. In Zimbabwe for 
the past 18 years the government has been in power observation of human rights and good . 
governance have been a dream not a reality. Strikes by students, strikes by public service workers 
and the private sector employees, owing to ever-souring economic conditions precipitated as a 
culmination of endeavours to improve the economy, all these facets, together with government 
killings, beatings and arrests of strikers reflect, "in toto" a bad human right record. 
Tony Hawkins observed that it is a sign of the times that the Banks courageously call for improved 
governance attracted so many adherents so quickly. Scarcely was the ink dry on the Bank's 1989 
Report when Western donors who in the past had preferred discreet silence on so sensitive an issue, 
began to suggest that in future financial aid might be withheld from countries that failed to meet the 
good governance criteria. 
In the light of the above it should be noted that good governance as a political conditionality for 
economic aid arose out of sheer expediency. However, there are a lot of debates over the role of 
democracy in development, in current development debates. The most important question to ask is 
whether multi-party democracy is, per se, a panacea for development? 
1.6.4. Arms Purchase 
In April 1991, the outgoing World Bank President Barber Conable proposed a formal linkage 
between military spending and aid to the Third World. Another former World Bank President 








solution to the west represented by excessive military spending in poor countries, which include 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. Enormous arms spending had severe impacts on the economy that is why 
the two erstwhile Presidents of the WB alluded to this concept. It is believed that whilst it is time 
that arms spending is a drain on Third World finances, the irony is that such arms are provided to 
African governments by rich nations of both the West and East. These violations of human rights 
are a product of militarism in developing countries, supported either directly or indirectly by the 
west. 
Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard Institute of International Development, on the World Economic Summit 
(Southern African Economic Summit held in Windhoek 16 May 1998), alluded, that the IMFIWorid 
Bank conditionalities should be reduced. Most heads of States from SADC region made pleas for 
their debts to be cancelled off (Business Report Tuesday May 1911998). The leaders seemed to 
have been saying that democratization and economic development were undermined by serving and 
repayment of national debt (Cape Times Business Report 19 May 1998). However, the IMF 
Managing Director Michael Camdessus believed that, the dangers of worse debts serving burdens 
on African States could be replaced by these countries continuing to cut unproductive spending, 
promoting domestic savings through budgetary mechanism and continuing to ameliorate the 
efficiency of their wealthy. 
1.7. Economic Structural Adjustment Package for Zimbabwe 
The World Bank I IMF complied a menu which was thought to be a viable solution to cure the 
economic putrescence which Zimbabwe was facing. The Zimbabwean government was to welcome 
that with an hands. Just like recently Zimbabwean government was to get IMF aid to help stabilize 
the currency, in the words of R.B.Z. governor, L Tsumba "the release of more donor aid could go a 
long way in further ensuring the stability of the foreign exchange market and helping minimise 
speculative purchases of the local currency, currently trading in the $18 to $18,50 range against the 
United States dollar, against which it fell by more than 75% last November." (Financial Gazette, 
. July 2, 1998). In the same breath the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe said "the stability of the local 
currency which came under severe pressure in April and May this year largely due to poor tabacco 
sales, was expected to be strengthened further now that the IMF had agreed to disburse a stand by 
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credit of US $175 million to be released in tranches between now and March 1999" (Financial 
Gazette July 2/1998). This point serves to illustrate that IMF packages are always given to cash-
strapped economies like the Zimbabwean one surprisingly yet painfully, the Zimbabwean 
government plans to go ahead with the Land Acquisition plans which have been estimated to cost 
the government Z$35b (Financial Gazette 1998). This is not the point, the point is Zimbabwe relies 
on IMFIWB packages. Was the "ESAP" package helpful or detrimental to the society? The 
starting point is to understand what ESAP is. 
According to Kadenge "the package consists of measures to alleviate the problems which the 
economy was facing. The components of the reform include budget deficit reduction through 
reforming and reducing expenditure on items causing the deficit price and wage decontrol, trade 
liberalization and investment promotion" (Kadenge ] 992:] 0) 
According to Kadenge "in order to release more funds for productive investment, the government 
intends to reduce the budget deficit progressively from its 1990 level of] 0% to 5% by 1995. This 
is aimed at achieving a sustainable rate of economic growth of 5%" (Kadenge ] 992:] 0). 
The economy of Zimbabwe has a big parastatal base. Because there was need to guard the petrol 
and oil/gas pipelines on the Beira Corridor, the government of Zimbabwe incurred a lot of military 
spending in Mozambique. Such Zimbabwean involvement drained a lot of life as military men were 
being killed on a large scale, government finances were also being used in that direction. Thus 
government was supposed to cut its military spending, reduce its spending on Health, Education 
and parastatals. Currently the DRC military adventures are also very costly to the country (Mail 
and Guardian, October] 998). Economic Structural adjustment sounded like a good plan because it 
aimed at increasing investment in material production sectors such as agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing together with supporting infrastructure in transport power and communication. In 
the same vain the various components of the government budget are to be restructured and it was 
the intention of government to obliterate subsidies by the end of the 1994 - 1995 financial year 
except for exceptional cases where subsidies would be directed to specific groups. 
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The size of the government was to be cut down into a small efficient and effective bureaucracy. 
The reform package gives thus in order to facilitate effective measures, the government intends to 
clear the subsidies backlog, within the two year period commencing with the 1990/1991 fiscal year 
so that losses can be considered on current year basis and not the cumulative losses which the 
economy has (Budget Statement 1990: 8). 
The government of Zimbabwe also planned to implement commercialization. Commercialization of 
the, nOI?--commercial government sector, was seen to be a strong push to enhance the ailing. 
economy. Commercialization and privatization were seen as important tools to revitalize the 
economy which was ailing. State owned enterprises were operating on social/welfare basis, in line 
with the socialist, ideology which the government of Zimbabwe at independence professed. 
However, the change from pursuing socialist policies to free-market policies, was seen in the light 
of enhancing governmental efficiency and economic productivity. Thus the state owned enterprises 
were to be operated on the basis of profit rather than social consideration. Fees for both primary 
and secondary schools were re-introduced and Health Facilities were also paid for. 
The government intended to streamline the large bureaucracy. This started on a phased basis in 
1990/91 by the freezing of non-essential posts as soon as they fell vacant, the rationalization of non-
essential services or areas of duplication and the removal of over staffing. 
It was also the intention of government to keep foreign borrowing down so as to reduce the 
inflation rate because it is the large fiscal shortfalls which has been fuelling money supply growth 
and to some extend inflation. The reform package also emphasized that for basic consumption 
items such as bread, maize-meal, beef, matches, cooking oil and fats, the price control system 
would still remain. 
Since the IMFIWB emphasized free-market economics, in which wage will depend on competitive 
market through collective bargaining between all parties concerned. Few exceptions were 
guaranteed by government, these were the domestic and farm employees, because they did not have 
any form of organizations that would represent them on collective-bargaining tables. 
27 
'""'""vv'" r  
Xlcena
1-'" ... .1." ....... HUU1'-"U",,, rrun Cl l:l l l 
to 
... "'IJ .... !,' ... CU [I lllU\I'
The economic structural adjustment programme embraced trade liberalization, which, per se, has 
two stages; 
1) The first is the managed transition from import controls to a tariff-based system which 
involves the progressive placements of imports under OGIL aimed at modernizing 
productive capacity, preparing producers for external competition by gearing them for the 
export market. 
2) This will be followed by placing of emphasis on further development and strengthening of 
an outward-looking export-based economy (Kadenge 1992: 12). 
The structural adjustment programme also believed in foreign investment promotion. In order to 
achieve the target of 5% annual growth, investment rate has to increase to at least 20% of GDP 
from its 1990 level, or 14,3% in nominal terms. 
This package was also tied with some conditionalities from the IMFIWB. Recently on the Southern 
African Economic Summit May 1998, in Windhoek, the 117 conditionalities were castigated as 
many. The International Labour Office saw the year 1990 as a time in which there was "a 
deterioration in the macro-economic situation, with higher inflation, a higher current account deficit 
and a stable fiscal deficit" (ILO, 1990). 
According to ILO "the first year of the reform package thus witnessed a sizeable destabilization of 
the economy owing to elements of the package such as devaluation, reduced price control and 
liberalization of imports, which resulted in higher inflation, a larger current account deficit, and 
increased nominal interests rates" (ILO, 1993:3). The reform package, was a complete economic 
weapon according to the IMFIWB, what essentially strikes a reader of structural adjustment 
programmes performances in SADC, is their impact, as shall be seen in this study. 
1.8. Background: 
The 1980's were an epoch of large-scale economic crisis and calamity, to most SADC countries. 
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just starting to become a free country. Zimbabwe at independence III 1980 had roughly a 
population of 8 million, which now might be 10,5 million. Its economy since independence, has 
been characterized by fluctuating rates of annual growth, ranging, between 10,7% and -4.2% and 
high levels of unemployment (Durevall: 1991). According to Dany Tevera "at the time of 
independence, the socialist inclined Zanu PF government inherited a typical underdeveloped 
economy characterized by racial inequalities with about 4% of the population earning 60% of the 
national income in 1979. (Cliffe Munslow 1981: Davies and Sanders; Riddell 1984) (Wim van 
Spengen, Chris Dixon and Anders Norman 1995:80). 
However, the problems which Zimbabwe were and is having are a result of the colonial past. f 
Zimbabwe was ruled by the B.S.A.C. (British South African Company) then it became a Crown 
Colony under the Queen of Britain, later it became self-governing under the colonial settlers lead by 
Ian Douglas Smith from 1965 - 1980 until independence. During this 1965 to 1980 era the 
economy was isolated from the international scene completely. Smith and his UDI, became striking 
features in the political economic history of Southern Africa. During the reign of Ian Smith, the 
economy was largely isolated from the whole world as a result of sanctions imposed on the settler 
regime, which failed to get international recognition. Given the above it can be noted that the 
economy was already facing a plethora of insurmountable problems domestically and externally. : 
I 
Interestingly and however, the only regime which helped Smith that time was Malan's South Africa \ 
which considered Rhodesia as a 9th province of South Africa. During the colonial epoch, the 
economic cake was distributed amongst the few in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), land, education, : 
health facilities, let alone housing. A few minority colonialists benefited from the system that is ~hy ; 
. there was a blood civil war, which lasted almost 20 years. 
Just like most socialists - sponsored liberators, the government of Zimbabwe, adopted socialism aJ 
independence. By adopting this stance, Zimbabwe was at odds with the international financi~ 
institutions, to which it was a member. / 
However, there was a tension against the Zimbabwean policy. Socialist planning approach to 
economic planning was adopted. This national development plans were launched. "The Three 







growth targets of 8% and 5, I % during their respective plan periods, but both have ran their course 
without achieving these targets; at least two main factors beyond the government's control have 




I distortions inherited from the previous regime and of dealing with the most glaring problems of I 
underdevelopment according to D Tevera (Van Spengen et al 1995: 80). ! 
It should be noted that the targets appeared to have been based on the unrealistically high economic 
growth rates achieved soon after independence and in 1981 due to demand-led growth-persistent 
droughts since 1982 and the international recession of the mid-1980's have been blamed for low 
rate of economic and employment growth and have constrained the government's efforts to 
promote development" (Van Spengen 1995:80). By 1985, the government had incurred huge debts 
to the tune of 32.2% of the GNP according to the Ministry of Finance 1987. (Ministry of Finance 
1987, Government of Zimbabwe 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986). 
As early as 1983 to 1990, the Zimbabwean government was already using IMF - inspired i 
stabilization programme, the main goal of which was to manage aggregate demand in order to / 
reduce domestic absorption. During the 1983, 1984 era, the country had already been struck by a I 
I 
I 
serious series of annual drought, commencing 1982. In line with its welfarist principles the; 
government was giving out some drought relief aid together with some non-govemment\ 
organization and UN agencies. 
According to Kadenge before 1960' s foreign capital penetration led to the then Rhodesia to 
become a hive of settler interest and international capital and the accumulation of wealth by settlers 
was based on the creation of a colonial, a poor traditional black community largely dependent on 
agriculture existing in juxtaposition with an affluent white sector (Kadenge 1992). It is essential to 
notice that when Smith government was isolated politically and economically, it was faced with 
reduced foreign exchange among its sectors and to compensate for the drawbacks of the autocratic! 
situation in which the economy was shaped and determined by sanctions, the government embarked j 
on an import - substitution, industrialization strategy so as to be self reliant and to be able to 
sustain itself both politically and financially. 
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Given the forgoing, it was very essential that the economy be structurally adjusted. However, "the 
growing body ofliterature on SAPs in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World shows that not only 
do the economic benefits not always materialize, but that there are major social costs involved with 
notable impacts throughout the space economy (Conia et ai, 1987, Hodd 1987, fLO 1993, I 
Onimode 1989, Stewart, 1991 Riddel, 1992, Robinson 1992). 
According to Tevera "Onimode (1989) makes several critical observations, among which are that 
SAPs have hindered African development by linking the local economics more firmly with the 
capitalist system thus inhibiting local industrialization and perpetuating traditional trade patterns, 
whereby these countries have provided markets for manufactured goods produced in the North and 
sources of raw materials - in addition while sAPs have a generally negative effect on national 
economies, they particularly hurt the import - based segments of the economy compared with those 
segments which are less dependent on foreign inputs" (Van Spengen et al 1995:79). 
Given the economic problems which Zimbabwe was facing, the whole essence of introducing 
E.S.A.P was primarily to "re-start the process of economic growth by liberalizing the economy, 
reducing the fiscal deficit, cutting down all expenditures and reshaping the role of government and 
encouragmg domestic and foreign investment" (Chisvo and Munro 1993). It should be 
remembered that most Mrican countries are currently implementing structural adjustment 
programmes, (SAPs) under World Bank and IMF tutelage, aimed primarily at their economies. The 
major objective of these programmes is to rekindle economic growth by increasing the mobility of 
production factors (including labour and raw materials) and by decreasing economic discrepancies 
(Muuka: SAPEM vol. No. 8 MaylJune 1997). What is however, surprising is that all African 
countries are implementing the same SAP documents and the results are almost the same. 
Economic structural adjustment programme was launched in Zimbabwe under the pretext of it 
being "home grown". How could it be home grown when IMFIWorid Bank masterminded the 
whole plan and attached irresistible, hard savings (conditionalities) on it. At this time most policy 
analysts and economists wandered why Zimbabwe had to adopt these measures because the 
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economy was not that bad. Some scholars argue that the time was not yet ripe for IMFIWB 
medicine. Zimbabwe was still alright! 
It was too early, for Durevall, the move was not at all surprising because, despite the tremendous 
progress in the provision of social services (e.g. post-independence primary school enrolment and 
basic health indicators, which were good), per capita income remained low and the potential for 
raising the income made the vulnerable groups remained small. He argues, also that in fact, several 
factors made Zimbabwe an ideal country for implementing an adjustment programme with a 
reasonable chance of success, as compared to other countries in the region. It should be realised 
that the objectives of the Zimbabwean SAP include the expansion of goods for trade, the removal 
of balance of payments constraints and the restoration of a sustainable balance between aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply of goods just like what had happened earlier in Zambia. 
Finally in a policy document entitled ZIMBABWE: A FRAl\1EWORK FOR ECONOMIC 
REFORM (1991 - 1995) the government declared its commitment to a programme of economic 
policy reform aimed at sustaining higher medium and long-term growth and at reducing poverty: -
the document states that the objectives of the programme is the improvement of living conditions, 
especially, of the poorest groups. 
The most important question to ask is whether, the programme has achieved this or it has worsened 
the sIal us quo, by precipitating a plethora of untold, insurmountable problems on the part of the 
citizenry. Structural adjustment proposed that it would increase real incomes and lower 
unemployment by generating sustained high economic growth by transforming the economy to 
make it more competitive and productive involving moving from a highly regulated economy to one 
where market forces playa dominant and decisive role. 
In the light of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme the government has taken measures 
to first open up the economy by sequential.ly putting goods, which were previously imported under 
a barrage of import restrictions on the Open General Import License Scheme and decreasing import 
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taxes from about 29% in 1991 to 23% by ] 995, the currency was then devalued in order to increase 
the competitiveness of local goods on the international market and to encourage domestic 
production of goods, as imports became more expensive this encourages switching to domestically 
- produced alternatives, this was followed by the relaxation of investment controls and the abolition 
of the foreign exchange allocation system and finally the budget - deficit is being reduced from ] 0% 
of the GDP in 1989 to 5 percent by 1994/5 mainly through reduction of subsidies to parastatal~ 
( 
In a nutshell, the principal challenge for Zimbabwe, is to develop and implement a combination of 
macro-economic and sectoral policies that will lead to growth with equity and the protection of the 
vulnerable groups in society such as the poor, women and children - and the major areas targeted 
for action are employment and training, food subsidies, cost recovery and social services, poverty 
and monitoring. This was the background upon which economic structural adjustment was 
implemented in Zimbabwe. 
Interestingly enough some issues in the Zimbabwean policy debate during adjustment, are also of 
significance when examining Zambia and the rest of the SADC region. However, most scholars 
argue that before the implementation of SAP in Zimbabwe, the economic crisis had not reached the 
Zambian stage - It was worst in Zambia. Ironically, the Southern African Economic Summit held 
in Windhoek in May ] 998, established that Zambia and Mozambique in SADC have substantially 
been improving, albeit, the Chissano speech, in which he highlighted that the people on the ground 
are crying and that only if the people on the ground can be satisfied, that's when he can recognize 
the positive strides which ESAP is taking in the country or the region (SADC). 
In terms of investor confidence "Zimbabwe scored worst in terms of state interference in business, 
directions of government subsidies, public-sector competence, composition of government spending 
and the extent to which tax system enhanced business competitiveness" (Financial Mail March 
13/1998) Comparatively on the financial side Zambia had the lowest rate of gross domestic 
investment at 1].7% of GDP and it scored lowest on Bank soundness. All these facets combine 
together to make a background upon which structural adjustment policies were implemented in the 
SADC region. It is argued that the architects of structural adjustments in the SADC region 
underestimated the likely impacts, which such policies might precipitate. Events in Zimbabwe have 
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demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubts that economic structural adjustments caused severe 
results on the society. Zambia, before Zimbabwe, had implemented, these policies, also fell victims, 




2.2. Research Design 
CHAPTER 2 
This chapter details the research methodology used in this study. It consists of description of 
research design, the population of study, data collection and the research instruments used therein. 
According to Johnson and Joslyn researchers conduct empirical research studies for two primary 
reasons mainly to accumulate knowledge that will apply to a particular problem in need of solution 
or to a conclusion in need of improvement (Johnson and Joslyn 1986:3). For instance this research 
was carried out in the light of trying to find out about how economic structural adjustment 
programmes have impacted on the SADe societies and possibly come out with solutions to the 
problems of the region in terms of development. 
Researchers also conduct empirical research to satisfY their intellectual curiosity about a subject, 
regardless of whether the research will lead to changes in governmental policy or private behavior 
(Johnson and Joslyn 1986:3). It should be noted that "conducting research is not a simple process, 
the information a researcher chooses to use, the method that he or she follows to investigate a 
research question and the statistics used to report research findings may affect the conclusions that 
are drawn" (Johnson and Joslyn 1986: 17). 
In general a research design is a plan that shows how a researcher intends to fulfill the goals of a 
proposed study and it indicates what observation will be made to provide answers to the questions 
posed by the researcher, how the observations will be made, and the analytical and statistical 
procedures to be used on the data collected. 
A research design has been defined as a plan that "guides the investigator in the process of 
collecting analyzing and interpreting observations and it is a logical model of proof that allows the 
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researcher to draw inferences concerning casual rclations among the variables under investigation" 
(Johnson and Joslyn 1986: 111). 
However, it should be noted that developing the research design is just as important as developing 
research questions, hypotheses, and methods of measurement and it is also worth noting that a poor 
research design may produce insignificant and erroneous conclusions, no matter how original and 
brilliant the hypothesis is (Johnson and Joslyn 1986: 111). In this study, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
have been carefully researched. Thesc arc thc two case studies the research has specifically 
centered on. 
2.3. Case Study Design: 
The case study approach is one of the non-experimental research designs. However, in a case study 
the researcher examines one or few cases of phenomenon in a considerable detail, typically using a 
number of data collection methods, such as personal interview, document analysis, and observation. 
For many years the case study was considered to be an inferior research strategy, but it is now 
recognized as a "distinctive form of empirical, inquiry" and an important design to use for the 
development and evaluation of public policies as well as for developing explanations for and testing 
theories of political phenomena. 
According to Robert as cited in (Johnson and Joslyn 1986), a case study as an empirical inquiry 
that: 
1) investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when 
2) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which 
3) mUltiple sources of evidence are used and a distinction is made between histories and case 
studies, reserving the term case study for the study of contemporary events (Johnson and 












It is significant to realize that a case-study allows a profound understanding of the causal processes 
as will be seen in the study (Johnson and Joslyn, 1986:147). The two cases of Zimbabwe and 
Zambia are used to explain the negative impact of the IMF/World Bank policy of economic 
structural adjustment in the SADC region. Case study approach is advantageous over experimental 
and cross-sectional designs for testing hypothesis under certain conditions and by choosing a case in 
which the appropriate values of the independent and dependent variables are present, researchers 
can try to determine whether and how the independent variable actually caused the dependent 
variable. 
Most important of all the points is that a case-study dcsign pennits a dccper undcrstanding of causal 
processes, the explication of general explanatory theory and the development of hypothesis 
regarding difficult to observe phenomenon according to (Johnson and Joslyn 1986:147). 
By relying on the two cases of Zimbabwe and Zambia, the researcher aims at producing a detailed 
analysis of the impact of economic structural adjustment programmes on the SADC region. The 
two countries are both in the SADC region and thcy once shared common civilization, under the 
British colonial rule, existed as Central African Republic known as Rhodesia and then separated 
into Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia respectively. The analysis of the two case studies 
has enabled the researcher to have a clear understanding of the input of Economic Structural 
Adjustment programmes in the SADe region. They have reflected the negative input of the 
structural adjustment policies to these countries. 
A case study approach has been made much easier by the availability of a plethora of documents 
available from IMFfWorld Bank and statistical data from other documents from non-government 
and government information services. The two cases given their input on SADC societies reflected 
that structural adjustments have precipitated an array of socio-economic problems to the citizens of 
the "adjusters". 
2.4. Research Apparatus 
2.4.1. Document Study: 
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This study relies paramountly on document study. It uses document analysis as the main research 
instrument in this study. Document study relies on written records and there are of different types, 
in that some written records are ongoing and cover an extensive period of time and others are more 
episodic, some are produced by public organization at tax payers expense others are produced by 
business concerns or by private citizens, some are carefully preserved and indexed and other 
records are written and forgotten. 
It should be noted that "the running record of organizations has become a rich source of political 
data as a result of the record-keeping activities of governments at all levels and of interest groups 
and research institutes concerned with public affairs" (Johnson and Joslyn 1986:255). 
Documents from University of Cape town African Studies Library were intensively used and relied 
on for both case studies in Zimbabwe and Zambia. The following documents were inter alia used: 
1. World BankJIMF Documents 
(a) yearly development journals 
(b) Annual Reports on E.S.AP. perfonnance in Africa (ESAP 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997). 
(c) Speeches from World Bank representatives in Zambia and Zimbabwe (WB, 1990, 
1995, 1997). 
(d) ADB (African Development Bank Statistical journals) (ADB, 1996). 
1. Non-World Bank - IMF Documents 
(a) ZCTU publications (Financial Gazette 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998) 
(b) C.S.O. data (Zimbabwe and Zambia) (CSO 1990, 1994, 1995) 
(c) U.Z. Economic Schooljoumals 
( d) lJNZA jo urnals (University 0 f Zambia) 
(e) P.S.C. papers (both countries) (PSC 1989,1990, 1995) 
(f) Government Gazettes (Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
1. Business/Economic Magazines 
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Standard Chartered Bank Papers (Zambia and zimbabwe) 
E. S.AP and ZIMPREST POLICY papers 
This study also relied on books, which have been published on the subject by scholars from both 
Zambia and Zimbabwe and the SADC region at large. 
It is significant to realize that this study since it is an analysis of the impact of a policy on the 
societies in SADC (Zimbabwe and Zambia), relies on the documents published on the subject. In 
the initial stages of this study at the Honours level some interviews were conducted and the results 
are well documented. But it is significant to notice that this study relies heavily on the use of 
documents available from different information centres. The IMFIWB has materials, which are 
published quarterly, semi-annually and annually. This method has made this study a success. 
2.4.2. Limitations 
The debate on Economic Structural adjustment programme is an ongoing debate which current 
information comes out everyday so the researcher has tried to encapsulate as much current data as 
possible, to make the study more current. 
Politics in the de facto one party state of Zimbabwe is undemocratic, sensitive data is curtailed so 
much so that what is reflected by the press to a larger extent is not information biased against the 
government. Transparency, is still a problem in Zimbabwe and some government departments like 
the Central Statistics Office did not welcome giving out information freely. It is significant to note 
that this study is a discussion on the impact of a policy on the lives of the people,· thus, discussions 
embodied in this study are policy-related. There has been red tape in obtaining some data from 
both Zambian government and Zimbabwean government departments. Information was either 
delayed or not supplied or classified as sensitive hence not therefore accessible. 
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In the same breadth it should be noted that albeit aU these obstacles the success of this thesis largely 
depended on independent paper magazines and current publications and IMFIWB documents, 
which were found in the African studies library of the University of Cape Town, the University of 
Zambia and the University of Zimbabwe. 
With the unpopularity, which has resulted from the ambitions, unnecessary DRC military 
adventures the government of Zimbabwe tries to refuse accessibility to what might be inciting data. 
The same thing for Zambia, the privatization programs are very unpopular, and the government is 
now unpopular, so it behaves just like the de facto government of Zimbabwe, thus limiting 
accessibility to information. Since, government information was not the only avenue of 
information, other sources which were used proved successful. 
2.5. Analysis of data and research findings 
The primary goal of this section is to inter alia present the data collected and analyze it in the light 
of the impact of Economic Structural adjustment programmes on the SADC region with specific 
focus on Zimbabwe and Zambia. The citizens in these two countries were affected in terms of their 
social life, education, health, employment and food nutrition. A lot of statistical data has been 
found and presented and even the information concerning the economic 'status quo' in the 
countries before and after the implementation of Economic Structural adjustment programme from 
the World Bank:/ThllF. 
Document study reflected that real wages of the workers in the bracket of the lowest paid fell 
drastically, from 1982 to 1992. This is attributed in part to the implementation of Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programmes which in the two countries resulted in inflation and the 
















impact on the standard 
delcent education 
lowest paid workers in 1982-1992 
(1980 = 100 
1982 1990 1991 1992 
199.7 181.4 138.4 
194.3 156.1 .1 
139.4 121 1 .2 
128.8 100.8 71.5 






data supplied by the .LYi.HlloJU 
it indicates clearly that real wages fell sharply so that had a 
people. People from these industries could no longer 
normal die, health facilities and rents and rates nav'ments. 
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3. Industries affected by ESAP 
20 
14 
In these selected industries in the SADC it was 
wage declined steeply as a result of 
industries suffered seriously in tenns of their ""r>" .... ,..'''''',.£' status. 
According to Kadenge, «a snap shot survey was 
and Harare, to access social awareness 




Wage earners at a mine 
Rural elite (teachers, health workers 
Rural business person 
low income urban households 
(Kadenge) 1992 
to the data collected from Kadenge, 78 were and 
Zhombe 
while were single. The following tables give an analysis 
L\;;<Ul(+l' __ ) and 80 were married, 
uu",.u""" tables (Tables 4, 6, 7, 8). 
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Table 4. Rural Elite 
Awareness Attitude 
+VE -VE +VE -VE 
1. Removal of Price Control 80% 10% 0% 100% 
2. Removal of Subsidies 80% 10% 10% 40% 
3. Reduction of Duty 80% 10% 90% 10% 
4. Forex Allocation and Devaluation ofZ$ 80% 10% 80%' 10% 
5. Introduction of School Fees 80% 10% 60% 10% 
6. Introduction of Hospital Fees 80% 10% 30% 50% 
7. Firing Procedures 80% 10% 30% 50% 
8. Mining Wages (Removal) 80% 10% 30% 50% 
9. Reduction of Civil Servants 80% 10% 40% 50% 
10. Parastatals 80% 10% 70% 20% 
(Kadenge) 1992 
Table 5. Low Income Urban Community 
Awareness Attitude 
+VE -VE +VE -VE 
1. Removal of Price Control 71.4% 29% 9.5% 85.1% 
2. Removal of Subsidies 52.3% 47.7% 9.5% 42.1% 
3. Reduction of Duty 42.9% 52.3% 47.6% 33.3% 
4. Forex Allocation and Devaluation of Z$ 42.9% 52.3% 23.8% 52.4% 
5. Introduction of School Fees 71.4% 23.8% 33.3% 52.4% 
6. Introduction of Hospital Fees 66.6% 29% 19% 76% 
7. Firing Procedures 52.3% 42.9% 33.3% 57.1% 
8. Mining Wages (Removal) 52.3% 42.9% 52.4% 28.6% 
9. Reduction of Civil Servants 71.4% 23.8% 52.4% 28.6% 
10. Parastatals 47.7% 47.7% 52.4% 23.8% 
(Kadenge) 1992 
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Table 6. Mining Community 
Awareness Attitude 
+VE -VE +VE -VE 
1. Removal of Price Control 80% 10% 0% 90% 
2. Removal of Subsidies 0% 30% 10% 10% 
3. Reduction of Duty 0% 90% 80% 0% 
4. Forex Allocation and Devaluation of Z$ 0% 90% 0% 80% 
5. Introduction of School Fees 10% 80% 30% 70% 
6. Introduction of Hospital Fees 10% 80% 20% 80% 
7. Firing Procedures 52.3% 90% 10% 90% 
8. Mining Wages (Removal) 0% 90% 0% 90% 
9. Reduction of Civil Servants 10% 80% 30% 60% 
10. Parastatals 0% 90% 60% 20% 
(Kadenge) 1992 
Table 7. Rural Business People 
Awareness Attitude 
+VE -VE +VE -VE 
l. Removal of Price Control 57.1% 42.0% 57.1% 14.2% 
2. Removal of Subsidies 28.6% 71.4% 28.6% 0% 
3. Reduction of Duty 14.3% 85.7% 42.9% 42.9% 
4. Forex Allocation and Devaluation ofZ$ 14.3% 85.7% 0% 100% 
5. Introduction of School Fees 51.9% 42.9% 14.3% 85.7% 
6. Introduction of Hospital Fees 28.6% 71.4% 28.6% 71.4% 
7. Firing Procedures 52.3% 90% 10% 90% 
8. Mining Wages (Removal) 28.6% 71.4% 28.6% 71.4% 
9. Reduction of Civil Servants 28.6% 71.4% 42.9% 51.1% 
10. Parastatals 43.3% 85.7% 28.6% 28.6% 
(Kadenge) 1992 
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Table 8. Peasant Community 
Awareness Attitude 
+VE -VE +VE -VE 
1. Removal of Price Control 10% 80% 0% 100% 
2. Removal of Subsidies 10% 80% 0% 100% 
3. Reduction of Duty 10% 80% 60% 10% 
4. Forex Allocation and Devaluation ofZ$ 10% 80% 70% 20% 
5. Introduction of School Fees 10% 80% 20% 79% 
6. Introduction of Hospital Fees 10% 80% 20% 70% 
7. Firing Procedures 10% 80% 30% 70% 
8. Mining Wages (Removal) 10% 80% 60% 30% 
9. Reduction of Civil Servants 30% 60% 0% 80% 
10. Parastatals 10% 80% 20% 50% 
(Kadenge) 1992 
All in all, Kadenge's research reflected a negative attitude towrads ESAP because of the way many 
people suffered. 
At independence there were many white-dominated positions In the public servIce but the 
government after their Prime Minister had established an inquiry, increased the number of blacks 
into the service thereby making it even bigger. Document study has reflected attempts to balance 
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With the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment programme the civil service was 
drastically cut. Almost 92 000 workers faced the axe ofESAP (pSC, 1993), 
Size of Service 
Target for Abolition 
Period: July - 1993 - June 1994 
Balance carried forward 1992/93 
Total target for abolishing 1993/4 





As shown by the forgoing table the period July 1993 June 1994, 1,846 posts were eliminated while 
only 274 posts were created by June 1994 the public service had been reduced to 171,562, The 
diagram below shows how many posts were abolished and the ultimate effect on the civil servants, 
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POST ABOLISHED Cumulative Balance to 
MONTH Total Total be abolished Posts Size of 
Abolished abolished 1994/4 Created Service 
Voluntary Obligatory Other 
Retirement education abolition 
BALANCE 173,408 
JULy 8 8 8 11,860 16 173,416 
AUGUST 112 112 120 11,852 98 173,402 
SEPTEMBER 1,064 1,064 1,184 11,740 53 173,4391 
OCTOBER 24 24 1,208 10,676 66 173,433 
NOVEMBER 10 10 1,218 10,642 41 173,464 
DECEMBER 857 902 2,120 9,740 0 173562 






TOTAL 35 10 2,075 2,120 1,184 9,740 274 
.. 














Table 10. .Countries Ranked by Overall 
Macroeconomic Policy Stance, 1990-91 
An analysis of documents has found out that 
Zimbabwe viewed in terms of overall macro-
economic policy is a poor country and Zambia is 
a very poor country. Therefore, they need to 
improve their policies so that that will go a long 
way into ameliorating the lives of the people in 
both countries. An analysis of WB IIMF papers 
has reflected a drop in the employment sector, 
drop in intake of female students in secondary 
school, deterioration of health standards, ever-
skyrocketing food prices, rated, tax and their 
constant impact on socio-economic development 
in both Zambia and Zimbabwe (World Bank, 
1994). The rural elite; urban community, mining 
sector and rural business people and peasant 
community registered different levels of 
awareness on ESAP. The World Bank I IMF 
also reflected that these different categories were 
affected by structural adjustment policies 
differently (World Bank I IMF, 1994). 
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It is the conviction of this study that the SADC region 
should· try to explore its potential items of economic 
diversification. 
SADC regIon has a huge tourism base for instance 
Zimbabwe and Zambia all share foreign currency profits 
from Victoria Fall sight from tourists abroad. Apart from 
that they all have a wide wild life base which can be relied 
upon for economic development. As depicted in the 
study, the foregoing options should also be given a fair 
chance by African leaders lest the region will not cope 
with the york of the IMFIWB debt. The study has 
reflected that Zambia's macro-economic performance 
deteriorated sharply after the implementation of the 
structural adjustment policies as shown by in the study 
(see Appendices Table 68). For the people in low-income 
group, pnces of consumer products increased 
exhobitantly, even for the high-income group (Table 69). 
Statistics has shown that external debt for Zambia has increased since 1985 as shown by Table 
71 (Appendices). The study has also found out that external debt for SADC and inflation has 
generally arisen, with Zambia and Zimbabwe (Appendices: Tables 72 and 73). Analysis of 
documents has shown that there are various policy options which Zambia and Zimbabwe can give a 
chance, to further socio-economic development and redress the socio-economic malaise prevalent 
in the SADC region. With the SADC increasing its regional trade organization, inter-regional trade 
should be given a fair chance (Appendices Table 80). 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most researches are normally undertaken within a guiding theoretical paradigm according to Burrel 
and Morgan (1982). According to Allast M. Mwanza, the World Bank model for structural 
adjustment for Africa was articulated in the 1981 Report (World Bank 1981). In this report, the 
World Bank acknowledged the contribution of structural and exogenous factors for the worsening 
crisis, but argued that the economic crisis was caused and aggravated by government policies that 
stood in the way of efficient markets. The result was that economic distortions were precipitated 
which, in turn, perpetuated and exacerbated the crisis (Mwanza 1992:3). 
Furthermore, government intervention in the economy was such that it further exacerbated the 
vulnerability of the economy to exogenous pressures and influences. It is within this context that 
the World Bank further argued that there was urgent need to eradicate government-perpetrated 
economic distortions such as over-valued exchange rates, price controls and inefficient government 
intervention through implementation of SAPS, in countries that were affected by economic 
hardships. 
The main objective of IMFlWorld Bank SAPS is to stabilize the economy through adjustment of 
domestic demand to the reduced level of external resources. Weissman argue that in order to 
induce long-term growth, most SAPS normally include changes in relative prices which, it is hoped, 
will introduce or strengthen economic flexibility and efficiency, this leading to better alleviation of 
resources (Weissman 1990). It should not be forgotten that "structural adjustment in Africa is 
based on Anglo-Saxon macro-economics" (B.Z.S. Newsletter 1994). 
The most popular paradigm in the field of development economics was the interventionist approach 
in the 1950's and 1960's. The approach was based on the assumption that the state intervention in 
the economy would be viable panacea to natural economic problems, for instance, market failure. 
In this line of thinking a socialist paradigm to economic management was adopted by most third 
world countries which include SADC countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
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The results of the interventionist paradigm to development in third World which include SADC , 
were not satisfactory owing to the fact that most targets and aims of the development economic 
policy planner were not accomplished. However, there was a dramatic shift in development 
economics in favour of the neo-classical, market-oriented approach. This paradigm professes a 
functionalist view, which generated the mainstream paradigm to development and structural 
adjustment. This view recommends the retrenchments privatization trade liberalization or in " , 
short, free-market economic environment. This strategy also advocates limited state intervention in 
the economy (World Bank 1994). 
Mwanza argues that the aim of adjustment is to reduce the vulnerability of the given economy to 
future shocks by increasing flexibility and adaptability through the interplay of market forces 
(Streeten 1987). 
It should be noted that SAPs have an ideological side. Nearly all SAPS are focussed on reducing 
state participation in the economy and thus allow market forces to operate more freely. The 
underlying assumption is that the private sector is more efficient and flexible than the public sector 
and should therefore lead to the process of economic restructuring. In that aspect, SAPS are 
essentially "privatization" programmes in practice. Interestingly enough, the belief in the efficiency 
of the private sector is so great that the privatization and liberalization of the economy is carried 
out even when and where the necessary conditions for the efficient operation of market forces do 
not exist. It is significant to note that economic structural adjustment programmes are generally 
meant to stimulate economic growth. Noticeably the economy collapses, during the early stage of 
the programmes. It is argued that the liberalization of prices initially worsens the inflationary spiral 
and results in a repressive shift in income distribution and limitation of real public expenditure 
(Balasa 1984, 1987; Corbett, 1981; S. Khan and M.P. Knight 1981, 1982). SAPs in practice are an 
imposition by donors, especially IMFIWorld Bank, on most governments. In the case of "home-
grown" variants, local expertise may be used. For instance, Zambia designed the New Economic 
Recovery Programme O'ffiRP) in May 1987. In the case of Zimbabwe a debate was once 
sometimes as to whether SAPS was locally designed (Chimanikire 1991:23) or not - the 
IMFIWorld Bank refused to accept or support the home-grown programmes in Zambia or 
Tanzania. 
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Structural adjustment has caused a lot of problems in the SADe region, despite some theoretical 
arguments, which might be put in support of any position. It is believed that the theories and 
arguments, such as increased efficiency, greater demand-oriented production, increased 
competition, reduced inflation rates, savings in government expenditure, increases in government 
revenue, export promotion and encouragement of foreign investment are mostly invalid when 
viewed in the context of the African countries, due to the structural constraints on the application 
of market principles. In fact, for these adjustment measures which remain applicable, the 
detrimental economic consequences leading to social and political turmoil render any benefits 
observed worthless according to most scholars. 
Given the above, it can be deduced that structural adjustment programmes are causing social stress, 
disruption and political risk. Reductions in per capita consumption and imports have had social 
costs in health education, nutrition and employment. Its insufficient attention to the human and 
social costs of SAPS is the World Bank's undoing. Zimbabwean case study, alongside Zambia, aU 
former Rhodesias, will serve to prove the point. 
In SADe region structural adjustment, programmes have precipitated a novel phenomenon of the 
informal sector. The informal sector paradigm has been so silent during the pre ESAP epoch but 
became more pronounced after and during the implementation of World Bank/ThIIF policies. Thus, 
an understanding of theories in that field are essential. According to Peter Gibbon, "following the 
discovery of the informal sector in the early 1970's and the polarization of debate on it around the 
dualistic ILO approach (modernity versus (informality) on the one hand and the "petty commodity 
production" approach on the other, view trends emerged in discussion of the phenomenon from the 
mid-80's onward" (Gibbon 1994:23). As recorded by Peter Gibbon, Rakowski (1994), besides the 
persisting ILO approach, the international literature is today dominated by three others, namely -
''Underground economy" school represented most clearly be the work of A. Portes. According to 
Portes, approaches such as II.,O's, neglect the integration of forms of production, production units, 
technologies and workers into local, regional and international economics (Gibbon 1995:23). The 
informal business paradigm, which develops more openly during the ESAP dispensation, borrows 
more from de Soto and Rakowski which they call microenterprise developmental ism. 
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It is widely believed that in Africa, although SAPS are usually designed by donors and aid 
recipients, the local government's role is generally weaker, in fact, IMF, World Bank, type SAPS 
are designed in Washington (USA) and the general practice is to bring in experts to conduct 
research leading to the design of the programme or bring in officials in ministries of organizations 
such as finance, agricultural and central banks. Significantly, economic structural adjustment 
programmes have been developed as an alternative to the development strategies undertaken by the 
international community under the structuralist theory of development of the 1960' s. 
The Washington bureaucrats at World BankJIlV1F project liberalism and they believe in liberalization 
of the economy and less government intervention in the economy as opposed to Marxist economic 
theory. Marxist school offers conflicting assumptions to the mainstream approach. Dependence 
theories propound that the situation of underdeveloped countries, which are trying to develop 
economically, can be ''understood when the decisive role of external factors is considered (Barongo 
1983: 181). 
The social structures of "colonies, ex-colonies or new-colonies are not the results of autonomous 
historic development, but they are determined by Foreign, hegemony and exploitation" (Barongo 
1983: 181), thus according to dependence, ESAP is blamed on foreign capital. In the view of the 
Institute for African Alternatives' report (IF AA), many of the economic principles and theories on 
which the IMFlWorld Bank's policies and programmes are based are clearly erroneous, owing to 
the fact that they are based on a mixture of different and conflicting theories classified, Keynesian, 
monetarist and neo-classical. The hybrid and eclectic theorizing mixes up paradigms and leads to 
policy confusion" (Chakaodza, 1993: 13). 
However, it should be noted that structuralism was the established orthodoxy of development 
theory and policy in the 1960 and 1970's and in the crooked possible terms, structuralisation held 
that in poor countries the economies were structurally different from advanced industrial economies 
and that therefore a distinct and different set of policies from the neo-Keynianism practices in the 
latter was appropriate to bring about development" (C. Van der Hoeven and van der Kraaji 
1994:22). 
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The "opponents of neo-Keynesian in industrialized countries turned to try to undermine 
development economies by tarring it with the neo-Keynesian brush" but this was misconceived 
tactic since the essence of structuralism was to insist no radical separation between the "special 
case" of advanced economic structures (to which development economics applied) (van der Hoeven 
and van der Kraaij 1994:22). 
The foreign theoretical approach guides the implementation of SAP's in the SADC region.' The 
case study of Zimbabwe and Zambia will go a long way to depicting how the World BankIIMF 
involvement in these two countries has impacted on the people of these countries. Significant to 
note is the fact that World BankIIMF believe it can bailout most countries in the region from their 
economic morass. Recently Russia, outside Afiica has been assisted (Business Times 
Octoberl998). 
3.1. Literature Review (Zimbabwe) 
3.1.1. Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and The Role Of The IMFfWorld Bank 
According to Kadenge "the problems which the Zimbabwean economy was facing when it adopted 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were a result of same fundamental structural features 
which date back to the colonial period. Thus the post-colonial government was faced with a 
conflict betWeen the need to redress the inherited social imbalances and the pressure from 
international agencies and the donor community campaigning for more freedom in the economy for 
market forces" (Kadenge 1992: 1). Significantly, ''these macro-economic prescriptions may seem 
straight forward but putting them into practice rarely is" (IMF: 1993). That was the case in 
Zimbabwe. On attainment of independence in 1980, the de facto one party state government of 
Zimbabwe pursued Marxist/Socialist policies, the government of the newly born country adopted a 
more welfarist approach. This was aimed at satisfYing and meeting the promises made during the 
pre-independence epoch. 
The major concern at independence in 1980 was rebuilding of social infrastructure and equity. 
When Zimbabwe got its independence, it was a hard time in Afiica in which the region had 
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commenced adopting structural reform policy programmes. The new government after 
independence inherited an economy which was not only regulated and inward looking (i.e. import-
substituting), but also settler-dominated, semi-industrialized and failed to cater for the needs of the 
Africans - the new government was thus faced with a conflict between the need to redress the 
inherited social imbalances and the pressure from international agencies and the donor community 
that the government should allow market forces more "carte blanche" in the economy. However, 
despite the existing economic status quo, the novel government decidedly did not change much of 
the colonial structures. 
When the new government of Zimbabwe adopted socialism as a guiding social principle, there was 
a lot of detest from the JMFIWorld Bank. It is argued that by the late 1980's, the inherited 
structures from the colonial era were fettering the growth of the economy and collectively these 
basic structures led to a complex set of intertwined problems: foreign exchange shortage: low 
levels of investment, large budget deficits, escalating debt and inflation, high unemployment; an 
industrial base which was not performing efficiently both for domestic and export markets and 
infra structural decay as shown by the government's expenditure decline on, and poor maintenance 
of roads, transport, telecommunications, dams and irrigation schemes". (Kadenge 1993:3). 
Furthermore, as these macro-economic imbalances became more manifest, increasing pressure was 
exerted on the state to go beyond the economic adjustment process commenced in 1982 and also 
liberalize the economy both internally and externally. It is significant to note that the 
implementation of some components of the SAP as from 1983 resulted in a process of abandoning 
hard-line socialist approaches to a more market-oriented one assisted by the changes in Europe. 
Economic structural adjustment programme in Zimbabwe became a bitter pill to swallow, especially 
in the light of the fact that there was a serious coincidence with the drought in the country. People 
felt the effects more painfully because the 'conditions were aggravated by the climatic situation 
during that epoch. 
Economic structural adjustment impact is going to be assessed in the light of access to jobs, 
medical/health care, education, food and nutrition. However, since the inception of the SAP "the 
economy has shown signs of a deepening crisis characterized by higher inflation intensification. De-
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industrialization, increased unemployment, stagnant salaries and inability by the citizens to meet 
basic needs (van Spengen et aI1995:82). 
The discussion of ESAP in Zimbabwe need not task place in vacuo but needs to be put into 
perspective. According to Peter Gibbon, there are 4 main phases that can be identified as far as 
economic policy in Zimbabwe is concerned. He reiterated that these are -
1. From independence to 1982 in which there was an economic boom and characterized by twin 
phenomena of the adoption of redistributionist policies and a high level of mutual suspicion 
between government and capital (almost wholly white in ownership). 
2. A second phase from 1982 to around 1986, contained two major economic recessions (first 
quite severe), a check on redistributionist policies and continuing cool relations between 
government and capital. 
3. The third dating from 1986 to 1990 involved the resumption of a degree of economic growth 
downplaying of redistribution, the displacement of the conflict between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU 
which the political stage since independence by one between a unified ZANU and an emergent 
but disorganized independent opposition and a very substantial improvement in government 
capital relations. 
4. The fourth, that of structural adjustment, began in 1990 and has been marked by a severe 
drought and economic construction on implicit rejection of distributionisrn, and an attempt to 
reconstruct ZANU's political power base on the foundation of new constituencies with interests 
consonant with liberal economic policies. (Gibbon 1995:8) 
The foregoing however, is significant because it gIves us a clear background upon which to 
examine the origins and impact of the economic structural adjustment programmes in Zimbabwe. It 
is important to notice that the background of anything is significant if a valid account is to be 
produced .. 
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In line with the socialist policies, the Zimbabwean government, keen on a planned economic policy 
approach, in 1986 announced a five-year national development plan (1986 - 1990). This 
programme played a vital role in the shaping and making of the Zimbabwean economy. Significant 
measures were taken, policy-wise, to restore a lot of land from commercial farmers so as to resettle 
a lot of previously disadvantaged peasants. A policy on Resettlement was gazetted and passed. 
According to Kadhani, 50 000 peasants were resettled in the former commercial white farms 
(Kadhani 1986: 115). This was part and parcel of a process to redress past land imbalances created 
by the colonial state. During the colonial epoch, a lot of peasants were thrown out of fertile lands 
and put to sandy areas along Gwaai and Shaangani. This was a serious blow to the black peasants. 
The 5-year Development Plan (1986-:-90), sought to address such inequalities. During that period, 
prior to the implementation ofESAP, Zimbabwean government was more of a welfare state. Little 
did they realise that such welfarist policies would impact on the economic performance at some 
stage in life. Interestingly, as had been the case with its predecessors of 1981 and 1982, no steps 
were taken to implement this plan and economic and social policy basically continued to comprise a 
combination of the continuation of the regime of economic controls established by the Smith 
government of the UDI period (1965 - 1979) and the extension of the whole population of the 
welfare services and employment rights previously only available to whites" (Gibbon 1995:8). 
Government was geared towards a state-led social engineering and it outrightly, however 
inappropriately, showed indifference to the interests of capital and investment. That was its 
greatest undoing. 
All these economic defaults had a significant impact on the adoption of ESAP. During this (1985 -
1990) period, the private minority owners of the means of production were not always in agreement 
with the government. Most of these commercial owners of the means of production were in the 
(C.F.U.) Commercial Farmers Union dominated by minorities and the (C.Z.!.) which was also 
another "settler-colony" until even today, 1998, the (C.Z.I.) is in that state. Significantly, 
Zimbabwe ran into budgetary problems in 1983 and it obtained an 18 months standby credit from 
the IMF with ZWD 375 million. The phenomenon of conditionalities did not surface only on the 
adoption of ESAP but it has a history. According to Kadhani, in return to the IMF Fund, 
Zimbabwe agreed to devaluate, restore internal and external balances and cuts in development 
programmes and subsidies. Unfortunately, the IMF suspended the standby in 1984. Basically this 
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was because of a fiasco to meet credit targets but to Stoneman and Cliffe (1989: 163) the most 
important factor was a failure to meet budget reduction targets and for Davies, Sanders and Shaw 
(1991:20) the whole problem emanated from the introduction of tighter import controls in February 
1984. Surprisingly, Chidzero former Senior Minister of Finance decided to cut any ties with IMF 
for the next 8 years. 
Whatever the case may be, it is significant to notice that the relations of the IMF IW orId Bank with 
Zimbabwe came from a long way in history. One of the most striking features between 
IMF IZambia and IMF IZimbabwe, in terms of policy towards relationships, are that both countries 
at some point in time decided to jettison any relations with the Bank, just like what Zambia did. 
Yet shockingly they all returned back to IMFlWorld Bank and got packages, which were attached 
to strenuous conditionalities. During the time when the bank was dropped as a helper, the 
Zimbabwean government received aid from British Commercial Banks like Standard Chartered 
Bank. 
In 1986, UNIDO published a report drawing attention to a number of structural problems in 
Zimbabwe's industrial sector: inter alia, included high levels of vertical and horizontal integration of 
private capitals and consequent high degree of effective monopoly but also its lack of significant job 
creation and the low levels of investment already referred to. 
However, it is against the backdrop of limited economic recovery but also on-going stagnation in 
investment and employment levels, the World Bank sought to get trade liberalization back on the 
agenda through operating a public debate on these questions and besides the need to radically 
improve investment incentives, the World Bank also argued for a recognition of the "exhaustion" of 
the Zimbabwean import substitution "experiment" which the government had inherited from UDI. 
It is against the background of all these conditions that the policy of economic structural adjustment 
was adopted. 
It should be noted that structural adjustment policy was adopted in three stages, July, September 
and January 1991 - the July package was preceded in February 1990 by the announcement of a 
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major easing of price controls and the introduction of what was called "free collective bargaining" 
(Gibbon 1995: 10). A lot oflabour developments took place. 
In fact free-collective bargaining meant that the "abolition of statutory wage regulation except for 
agricultural and domestic workers and collective bargaining was still to be regulated through the 
Ministry of Labour, while the right to strike remained highly circumscribed" (lLO, 1995). 
The 1990 version of structural reformation stated the government's new economic policies in a 
fortnight but not particularly detailed way. The government's main focus was to de-emphasize its 
expenditure on social services and emphasize investment in the material production sectors such as 
agriculture and mining and manufacturing and other productive sectors, just like what happened in 
Zambia during the first Republic. 
During that epoch targets were set of 5% annual growth in GDP, 20% annual nominal investment 
growth (later revised to 25%) and a reduction of the budget deficit by 1994-1995 from 10% to 5%, 
the centre-piece of the package however was the announcement that import/controlfforex allocation 
system would be replaced by tariffs and an Open General and Labour Law. 
With a view to cut budgetary expenditure, there was going to be drastic cuts in the government 
subsidies on health, education and transport. In the furtherance of the plans, the government 
upgraded the powers of the Investment Centre. Seemingly all these developments were measures 
~o come up with a clear-cut policy on economic management. The World Bank embraced all the 
overtures but still it had to insist that information that is more concrete be availed prior to coming 
with aid financial. Summarily put, the main objective of the ESAP policy programme and its targets 
are envisaged in the framework for Economic Policy Reform document: 
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3.1.2. Main targets of ESAP 
MAIN TARGETS OF ESAP (1991-1995) IN ZIMBABWE 
, Q A reduction of government deficit from about 10% of GDP in 1990 to 5% by 1995~ 
o Complete liberalization of the foreign rate and trade regime by 1995 
o Elimination of subsidies, reduction of social expenditures and 'levying of cost recovery rates 
on social services 
o Rationalization of some public enterprises and privatization of others , 
o Liberalization of prices, interest rates and the exchange rate by 1995 
o ' Deregulation of the economy,' 
. .... 
o Liberalization offoreign investment regulations, and, 
, 0 'Deregulation of the labour market by allowing for free collective bargaining' and wag~ 
, , 
. . .. ' 
flexibility and by abolishing certain reStrictions on retrenchments. 
(Source: Peter Gibbon 1995) 
According to Beyond ESAP: Framework for a long-term Development Strategy for Zimbabwe, the 
foregoing objectives, constituting ESAP were to be supplemented by sectoral initiatives related to 
population and health, education and training, agriculture, environment, energy, the informal sector 
and addressing issues of gender. It is very significant, given the foregoing, to examine the input of 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme on the citizens of Zimbabwe. In Zambia, the 
implementation of economic structural adjustment has culminated in untold suffering to all the 
categories of vulnerable groups in the society the same saga happened to Zambia. Since the 
inception of the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment policies, there has been a 
growing increase in strikes, inflation, school drop-outs, malnutrition - all these facets depicted an 
aura of social and economic malaise. Today, if you look at Zimbabwe, the once economic tycoon is 
now a dying horse as depicted by Karen Moolman (Standard Chartered Bank - Business Day 
8/5/98) (See Table 11). 
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Table 11. Zimbabwe's economic outlook today 
Years 1996 1997 1998 
.. ~---~ 
GDP % per year 7,3 3,5 1,5 to 2,0 
Inflation 21,6 18,9 27,0 
Prime lending rate % 
Per year 32,5 30,5 35,0 
Z $fUS$ (year end) 10,9 18,5 20,0 
Trade-weighted exchange 
Rate index (year end) 94,6 60,0 54,0 
(April 1998 = 64) 
-,,---=--_ .... --..... __ .-
(Source: Standard Chartered Bank 1998/8/51) 
The foregoing represents the economic "status quo" in Zimbabwe today. The economic outlook is 
not a viable one socially because the citizens at grassroots are facing innumerable problems. Albeit 
the fact that the citizens on the ground are suffering, the government seems to be bent on the issue 
of rising taxes. "Even with the fall in world oil prices, fuel prices must rise substantially to cover 
last year's devaluation, but Mugabe appears to be reluctant to face inaustrial unrest over increased 
transport costs" according to Financial Mail 13 March 1998. Did that not happen? It happened - a 
strike by workers organized by Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions took place and the economy 
was once again paralyzed. Thus "for their part the unions - said that last week's stayaway was 
both widely observed and peaceful workers still are threatening to call new stoppages if government 
refuses to drop last year's 2,5% point increase in sales tax to 16,5% and its 5% development levy 
on income tax" (Financial Mail 13/03/98) and "with inflation set to move as high as 30% before 
slowing and industrialists predicting wage increases of 25% - 30% this year (1998), Ministers say 
they cannot afford to back down on tax and fuel price hikes. If they do, any IMF agreement will be 
short lived and to make matters worse, business investment plans are being paired - a number of 
companies have announced plans to shelve proposed projects and "only this week the Edgars group 
said it was postponing initially all capital spending" (Financial Mail 13/03/98). Significantly all 
these are effects of the structural adjustment policy programme which the government adopted 
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from the IMFlWorld Bank. It must be noted that all these developments have a sharp detrimental 
everlasting impact on the citizens. 
Therefore, when examining impacts of the economic structural adjustment programme, there are 
less positive economic "spin-offs". Rather, an array of structural social problems have been 
precipitated which problems, the citizenry finds it difficult to come out of. 
When one exarrunes the life of the Zimbabweans after the implementation of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Policy programme, it can be seen that in social aspects, their lives have gone 
from bad to worse. Little, at grassroots level, has been attained in terms of positive economic spin-
offs, rather, untold insurmountable problems have been created which make life very difficult for 
the citizens, for example, if we look at medical care, a lot of changes have taken place, but to what 
advantage that is the most important question every researcher on the relationship between the 
policy of structural adjustments and the impact on some people looks at. Just like the case study of 
Zambia has been evaluated concentrating on social impact of adjustment policy, the same avenue is 
going to be used when examining the Zimbabwean case study. Thus the impact of structural 
adjustment programme is going to be evaluated examining all socio-economic aspects of the 
Zimbabwean life like medical care, education, food and nutrition and finally the human resources. 
In sum, all these sectors will provide an adequate evaluation of the impact of Economic Structural 
Adjustment policy in Zimbabwe and SADC as a whole. 
3.1.2. Economic Structural Adjustment and Impact on Medical Care and Food 
The IMFlWorld Bank's financial policy of economic structural adjustment programme had a titanic 
impact on the medical care in Zimbabwe. The notion of government cutting public sector spending 
was respected to the fullest. At the attainment of independence, the new government, keen to 
please its electorate, introduced free medical care programmes. The effort was part of an attempt 
to bridge the gap which the colonial regime had created in service delivery. The majority of the 
blacks in the country, while they did not have viable jobs that earned them good salaries, they were 
forced by the colonial Smith's regime, to pay for their medical expenses. Their salaries and wages 
were not at all viable such that it was grossly unreasonable to suggest that any African worker of 
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that colonial epoch can eke out a viable living out of those few Rhodesian cents and dollars. They 
were paying for their medical expenses. Ironically today in 1998 demonstration workers reportedly 
said that Rhodesian currency was better than today's Zimbabwean dollar. 
During the liberation struggle, which took almost 20 years, the people, campaigned against such 
type of segregation because their white counterparts were well catered for by the colonial state. 
Thus at independence, it was one of the burning issues that touched the lives of the people. 
In 1981 the government introduced free medical care to all those whose monthly incomes were less 
than Z$150 and to those outside fonnal employment with the obj ective of providing health for all 
by the year 2000. However, the post-independence economic trends in Zimbabwe were such that 
inflation was a daily thing because the government was always pronouncing some socialist policies 
almost every year. 
Hence wage distribution patterns for the period 1982 and 1992 reveal that in 1982 about 46% of 
the fonnal sector employees qualified for free health care, while by 1992, less than 2% were eligible 
and, quite surprising - although by 1991 inflation had eroded on income of Z$150 to just Z$80 in 
real tenns, thereby placing many more people in the tariff paying group, collection of fees was lax 
and many low income people (albeit earning more than the threshold income) continued receiving 
.; 
free medical care - in 1992 however, a new exemption limit of Z$400 per household was 
introduced. 
The foregoing scenario was worsened by the drastic cuts in health expenditure, which took place 
around 1991 and 1992. During these same years, Zimbabwe was severely hit by drought so the 
suffering of the people was worsened practically and physically. The cutting of reducing 
government expenditure on health care has sharply impacted on the people in the following ways 
according to ILO and Van Spengen et al, "first the government cut real recurrent expenditure on 
health by 11.8% during 199112 financial year and by an additional 14.5% during the 1992/3 
financial year and the major consequences of these cuts was a fall of 10% in the number of nurses 
per person employed by the Ministry of Health between 1991 and 1992 - for more than 9%, 10 000 
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to just over 8% per 10 000 and by mid 1992 about 800 health workers had been retrenched and 400 
nursing posts had been abolished (ILO 1993). 
Another impact of the cutting of costs was the sharp decline of spending on drugs for public 
consumption. In line with the government cost recovery programme and with the aim of getting at 
least 5% through health expenditure through fees by 1993 and 8% by 1995, government initiated 
the above rules. Most of the employees in the health sector have been retrenched so they could no 
longer afford to pay medical fees and their dependents had to feel the pinch of the policy on cutting 
of government spending on the health services. All these were completely cost recovery policies 
implemented by the government in line with IMFlWorld Bank agreed policies. 
To the poor people of Zimbabwe who constitute a greater percentage of the population, what all 
these adjustments meant was simply that accessibility to medical care was limited. Thus for those 
who were and are not on government welfare plans (who are the majority) they could not afford 
costs on medical hospitalization and medicines. So they rather had to resort to traditional faith or, 
religious faith were it is and was not expensive for treatment of diseases. According to Sanders, he 
has identified the impact of SAP on the population this way - "the implementation of the fee 
collection system involving advance payment, particularly for maternity care, is likely to cause a 
sharp drop in the number of people utilizing modern health services, the introduction of charges of 
many patients and this has made life particularly difficult for those with chronic diseases requiring 
long-term drug therapy (e.g. for hypertension, diabetes, psychiatric illness)" (Sanders 1992). 
Unfortunately the introduction of drug charges coincided with a period of rapid devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean currency and this also had a sharp impact on the selling and importing of drugs to the 
country. The government now had to import these drugs at highly expensive prices and therefore 
the government decided to cater for that by hiking the medical health expenses. Inflation in 
Zimbabwe during the implementation of SAPs, was a daily bread. Thus, it is widely believed 
indicators reflected a steady increase in deaths from diseases which in the past had been brought 
under control partly because access to both preventive and curative medicines is now restricted and 
partly because of other factors such as poor nutrition, unhealthy living conditions and infection by 
deadly mY/AIDS virus. Significantly, what this means is that the health care in Zimbabwe has 
been put in a state of turmoil because of these measures. The turmoil had a sharp impact on the 
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lives of the people in the country. Thus from the foregoing, it can be noticed that economic 
structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe had a negative impact on the lives of the people hence 
they view it as anathema in their lives. Little has been accomplished at grassroots level. From the 
york of Rhodesian epoch a novel type of suffering, this time not political but social, had been 
heralded by the implementation of SAP programmes. Health care is one of the basic human needs 
and without it the social and economic livelihood gets completely eroded. That is Zimbabwe, 
which people fought for tirelessly and only to find that 10 years after independence (at a time when 
the country did not even need adjustment) they are in yet another war for survival or a struggle for 
survival, in an ever-growing competitive global political economy. 
It is significant to notice that to Zambia and the MMD government "the social sector - health, 
education, community development - are equally cardinal in the economic recovery of the country 
and so they deserve attention if poverty is to be eliminated" (SAPEM Vol. 10 No. 5 1997 -
February). At the recent World Economic Forum held in Windhoek, regional leaders backed by 
Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard University Economist, pledged with the World Bank to cancel their debt 
so that they can now start concentrating on development instead of debt servicing. Sachs also 
supported Chiluba on canceling debt and he went to the extent of saying that the 117 
conditionalities of the World Bank should be reduced to just 5 and the SADC region "must rejoin-
the world economy on a new basis fundamentally different from what exists today" (Business 
Report Tuesday May 191h 1998). Maybe this might improve and aid in reducing and softening the 
detrimental impact of SAPS in SADC. 
3.1.3. Economic Structural Adjustment and Food in Zimbabwe 
According to Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, food is one of the basic needs in humanity 
and thus, any attempts to mercy with food can spark innumerable endless problems. 
In 1994 a Herald article (2311 0/1994) carried an article: 
"thousands of Zimbabweans helpless watch their standard of living steadily drop despite the 
government's promises of a better tomorrow - people are wondering whether independence 
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meant more suffering - chicken, potatoes and many kinds of foods were now beyond most 
people's reach, workers' families had stopped eating breakfast and lunch, 20 000 people had 
lost their jobs and 18 000 civil servants had been retrenched - what the government calls cost 
recovery is seen by the people as a total neglect and betrayal; of the liberation struggle" (B.Z.S. 
March/April 1994: 10). This is a real summary of how people suffered and are suffering as a 
result of the new policy of economic structural adjustment programme. 
The ever-spiraling inflation had a titanic impact on the costs for the producers in Zimbabwe in terms 
of importing raw materials from abroad (foreign exchange) and transport costs became high. The 
elimination of subsidies and the deregulation of price control systems and food in Zimbabwe was 
inflationary. What this meant was that people suffered because their wages and the daily rises in 
inflation affected their purchase power in terms of food purchasing. During Rhodesia bread was at 
some point ten cents but now it is Z$9.50. 
According to Van Spengen et al "The rate of inflation increased from 16.1% in 1990 to 23.3% in 
1991 and 42.1 % in 1992 but dropped to just less than 30% in 1993 and in July 1991 consumer 
prices for lower income urban families were an average of 35% higher than in July 1990 and the 
price of subsidized plain maize meal rose by over 100% between 100 and 185% during the same 
period" (Van Spengen et al 1995:85). It should be noted that lower income groups suffered 47% 
inflation in 1992 and the higher income groups suffered 35.9% inflation according to International 
Labour Organization (ILO 1993). 
Unfortunately during the period of drought (1991-1992) the prices of food skyrocketed by 53%. 
Thus most of these low income categories had to spend almost half of their salaries on food only 
and they also adopted some survival strategies like not eating three meals a day but just having two 
meals a day. When we look at the modes of survival for most poor and urban people, the urbaners 
suffered more because they are reliant on purchased foodstuffs while those in rural areas might 
grow the food and consume them, for instance maize and other crops. However, because of the 
continuous devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, the prices rose up to unaffordable ratios. 
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It should be noted that within the urban areas, however, the high food prices affected the poor and 
squatters, whose efforts to produce their own food on municipal soil are often thwarted by local 
authorities. Because the people had to live within the limits of inflation, people only eat and ate 
basic foods like meal-meal and vegetables twice a day. Some nutritious foods like eggs, margarine 
and potatoes were avoided because they were and are expensive. Their prices have been inflated so 
that they are very expensive and unmanageable by the low-income categories in Zimbabwe. The 
rates of malnutrition amongst children increased. Purchase of maize in the past was subsidized but 
with the removal of subsidies, the situation became very tense and unmanageable. All in all, 
Economic Structural Adjustment Policy has created much suffering almost similar to the suffering 
which people faced during the Rhodesian era. In Zambia, as will be seen later food prices also rose 
tremendously and affected the people. 
3.1.4. Economic Structural Adjustment and Education 
One of the basic operating principles of SAPS is that government has to cut its expenditure in the 
public sector. At independence, the government embarked on education for all programmes, which 
facilitated everybody to get access to education both primary and secondary. The government was 
following some welfarist policies. The ruling party had to pursue these policies because it has 
promised the citizens during the liberation struggle that these facilities were going to be made 
available to them. Since government was not inclined towards free-market economic system and 
adhering to the IMFlWorld Bank conditionalities, they had to cut down expenditure in education. 
Cutting of education expenditure was a very serious issue because of the impact it had on the 
society. 
According to Van Spengen "the programme affected the education sector in the following ways: 
1. Real recurrent educational expenditure fell by 8% in 199112 and by a furt her 11 % in 1992/3. 
2. Cost recovery measures were also increased in 1992 until the introduction of school fees for , 
primary schools in urban areas, and for secondary schools throughout the country. 
3. There was a substantial increase in international examination fees owing to the devaluation of 
the Zimbabwe dollar." (Van Spengen 1995, ILO, 1993) 
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There was an introduction of school fees for primary. school at Z$12 annually in rural areas and 
Z$60 in high-density urban areas and Z$21O in low-density areas, with the exception of those 
parents earning below Z$400 per moth. The same story happened to the secondary schools: -
Table 12. Fees Introduction 
Rural Areas 
High Density Areas (Urban) 
Low Density Areas (Urban) 
Boarding Fees (Primary) 
Boarding Fees (Secondary) 
........ "'-... . .. -






These fees were completely a stumbling block to a lot of parents because most of them had been 
retrenched from either the public or the private sector. So these payments were a serious problem 
because they just could not afford them. However Sanders (1992) has found out 4 main impacts of 
SAP on education (Sanders 1992). 
1. The increased costs have already contributed to increase in drop-out rate particularly amongst 
girls 
2. There has been a gradual deterioration in the quality of and access to educational opportunities 
since 1991 especially in the communal areas and the low-income urban suburbs. 
3. Females have suffered particularly from the introduction of fees because most parents reason 
that if they cannot afford to educate all of their children due to lack of money, then it is the 
daughters who have to be sacrificed. 
4. The reduction in the number of teachers in primary and secondary schools resulted in pupil-
teacher ratio increasing by about 5% in primary schools in 1991 (Chisvo, 1993, Van Spengen 
1995, ILO 1993 and Sanders 1992). 
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The foregoing reflects the extent to which the education sector has been affected deeply by the 
implementation of the structural adjustment programmes. Undoubtedly the very government they 
all helped to put in power impoverished the citizens of Zimbabwe. The IMFI World Bank policies 
·sounded like another fonn of cruelty after the colonial master. In Zambia the same· story happened, 
fees were raised and became unaff'ordable. 
In a nutshell, it can be noted that the increase in fees, the drop in the number of female students in 
schools, the downsizing of the civil servants and incessant devaluation of the Zimbabwean Dollar, 
all these facets had a great impact on the lives of the citizens. Children are the future of any nonnal 
parents, institutions and government but if removing them from schools as a result of failure to pay 
handicaps them, will they still be the future? Not sending children to school is a process of 
gradually reducing the nations' energies to uselessness. IMFIWorld Bank policy of SAP has 
impoverished people and made them slaves once again. This time it is more painful than before 
because of the level of civilization. 
3.1.5. Structural Adjustment, Retrenchment~ and Unemployment 
The implementation of structural adjustment programmes in the SADC region has precipitated an 
avalanche of serious insunnountable problems for the workers in the region, President Joaquim 
Chissano of Mozambique said that albeit the fact that IMFIWorld Bank observers say that his 
country is at least benefiting from the IMF World Bank handouts, he reported that on the ground 
his people are not satisfied. (Business Report, Tuesday May 15 1998) F Chiluba of Zambia also said 
the same thing about the SADC IMFIWorld Bank influenced perestroikas. The leaders of the region 
said that democratization and economic development were being undermined by the servicing and 
repayment of national debt (Cape Times Business Report 19 May 1998). One of the most 
detrimental impact of IMFIWorld Bank SAP's was manifested in the lives of workers in the country 
whose social and economic livelihood was completely eroded by such policies. According to The 
Economist (30/0111998), the economic management has been erratic and inept and what should 
have been one of Afiica's healthiest economics' has become inflation ridden, debt burdened and 
plagued by 50% unemployment rate. The workers (human resources) have been a victim of 
circumstance in every circumstance in the crisis. Recently, because the war veterans had 
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campaigned for compensation and pension for having fought during the struggle, the government 
ordered the ministers to simply get the money. Around 50 000 ex-fighters were given money of 
approximately US$ 4,5 billion (Z$ 225 m) (Economist 24 - 30 January 1998). The government 
bought 50 new cars for the ministers. So the whole essence of cutting costs is not at all respected. 
But all in all the workers in the country stand to suffer the consequences because the government 
will either retrench them or tax them. Just like in Zambia, labour is suffering a lot. The workers in 
Zimbabwe suffered more than anybody else. Zimbabwe began to face increasing unemployment 
and about 25% of the work force lost their jobs and recently unemployment has gone up to 65%. 
According to BZS, employment in June 1992 was 1 221 500 which means 21 000 lower than in 
1992, according to CSO figures and the average level in 1993 fell by 3,5% to 1 217 200 (BZS issue 
no. 9511 Feb 1995). 
According to the ZCTU, which is the official organization of workers 20 710 workers have lost 
their jobs since the beginning of the economic reform programme in 1991 and the ZCTU stated that 
it regarded such figures as gross under estimates with a total of a least 30 000 having lost their jobs. 
The deputy minister of public service, labour and social welfare, admitted in October 1994, that the 
rate of unemployment had risen from 37,2% in 1990 to 44$ in 1993 or a total of 971 500 
unemployed out of a total labour force (excluding commercial areas, farmers) of 2,2 million (BZS 
issue No. 95/111995). 
Retrenchments, layoffs and unemployment became the order of the day. Liberalization which is one 
of the basic principles of IMFlWorld Bank's SAP's made some categories of employees slaves, 
women are now victims of the managers and in the public sector they are at the risk of senior civil 
servants. They are very prone to a lot of victimizations. The female employee is forced to look at 
the consequences of loosing her job so some of the abuse goes unreported. As foretold by the 
ZCTU, with the coming of cutting of throat competition illiterate women doing unskilled work 
would be first targets of retrenchment. Companies would want to have manpower that is more 
skilled and less of general hands. Just like in Zambia, huge retrenchments took place. Employment 
opportunities for women, which had improved because of continued government encouragement 
would soon dwindle. The removal of government protection would be a blow to working women 
(BZS 1990 No. 55). 
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That kind of prediction, became complete reality in the lives of women, because women are 
harassed sexually and morally. The "thousands of Zimbabweans helplessly watch their standard of 
living steadily drop despite the government's promises of a better tomorrow, people are considering 
- whether independence meant suffering because, chickens, potatoes, etc. and many kinds of meat are 
I11III now beyond most peoples reach, worker's families have stopped eating breakfast and lunch - two 
meals or one meal a day become the order of the day" (Herald 23 October 1994). 
, .. , 
-. 
From the foregoing statement it is clear that workers have suffered seriously due to the introduction 
of ESAP in the country. The standards of living of workers have steadily decreased. The new 
piece of legislation concerning the lives of workers placed them at the mercy of the employer. 
People/workers were promised that with the implementation of IMFlWorld Bank programmes 
employment would increase but that was exactly the opposite of what happened practically. 
It is believed that the framework of Economic Reform (Zimbabwe Government 1991 a), opened by 
"specifying front loaded" timetables for reducing subsidies to parastatals for ZWD 629 million in 
1990-91 to 40 million in 1994-95 and for reducing non-educated and service employment by 25% 
(23 00 persons) over the same period) (Gibbon 1995: 11). It should be noted that the forecast that 
at least 45 - 50 000 retrenchments in the formal sector (public and private) disproportionately 
affecting the lowest paid that at least half of these still employed, mainly the semi and unskilled, 
would face wage erosion and that a further 10% would see their incomes fall below the poverty 
datum line, has come to pass, for the majority of the workers also were retrenched it did not 
consume time before they would realize how tough life is, because the inflation which took place 
was serious and uncalled for. 
When examining the category of the skilled and semi-skilled workers in the urban sector, it should 
be noticed that the demand of skilled labour in an adjusting economy were so high that they at least 
survived. Surviving tiny jobs did not mean anything to the employees because their salaries were 
hit hard by inflation, which was taking place almost on a daily basis. The category of workers, 
which was badly hit by the scourge of ESAP, was the unskilled and domestic workers. 'With sharp 
and fierce competition in e~ployment the people who had no or little qualifications had problems in 
getting jobs. 
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What is critically surprising about the defacto one-part state of Zimbabwe is that at independence 
the government, because of some socialist principles it was following protected the workers from 
the abuses by the employers. Hence policies on minimum wages were introduced to protect the 
people. Surprisingly and much to the disappointment of workers, government by adopting SAPs 
seemed to have neglected the very people who brought it to power. The decontrolling of Labour 
regulations had a severe influence on the lives of the workers in Zimbabwe. The government 
officials are completely out of touch with realities of life; hence they do not understand the 
problems of workers practically. 
The major problems which the Zimbabwean government is facing is that retrenchments are 
occurring at a time when the school system is producing almost a third of a million school leavers 
each year, the majority of whom have little prospects of formal employment and furthermore, most 
of the retrenchees have been unskilled and semi skilled workers with little formal education 
qualification or certificate experience in specific skills (lLO, 1993). 
Because of the growing problems regarding accessibility to finance the workers had to alter their 
eating habits, for example, in Mbare, a high density suburb in the Capital city of Harare, normally 3 
meals in the Zimbabwean culture, are taken but by ] 993 a majority had only two, 80% of 
households reported changes in diet, 68% ate less meat and 59% less bread. 
According to Sachikonye, many households no longer purchased bread. Another mammoth 
challenge which workers faced was that of fees and charges for medical attention and since most 
workers had been retrenched, they could not afford the high medical charges or modern hospitals 
instead they resorted to traditional doctors. 
It should be noted that there was a clear pattern of internal differentiation within the Zimbabwean 
working class in the decade prior to adjustment, amongst wage workers, parastatal employees were 
in a relatively privileged situation with even unskilled workers earning double the income of similar 
workers in other sectors as well as enjoying various benefits and at the bottom wage worker 
hierarchy carne plantation workers. 
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As part of the government's efforts to cut costs the public service had to retrench a lot of people 
from their jobs. Within the first three (3) years of the implementation of SAP, Zimbabwe, 10 000 
workers lost their jobs comparatively in Zambia, there were a lot of strikes which took place during 
the 1990's as a result of deterioration of the standards of living for workers. If we examine the 
plight of workers in the Textile and Clothing industry, it will be seen that ESAP has crippled people 
socially. Huge retrenchments took place in this industry. There was a reduction of 50% of 
operating workers per shift according to Sachikonye and the job content of the workers expanded. 
through performing tasks, formally done either by retrenchees or other workers and union officials 
reported the automation and led to redundancies in the textile and clothing industries (Sachikonye 
1992) 
It has been observed that the labour regime generally under E.S.A.P. has become increasingly 
authoritarian and loaded against workers and economic restructuring was promised on the removal 
of protective safeguards for workers. Enshrined in the legal provision and security. Under the new 
programme the employer has been empowered to hire and fire the worker, hence the morale of 
workers went down, in the wake of the passing of the Labour Relations Amendment Act. During 
ESAP, government leaders "stressed workers the priority of increasing productivity in the new 
economic era and embraced the idea of the inevitability of wide spread retrenchment" (Zimbabwe 
Government 1991). Most people felt that Cone Textiles conducted unfair retrenchments. Most 
companies were liquidated just like most companies in Lusaka. 
Notwithstanding, the fact that workers were feeling that the unions have been crippled and made 
barren, mechanically and operationally by ESAP levels of membership in both textiles and clothing 
industries remained relatively high. 
It is normally a common feature that when a worker is still in employment, he does not forget his 
rural relations so he keeps in touch with them on a weekly or monthly basis. But now when these 
people where retrenched they went to their rural homes to stay there permanently especially after 
serious, hectic attempts to get other jobs (which attempts during ESAP normally turned to be a 
fiasco because instead of embarking on employment companies retrenched). 
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Owing to the continuous devaluation, the Zimbabwean dollar and the decontrolling of prices, the 
cost of living went up for these retrenched workers and for those who remained in employment 
their salaries were not healthy so they suffered heavily. 
According to the 1993 wage agreements for the textile industry, the basic wage for manual 
labourers (unskilled workers) varied between ZWD 87,70 an~ ZWD 96,03 per week, while in the 
clothing industry it fell between ZWD 74,]] and ZWD 80,50 (Sachikonye ]992). 
Amid all these problems the workers resorted to other mechanisms. They formed clubs, financial in 
orientation. When a worker borrows money, he/she will repay the money with interest; these 
financial clubs also helped the workers as far as stands for houses were concerned. In short it can 
simply be mentioned that during ESAP, maize meal, bread, milk, beef, soft drinks, soap, toothpaste 
and newspapers became unaffordable to the workers, in other words these items were no longer 
affordable on a daily basis. Workers are adversely affected by the SAP policies. 
3.1.6. The Civil Service and Economic Structural Adjustment 
During the colonial epoch, when unr was declared (1965 - 1980), the civil service was dominated 
mainly by the whites and blacks had no great access to the civil service jobs. Those who were 
lucky to have jobs were either cleaners or housemaids. There was a deep chasm between the 
whites and the blacks. Thus on attainment of independence, in 1980, the face of the civil service 
underwent a gradual surgery. Blacks, who were educated started to have access to the jobs in the 
civil service, most whites ran away because of threats from the new government, so they left their 
jobs. They were surprised by the reconciliation policy. Government of the majority flooded the 
civil service with its appointees and certainly the ratio of blacks in the civil service increased. But 
employment of a lot of workers resulted in the Civil Service being bloated. 
The Herald had a headline documenting "thousands of Zimbabweans helplessly watch their 
standards of living steadily drop despite the government promises of a better tomorrow" (BZS 
March! April 1994). The late former speaker of the House of Assembly once said "unemployment is 
now the biggest single threat to the stability of Zimbabwe and the most serious problem facing the 
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nation - we cannot afford to fail, we have the skills, the professionalism, the human resources, the 
infrastructure, the zeal to go forward and the political will" (BZS Marchi April 1994). But the 
political will has always been in doubt. Since one of the major goals of structural adjustment was to 
cut costs government thought it was vital to retrench and downsize the civil service. 
A report was produced which depicted that the civil servIce in Zimbabwe had problems of 
duplication of function red tape, let alone inefficiency and ineffectiveness. The ESAP programme 
meant that 25% of the workers were going to loose there jobs the government to remove 7000 
posts and. it did that by 1995. Thus, the number of non-education, civil servants would come down 
from 104000 to 78000. What this meant was that 26 000 civil servants were going to loose their 
jobs. According to the ZCTU 50 000 workers lost their jobs from the public service. The 
categories of the people affected was more too non-skilled employees and semi-skilled labour. 
According to the PSC (Public Service Commission) the civil service was 192000 and 100 000 
workers enjoyed and were guaranteed immunity from retrenchments thus 92000 were supposed to 
be chopped out of the service. When we look at the biggest section of the civil service, which is the 
teaching group, most primary school teachers were retrenched. 
By the year 1996 most jobs in the civil service have been lost either through retrenchment, forced 
retirement or lay-offs. Given the fact that these civil servants are people just like anybody else, the 
titanic challenges they were and are facing are of school fees, food and health fees let alone 
transport fees/rates. The cost of living resulted in strikes and most teachers were fired because of 
strikes so just like most of the civil servants, they staged a mass exodus to neighboring countries 
like Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia which have better standards of 
living. Most semi-skilled workers left the country to Botswana and they got jobs, which enabled 
them to sustain their families. Most University of Zimbabwe students failed to get jobs, so they 
traveled around the SADC region seeking greener pastures. 
At the international conference the government of Zimbabwe admitted that "no significant 
improvement has been recorded in the countries' economic perfonnance over the first three years of 
the 1990's and that the unemployment statistics "convey a chilling message" and it confessed that 
ESAP had introduced a new dimension in the unemployment equation. (CBZS MarchiApril 1994). 
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Surprisingly at least one senior minister broke ranks in October, Didymus Mutasa, Minister for 
National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives, told a meeting in Gwanda "that he had 
been against ESAP from its inception - in his view socialism was within the reach of distributing 
wealth equitably when it was abandoned and the economy given back to foreigners, capitalism will 
not work for us, we have less than 10 indigenous millionaires against 10 million poor workers. 
With such statistics I do not believe that we will progress through a capitalism thrust, we are 
doomed" (Herald 2 October 1993). For saying this he was victimized politically. 
Despite all these words by the senior minister, ESAP did not stop, it even went ahead. All these 
activities are a result of the IMFlWorld Bank activities in Zimbabwe. Many scholars wonder about 
a lot of things. Edmore Tobaiwa concludes that "foreign aid without an underlying commitment to 
transform this sleeping giant called Zimbabwe is simply money down the drain, on the part of 
donors and a recipe for economic disaster for Zimbabwe. More and more, we should start seeing 
and realizing sustainable solutions to our economic problems in our selves, otherwise we will 
become a nation of foreign aid junkies" (financial Gazette 9 July 1998). In the same breath, he 
argues "but how sustainable is foreign assistance in stabilizing our national economy ... according 
to economic literature, given that the current account deficit of the balance of payments is the 
difference between Zimbabwe's national savings and investments the effectiveness of foreign 
assistance on domestic economic performance is a prior, indeterminate. Retrenchments, 
unemployment and forced retirements from the public services are all blamed on the IMFlWorld 
Bank policies (Financial Gazette, 9 July 1998). 
3.1.7. Conclusion (Zimbabwe) 
Zimbabwe has recently entered a second phase of economic reformation (Financial Gazette 
15/8/98) but the most significant question to ask is, with the unveiling of the new ZIMPREST 
(Program for Social and Economic Transformation), has Zimbabwe not given birth to yet another 
calamitous "perestroika"? If not will the novel policy cater for the impact precipitated by the first 
perestroi ka? 
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According to Edmore Tobaiwa "government institutions, the main policy implementers should be 
abreast of the situation and not be found lagging behind as happened under the first phase of 
economic refonns many opportunities were lost by private business because some government 
departments could not be bothered to update themselves visa viz policy changes" (financial Gazette 
5/8/98). 
So in the light of the new programme "government should not only be limited to providing an 
enabling environment for private business as well as public goods and services such as schools and 
hospitals, but it should find itself playing a crucial role through direct selective and differentiated 
interventions. The duty of the government is to find a mix that will best stimulate the economy, 
even if it means being virtually orthogonal in policy fonnulation style, as long as there is a response 
from private business and the economy generates the much needed employment" (financial Gazette 
15/8/98). 
Employment is needed because a lot of people has been retrenched under E. S. A.P. A lot of families 
have fallen apart because their working parents were axed from employment. ESAP was thought 
to be a instrument of improving the economy so that the much needed jobs could be generated but 
surprisingly 'the economy is officially established to have registered a lower growth rate of 3,7% in 
1997, annualized inflation ended the year 1997 at 20,1% up from 15,8% in January 1997. 
On the other hand, annualized inflation this year started at 24,2% before peaking at 29,3% as of 
May 1998 - a two year high, indication are that inflation will go up significantly this year lie, 
particularly fuel and electricity, the expected rapid increases in municipal charges, wage increases, 
the inevitable hike in the price of consumer goods, and the increase in sales tax as the government 
battles to raise funds to finance unproductive war veterans tax free pensions" (Financial Gazette 2 
July 1998). All these harsh conditions have a sharp impact on the workers and they have their 
strong origins in the IMFlWorld Bank stimulated SADe perestroikas. 
Since the inception of E.S.A.P. government has been at pains to cut costs but it failed with large 
scale retrenchments in the civil service and the private sector, ever-skyrocketing rents, price of 
goods tax-burden on workers, poor standards of health facilities, low levels of nutrition and poor 
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quality food supply, let alone dwindling education standards - all these facets are a mirror reflection 
of the extend to which the living standards of the citizens have been eroded catastrophically by the 
implementation of E.S.A.P. promises that life was going to improve - have turned to be clear-
crystal lies from the mouth of the ruling oligarchy who will at the end of the day say - its not all our 
fault! Just like in Zambia, socio-economic hardships have been precipitated by structural policies. 
Given the foregoing it can be noted that E.S.A.P. had a calamitous impact on the lives of the people 
about 50 000 people (and the number recently has reached around 70 000) lost their jobs from the 
civil service and 30 000 from the private sector. At least Labour in Zambia achieved taking over 
the government but in Zimbabwe the ZCTU is still a toothless bulldog. 
The most serious question is what will happen to the lives of people whose economic and social 
livelihood has been debilitated by a policy, which originate from the external. After all the country 
had not reached an economic crisis which warranted that medicine. It is significant to notice that 
'1he social impact of the fall in real incomes and employment since the early 1990's has been 
exacerbated by the recent sharp depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar and the large price increases 
for basic food items" (African Business July/August No. 234 1998). However, the ThtfF says that 
Zimbabwe has a better future "better times ahead African Business July/August 1998 No. 234)!" 
What better times when inflation is now over 70%. What better times when the decision to support 
Kabila resulted in the government using US$ 300 000 a day, and causing the Zimbabwean dollar to 
crush down. It dropped from Z$18 to US$l to Z$22 to US$l, and now the rate is Z$37 to US$l 
(BBC Focus on Africa January - March 1999). This doe not mean that government in line with 
ThtfFlWorld Bank guidelines is cutting military spending. This money could have been used for 
improving socio-economic life crippled by the structural adjustment policies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. ZAMBIAN CASE STUDY 
4.1. Colonial Background of Zambia 
The British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C.), which was administering Zambia, gave the 
administration of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), to the British government in 1924 and copper 
mining was embarked on in earnest a few years later. Right from the commencement of the 
colonial epoch, copper mining, had a sturdy niche, in colonial political economy. However, its 
"development was largely left to transnational interest, involving South Mrica, British and North 
America companies", (Blomstrom and Lundahl 1993: 145). Interestingly, as a fundamental starting 
point, it shall be noted that this very same copper, coupled with other structural problems, led to a 
state of economic malaise, when it drastically and tragically collapsed on the international market, 
leading to the fall of the Zambian economy in the 1980s. The years ensuing Second World War 
were an era of boom, which boom, however, was short-lived. 
In relation to her Southern neighbor, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) Northern Rhodesia was 
regarded as something of a marginal colony. To create an ambience of cheap and plentiful supply 
of labour mining sector, the colony's traditional sectors were left undeveloped (Blomstrom and 
Lundahl 1993: 146). During the colonial era the social infrastructure received low priority. 
However the years preceeding the second world war marked the beginning of what would be called 
by student of the Zambian economy, dualistic development because mining was undergoing a boom 
while the peasant sector tried to make ends meet under a lop-sided agricultural legislation which 
favoured all, but capital intensive settler-farmer enclave (Fry 1979). Migration from rural areas to 
mining and commercial agriculture income-generating opportunities in traditional agriculture and 
craftsmanship were restricted by laws and other regulations (Blomstorm and Lundahl J 993: 146). 
However, "the most important socio-economic impact of the mining sector was the role it played in 
the evolution of an urban working class (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984). Miners are "a labour 
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aristocracy with considerable influences on the economy at large, most notably via their impact on 
modem sector wages (Blomstrom and Lundahl 1993: 146). 
4.2. Background to Structural Adjustment Policies in Zambia 
Zambia obtained its independence on 24 October 1964, from the British rule. The economy that 
was inherited was relatively sound economy. However, investment was concentrated largely on 
important-substituting industrialization in part a move to reduce dependence on the illegal regime in 
Rhodesia" (Van Der Geest 1994:25). From 1965-73, GDP increased at an average rate of 2.4% 
with the manufacturing sector growing at 9.8% (Gulhati, 1989). This steadily economic country 
was heavily dependent on mining sector. In 1970, copper and cobalt contributed 97% of gross 
export revenues taxes, on the mining sector contributed 58% of government revenue, and mining 
accounted for 36% of GDP. In 1975, the world's price of copper fell. This had a sharp impact on 
the economy of Zambia. Mining's share of GDP halved and the sector ceased to make any direct 
contribution to government revenue. 
It should be confirmed that initially this was expected to be only a temporary shock but however, 
this hope proved illusory and copper prices have never recovered to their level of the early 1970s 
and the effect of this had permanent adverse shift in terms of trade, the most severe of most 
developing country in the 1970s has been calculated to represent a real income loss compared to 
1974 equivalent to 22.9% of GDP over the period 1975-9 and 31.9% over the period 1980-6 
(Gulhati 1989). It should be noted that this adverse shock would have presented a formidable 
adjustments problem even for a relatively stronger more flexible and more diversified economy. 
The fall of the copper price reflected fundamental weakness in this structure of the Zambian 
economy. While diversification of export earnings away from copper, and the promotion of the 
agricultural sector which absorbed the bulk of employment had both been primarily stated 
government objectives since independence in 1964, government investment and pricing strategies 
had done little to bring them about. 
On the other hand agricultural growth had lagged behind the rest of the economy (amounting to 
only 2.0% an average from 1965 to 1973) and agricultural exports were negligible despite 
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considerable potential. manufacturing sector generally enjoyed high rates of 
effective protection so was um::on!1pe:tltl while being highly dependent on 
foreign exchange earnings from copper to 1..LA"""1,-,"" raw and capital goods 
and consequently the copper price slump affected manultac1tun 
Furthermore, the development strategy pursued in 
at least as severely as mining. 
1 had emphasized the 
of administrative controls exp,anS:lOn of public ownership and central planning within a tralne\;VOr 
over imports, and foreign-exchange allocation. 
It is very ;;UjI')lU.L" .... <I.J, .. to notice that "price signals and incentives were accorded only a 
more critical importance is that while controls were in 
the hostile rel:at1<)nS with they imposed a severe burden on a country which 
limited resources 
Der Geest 1994:26). 
livelihood of public sector pntprnin<;!f~<;! 
economic analysis at the time of independence" 
..... nr· .... cr policies which were enacted narIOl(:aDloea 
The economic situation which Zambia found carmot be divorced from its colonial past, 
m 
like in Zimbabwe, the colonial past is of fundamental the analysis of structural 
adjustment policies while these two countries of econOmIC 
Interestingly enough, the political leaders were meant to IMFIWorld Bank 
........ "'UU'"ll .... Messiahship. In 1953, the central African federation, of Southern 
nTT"""rn Rhodesia and Nyasaland was created. 
a or resistance and opposition by the 
since it was toto", Southern Rhodesia and South economic 
resources were milked and 
estimated that between, 1 
UJQ.U", .. 'y development in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It is 
to $70 million was diverted to Southern Rhodesia 
Northern Rhodesia. Furthermore, industrial and '"Tle",,,,!',,", development was concentrated in 
provided the largest portion of the federal Southern Rhodesia with the Northern 
government's income tax revenue except 
UN! ECAIF AO Economic Survey Mission 
82 
and 1959 (Hazlehood, 1967:209, 
SUMMARY OF COLONIAL LEGACY 
. ." ' . . . " .' '. ". . " ,:,: . ."' ... :", "., .",".' . "," 
1. . . . Development of a technologically advanced mining seclorinto the mainstayofthe eConomy, thereby laying···· 
the. ground· for an almost. irreverSib1eextemal·. dependence. And since· mining uses capitaI-intensive·· 
. . 
techniques, the sector would not be relied on to generate the employment that the country yearned for .. 
. 2. Traditional agriculture was marginalized by a combination of taxation and agricultural poliCies, which were 
titled in favour of expatriate farmers and the mining industry i~cembe 1974). . . 
" .' '.' .... ". . . : ' '. ,'." ' .. ' .. ",' ': : "'. ," .. " . '. 
3. .• . Economic activity was concentrated in the line-of-rail provinces, laying the ground for vast regional· 
... inequalities after independence. 
...... .... .... . . . ...... ..... ... .... . ... .. .. .... .., . ... . ..•.. .. 
4. At independence, the wagestI1lctures ~ere characteriZed byhuge differentials theil-piecemeal adoption . 
. meant tluit incomemsPanries were tocOn.tinue to· flourish. . 
5. . • African.OO=tion andotlrer soeialinfrasaucture were largely negjecte<l 
Adopted from (Blomstron and Lundahl 1993: 146 
NB: These issues precipitated serious and economically detrimental problems after independence. With 
the collapse of copper mining and early economic policy mismanagement Zambia had an economic 
decline. Hence in the 1980s IMF World Bank policies were adopted as panacea. 
It should not be forgotten that "from the vantage point of the crisis-ridden 1980s, the period 1964-
74 was Zambia's golden age-thanks to favourable copper prices and high mineral production the 
country registered impressive growth rates" (Blomstrom and Lundahl 1993: 146). Table 1 depicts 
considerable variation between the years, reached 7% in real terms. During this epocl\, the 
contribution of mining to GDP ranged from 23 to 48% and mining and copper accounted for up to 
94% of total exports and 50% of government revenue. It should be noted that variations in overall 
economic growth were not wholly blamed on the imports of the mining sector, but the strategy of 
import substitution bears much of the blame (Blomstrom and Lundahl 1993:145). Table 1 also 
reflects how, in total, the economy of Zambia grew and declined, prior the implementation of 
World Bank! IMF policies and afterwards. This colonial background however, sets the stage for a 
viable analysis of Zambia's, implementation of structural adjustment policies and their impact on the 
Zambia socio-political and economic life. This is mainly because structural problems, which 
Zambia is facing, emanated from its colonial, global economic trends and government policy 
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all this led to the adoption of measures to remedy 
nut .... '" table reflects the rise and fall of the "-'''''''IV'''''! ",,,,,,,,,"',,,u 
THE GROWTH AND OF THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY FROM 1964-1990 
THE SEARCH FOR DIVERSIFICATION IN ZAMBIA. 
Zambia: gross domestic product (million Kwacha) and copper dependence 
1964 1,618 449 644 45 53 
1965 1,915 18 518 15 686 40 71 
1966 2,172 13 572 10 588 44 64 
1967 2,449 13 628 10 619 39 60 
1968 7 650 4 660 38 58 
1969 3,123 19 758 17 755 48 59 
1970 -14 634 -16 686 36 58 
1971 2,697 0 614 -3 636 23 36 
1972 10 656 7 701 24 19 
1973 -1 627 -4 683 32 29 
1974 7 648 3 709 32 53 
1975 -2 614 -5 648 13 13 
1976 4 620 1 712 17 3 
1977 -5 573 -8 659 11 
1978 2 573 0 654 12 
1979 -8 529 -8 584 18 
1980 3,063 4 551 4 609 16 5 
1981 6 554 1 560 14 1 
1982 3,155 -3 523 -6 592 11 
1983 3,108 -2 498 -5 576 15 4 
1984 3,084 -1 479 -4 551 14 6 
1985 3,279 6 487 2 480 16 8 
1986 3,346 2 434 -11 460 18 13 
1987 3,503 6 465 7 483 14 7 
1988 4,216 5 470 1 422 10 2 
1989 4,210 0 451 12 11 
1990 441 17 
Republic of Zambia (a); (b)~ 1986; IMF, 
issues. 





= Copper production in thousands of tons. 
Contribution of copper to GDP (per cent) 
Contribution of copper to government revenue 
Contribution of copper to ell.-ports (percent) 
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However by the end of the colonial epoch the basic structure of the Zambian economy had been 
created. On the other side of the coin, "there was a thriving export enclave based on the 
exploitation and export of copper and this sector was served by a well-developed infrastructure" 
(Mwanza 1992:2). Mining development also created the resurgence of a small but active 
manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, the line of rai I regions were host to a thriving agrarian capitalist 
sector based on the production and export of few crops and these farmers were proped up by 
colonial government intervention. Just like in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), another type of 
economic survival existed, that was the peasant sector, which sector, however, produced labour for 
the commercial sector. This was the highly neglected rural sector. 
However when examining and analyzing the evolution of Zambia's economic crisis, it is, significant 
to categorise the 27 years of independence into two major periods: namely 1964 to 1974 and 1975 
to the present. During the first period copper prices rose, though erratically, and contributed to 
high mining industry profits and thus to government revenues. This was the period of boom in 
Zambia. The 1970s were economically bad years for Zambia. Copper prices sharply declined and 
this had a significant impact on the government revenues. The agricultural sector was relatively 
ignored during the time when there was relative economic boom in Zambia. "For instance, there 
was no major shift in agriculture with that of manufacturing and to this day, the nature of 
agricultural pricing policy and the land tenure system still bears the marks of the colonial era whilst 
there were designed to benefit European settlers" (Good 1976). 
It should be pointed our that after 1975 there was a massive contraction of the Zambian economy 
brought about, by, mainly, the effects of the world recession after 1973 energy crisis and this 
recession led in part, to a depletion in the demand for industrial and construction input like copper. 
Of crucial importance is the fact that falling export prices and rising input prices and the resultant 
high deficits in Zambia's balance of payments and the governments budget exacerbated the 
economic CriSIS. It should be pointed out that external pressures were reinforced by internal policy 
mistakes, such as in appropriate pricing policies, maintenance of an over-valued exchange rate, 
repressive financial policies, an inefficient parastatals sector and the heavy external debt (G.R.Z 
1984:17-18). 
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In an effort to try to uphold the Iffi'(:laCt 1'\"'''''1''",,,,,,,,,11 "0''''11'' on the international 
is to 
and this resulted in a mushrooming by the end of 1983, the 
was more than 1 00% of the 
such an economic scenario 
economic development 
of political stumbling blocks to economic or()gress and reform. Thus "the 
of external debt was roughly US $3000 million 
during that time. To forget the political 
It should be clearly pointed out that 
a ..... " .. v' .... 
economic the mining unions, the expansion of the public sector, of protected 
manufacturing and subsidized social services (predominantly provided to the 
population) created urban political which were strongly "P'f""""""""T""rI 
National Independence had the sole legal party in 
1994:26). By 1969, the proportion population in urban areas had reached was 
continuing to increase rapidly, by 1980, one of the highest propositions Africa. 
According to Jones, all of these groups "'''''''u"" had much to lose at least in the short term, from 
au,-,,,",,, economic reforms of the type which were rec;onunlen(led World Bank as early as 
INnu,p" ... r it should be noted that these aimed at improving the rural urban terms of trade. 
UA ... ' ..... "' ....... restraJlIl1rlg urban wages, eliminating subsidies on products, which benefited 
and the provision of incentives to and production. In" 1974 
and the {'Jf'\'",'''rnrnpnt attempted to carry through measures to consumer prices 
and .... "1r .. "'''nt but was forced to back down in the political opposition 
(Gulhati 1989), It should noted that the result was that during the 1970s was little 
stand-bys and two World 
to support the balance of payments ... "'~""' .. and 
concerted effort at adjustment, 
The government borrowed 
internally from the banking budget deficits. The measures leading to lustment In 
relative prices such as ex(;na:ngt~-ra U",,'QUl<1U.VU, the abolition of price controls, or 
in agricultural producer prices were in 
made under Th1F stwnd-bys in 1976 and 
heavily on recurrent cost, capital investment 
government. In the same 
reslst~:d and major cuts in 
were poorly planned 
were 
ImlJactea most 
salaries, with debilitating ettf:cts on 
.. "' •• u ...... subsidies on staple foods were increased 
in the 1 an "'tt':>rn .... t to cushion the input of the national income loss on the urban poor. 
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4.3. Summary of the causes of economic in Zambia 
In the POl)t-llnoe:peIloence the political economies most of the SADC region ....... ,""""" 
to "there is an urgent need to transform developing economies 
........ "',uv.l1u.... structures inherited from the colonial era may not ",,.,,,tt,,,, 
(Mwanza 1992: 118). Thus, after independenGe most countries 
colonial structures mainly through import sut)stitutllon 
a basis 
to 
It should be 
that Zambia is an interesting case study upon acnlevm moepcmo.en(;e on October, 1964, 
the country a relatively solely on account of earnings from the 
export 
In the Zambia had one of the highest levels of per capita income sub-Saharan 
and steady economic growth since independence in 1964 had funded an au.,v ... "" .... n)'plt~.rp state 
based on rapid expansion of health and education and on 
which Zambia faced is mainly a consequence of the P .... 'Uu .. pelrtOJrm.mc:e 
crisis is dearly a financial and in measure 1'''''I'''PH1'" exchange 
cnsls 
mll1lmg industry. The 
and the country lacks 
enough financial resources to run the "'f'~\nl'\1"1'1'1 and to llU':I.I .... "" long-term investment. 
In a to mal,ntam restmelnt and consumption, the country has relied heavily on hn'Tn"Arlrlo thus 
wClrse~rutlg its debt The crisis is also a result of structural factors which have 
by the development of strategies implemented 
development strategies have not been sustainable since 
colonial times for 
too on 
the 
subsidies. The fall of copper deeply am~ct<::o 
sector of the economy. 
controls 
CalJaCltV and subsidy tiP'''IPTIItiPlr1t 
was imposition of a regime of 
actually contributed to the worsening of 
above, the main bone of contention seems to be over 
f'rlllnnO is needed to effect long-terms changes for ...... all .. v.lU. 
although economy may benefit in the long run, concern has been ... Y'''Irp<::.: ... ·ti over 
risks and cost of structural adjustment. 
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There is a general agreement among scholars that "what has not been widely recognized is that the 
magnitude of the shocks and the severity of the distortions vary greatly from country to country. 
F or example Malawi lost 5 percent of its gross domestic income owing to terms of trade 
movements during the same time, and its policy distortions remained relatively low. Surprisingly 
the terms of trade loss in Zambia was 18% of GDP and at the same time policy distortions had 
reached a high level. World Bank economist find it relatively easy to agree on what constitutes 
"policy and institutional distortions" and these are government interventions made in the name of 
promoting economic growth, alleviating poverty, or maintaining financial balance that prove 
ineffective but instead they generated adverse side-effects either immediately or over period of time. 
World Bank has categorized Zambia as a country that fall under countries with high magnitude of 
distortions (policy and institutional), and comparatively other countries are classified as medium 
and low. 
According to World Bank Zambia, falls within the category of the 14 countries categorized as high 
distortion category. Table 13 reflected that. 
Table 13. Magnitude of Distortion (policy and Institutional), End 1970s 
High Medium Low 
Ghana Cote d'Ivoire Malawi 
Nigeria Ethiopia Cameroon 
Tanzania Burundi Rwanda 
Senegal Zimbabwe Mauritius 











Source: (Gulhati 1989) 
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To trown it all, however, it should be noted that the economic crisis which Zambia faced was an 
aftermath of a blend of colonial legacy and immediate post-independence structural distortions 
(policy and institutional). 
4.4. Theory and practice of structural adjustment programmes 
All countries in the region (S.A.D.C) have so far adopted structural adjustment programmes 
(S.A.P.S). It should be noted that SAPs were only short-term, but now they have become more 
comprehensive and long term. Not all the countries in the SADC region are implementing SAPs, 
Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia are exceptions. This is because the countries sustain viable 
economies in the region. For instance Botswana, has a rich diamond mining base which, boosts her 
foreign currency reserves, thus her economy is strong against the backdrop of a very small 
population of around 1.3 million people mainly concentrated in urban and semi-urban ar~as. Most 
donors regard the adoption of SAP as a necessary condition for releasing their aid. Thus the 
international monetary fund (IMF) and the World Bank are currently enjoying an unparalleled 
degree of eminence as they shuttle from country to country in a frenzied exercise to make the 
programmes work. 
The recipients of aid however, have appeared to be gloomy and helpless in terms of their economic 
performance thus leading to further reliance on the international donor community for economic 
survival. Current economic trends in all the countries that adopted SAPs reflect a regional state of 
corrosive economic malaise in the region. The message that there is no alternative economic policy 
to structural adjustment is now fully embraced, albeit with reservations in some countries in the 
SA DC region. 
4.5. Structuralism: An Overview. 
Structural theories have got a long history in development economics. There are not in anyway 
recent phenomenon. "In fact structural hypotheses were being formulated in Europe during the 
immediate post-World War II period" (Mwanza 1992: 1). The theory of structuralism was further 
developed and refined in Latin America, in the wake of large-scale inflation, which the monetary 
and fiscal policies in those countries failed to resolve. However, 1955, the government of Chile 
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employed a group of American consultants (the so-called klein-saks mission) to advise it on how 
best to stabilize the economy and in 1958/59, the IMF recommended on essentially "monetarist" 
stabilization package for Argentina. 
Thus the recommendations of the Klein-saks mission and the IMF sparked off the monetarist 
structuralist debate (Arndt 1985; Mwanza 1992:2). The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America (led by Raul Prebisch) and at the Institute of Economics, University of Chile, further 
developed the theory of structuralism. However, it must be realised that during the 1950s and 
1960s structuralism was used to explain the problem engulfing many Latin American countries, and 
the basic argument of the monetarist school was that inflation had reached serious proportions and 
needed to be stopped by curbing excess demand through monetary and fiscal policies, supplemented 
by the international financial assistance (Campose 1960). The "structuralist further argued that 
inflation was caused by basic inflationary pressure which were related to structural rigidities, such 
as inflexibility of the economic system and immobility of production factors and other structural 
rigidities included export concentrations and inability to increase the amount and purchasing power 
of export, stagnant food supply in face of increasing demand the low rate of capital formation and 
deficiencies in the tax system (Sunkel, 1961; Seers 1962, Arndt, 1985) 
Structuralists believe that the economic system was rather inflexible and that change would be 
inhibited by obstacles due to the interplay of structural rigidities. It should be noted that "while the 
structural theory was able to identifY and classifY the various structural factors and their inter-
relationships it did not really succeed in designing a policy package that would be used to eradicate 
those factors in the same light it should be noted that one attempts to design an alternative 
stabilization programme for Chile was not a significant paradigm (Sunkel 1961). 
4.6. Zambia and the IMF 
The IMFIWorld Bank are the largest "donor" international financial institutions. They get most of 
their resources from quota contributions by member states, although the World Bank also sells 
bonds and Word markets and through its international financial corporation (I.F.C) invests in 
member countries private enterprises (Southern African Political and Economic monthly Vol. 10. 
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No. 12, Oct 1997). IMF and World Bank loans may not be rescheduled since these institutions 
recycle the loans and only issues new loans when the old ones have been paid off. Zambia joined 
the IMF in 1965, but because of the economic boom the country was enjoying in the 1960s, it saw 
no point in using IMF resources until 1971 .. 
Thus in order to "stop the decline in foreign exchange reserves as a result of failing copper prices 
and to reduce demand and encourage domestic production, Zambia agreed to set a compulsory 
financing facility (C.F.F) with the IMF in 1971" (Mwanza 1992:35). Fundanga lists a number of 
loan agreements reached between Zambia and the IMF during the period between 1973 and 1986 
and as usual, the IMF imposed their conditions for these various stand by arrangements and 
extended finance facilities (E.F.F). Conditionally included ceilings on overall credit and credit to 
government as wen as reduction in government deficit spreading form 12 to 7 percent of GDP. 
This programme was tied to a three year Word Bank investment programme to reorient expenditure 
from infrastructure to agricultural and industrial product. 
Amongst other conditionalities that IMFIWB imposed on recipient countries was 20% devaluation 
of the Kwacha and the decontrolling of prices as well as imposition of wage restriction to 5%. The 
EFF Agreement reached between Zambia and the IMF in May 1981 place more emphasis on 
structures of adjustment and provided at least 3 years for the adjustment process to take place. In 
the mid 1982 the arrangement was suspended because the Zambian government had unsuccessfully 
tried to meet performance grades. It should be realized that countries that wish to avail themselves 
of IMF resources will have to agree on a policy framework and prepare an economic programme 
jointly with IMFlWorld Bank. Zimbabwe did the same. 
However, given the strictness of the economic conditions in Zambia it was hoped that the country 
would make full use of the EFF, but the IMF prescriptions were too bitter for Zambia to swallow. 
The World Bank IMF had imposed conditions, which included restricted public borrowing, a 
reduction in overseas payment arrears and a ceiling of $1.500m on foreign debt. However, it 
should be noted that the history of structural adjustment policies in Zambia can be divided into 
distinct periods. Such periodization is essentially necessary because Zambia at some point 
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abandoned the IMFIWB aid again. Thus it is important to analyze each distinct period on its own 
and another separately. Also, this is because IMFIWB aid had varying severity at each different 
stage of implementation. However, it is significant to notice that the re-adoption by the Zambian 
government of the IMFIWB policies reflects beyond any reasonable doubts that Zambia could not 
do it alone. However, such phases in the adoption of IMFIWB policies are not only found on the 
Zambia political economy but Zimbabwe is currently undergoing the same economic saga, because 
now she "enters the second phase of economic reforms, the programme for social and Economic 
transformation (ZIMPREST), however, it is not clear what the government's main role will be that 
is whether to be passive and playa regulatory role or be involved in the markets places", (Financial 
Gazette 15/8/97). 
It should be noted that "the government's role remains unclear though to a large extent the World 
Bank! IMF are strong proponents of state enterprise divestiture with the government using the 
proceeds to retire Debt and allowing the market place through supply and demand forces to freely 
detemrine prices and many policy-oriented analyst and economist see this as the way forward". 
(Financial Gazette 15/8/97). Thus, given the above, it should be noted that in each of the countries 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, adoption for IMF IW orId Bank policies, took the fashion of phases or 
distinct periods (periodization). Each period had unique, characteristics and features, and impacts .. 
on the general populace. To say the above is not to divert from the whole issue of socio-economic 
impact but, it is to say adoption of IMFIWB policies on Zambian political economy has distinct 
phases which phases impacted on the socio-political and economic life of Zambians. 
4.7. Economic Management in the Immediate-Post-Independence Era (1966-1970) 
Just like what happened to Zimbabwe, in a bid to redress the colonial economic past, Zambia 
adopted First National Development plan popularly called the (FNDP). This development-planning 
paradigm clamored for intensive economic diversification and reduction of dependence on the 
mining and export of unprocessed copper. The government of Zambia led by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda 
concentrated on the improvement of infrastructure, mainly in health, energy transport and education 
sectors (F.N.D.P 1966-70). Zimbabwe also did the same thing after independence, the government 
played a "more decisive role in the public sector" (Chakaodza 1994:50). In Zambia under the 
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F.N.D.P, rnost of the targets were realized. Thus, education and health facilities expanded rapidly 
while and irnpressive social and econornic infrastructure was developed and this success was based 
on high copper prices during the irnrnediate post-independence era. 
This irnplies that the Zarnbian governrnent planned its econornic activities and econornlC life. 
Planning of the econorny was actuaHy done in phases. The (F.N.D.P) was followed chronologically 
by second national developrnent plan (1972-76). When the second National Developrnent plan 
(1972-76) was established global trends were not favourable for national econornies. In fact the 
launching of the second National Developrnent Plan (1972-76) coined with the ernergence of the 
World-wide econornic recession due to rising inflation rnainly caused by the 1973 oil crisis and the 




a rnodest incorne growth forrn copper rnining 
The stabilization of the international price of copper at 740 pounds per rnetric ton. ,. 
a rnodest irnport index increase of2-3% during the plan period. 
However, the chief objectives of the FNDP encornpassed, inter alia the expansion of agriculture, 
industrial expansion. Reduction of regional inequalities and developrnent of tourisrn. The hope that 
the gains of FNDP were going to be strengthened or enhanced, becarne a nightrnare. It was the 
opposite, the gains of FNDP were cornpletely underrnined by the F.N.D.P period. Stastically, 
copper production collapsed frorn 712 000 tonnes in 1976 to 525 000 tonnes in 1984. That rneans 
a total difference of 187000 tonnes with a scope of 8 years. Zarnbian econorny was beset with a lot 
of problerns, which ernanated frorn its colonial past. Sorne of the problerns Zarnbia faced were a 
result of bad c1irnatic condition. Thus, owing to unfavorable clirnatic whether conditions as of the 
1980s Zarnbia had to irnport her food requirernents, the average annual cost arnounting to U.S. $ 
30 rnillion. This kind of econornic rnilieu had titanic effects on the future of the Zarnbian econornic 
policy rnaking. 
However, as foreign exchange crisis continued to worsen, the volurne of irnports contracted so 
rapidly that by 1984 irnports were only about 32% of the 1974 level in real terms. The results of 
this situation was that there was a serious shortage of raw rnaterial, intermediate foods, spare parts 
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and capital equipment, which in tum reached the supply of consumer goods and, furthermore, 
mineral revenue declined from the peak ofK314,7 million in 1974 to K59,4 million in 1975. This 
also led to a decrease in mining revenues. 
In response to the economic malaise, the Zambian government led by Dr. K. Kaunda, made strong 
efforts to broaden the tax base so as to insulate the budget from the effects of revenue instability. It 
should be noted that since the fiscal system failed to satisfY government expenditure requirements, 
the government increased its reliance on bank and foreign borrowing and embarked on subsidy 
reduction and price liberalization and as a result inflationary pressures increased during the late 
1970s"(Mwanza 1992:5). Rising inflation culminated in the collapse of the Zambian Kwacha 
against major economic currencies. 
As a consequence of economic decline, increase in population demography, even-spiraling inflation, 
the GDP in 1984 was 78% of the 1974 level. The situation was intensively exacerbated or 
aggravated by an increase in raw-material shortfalls, a high level of capital intensity in industry, let 
alone, ineffective and inefficient allocation 9f scarce foreign exchange resources. Given the 
foregoing, basically and primarily, there was thus, a great need to reduce consumption and enhance 
production in order to lay a foundation for sustainable economic development. It is against the 
backdrop ofa collapsing economy that the Zambian government decided to adopt lMFlWB policies 
as viable panacea to these economic ills and structural stumbling blocks. 
4.8. Summary of structural problems facing tbe Zambian economy in tbe 1980s 
1. A highly urbanized and rapidly growing population, with stagnant formal sector 
employment and a high degree of dependence and subsidized consumer goods and welfare 
sefV1ces. 
2. An extremely skewed income distribution, even by developing country standards, with the 
richest 5% receiving a third of total income and the poorest 60% only a fifth (Joshi, and 
ministry 1989). 
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3. A political system, which to a considerable degree entrenched the interest of those who, 
had most to lose from the reform (Bates and Collier 1991). 
4. Extremely high levels of external debt in relation to exports, and GDP by 1987 the per 
capita debt burden was the highest in the developing world. 
5. A real effective exchange rate whose level had remained almost constant at the pre 1975 
level, implying no additional incentive to promote non-traditional exports. 
6. A large number of parastatal enterprises and agencies whose financial and management 
performance was poor, and a demoralized public service. 
7. An agricultural sector whose development had been neglected and was characterized by 
extreme dualism between large-scale capital-intensive commercial fanning and subsistence 
activities. 
8. Continued dependence on the mining sector to generate foreign exchange and government 
revenues and consequent extreme, vulnerability to world price fluctuations and for the 
exhaustion of the main mineral deposits which is due in the early years of the next century. 
9. A relatively large manufacturing sector of doubtful economic viability, generally enjoying 
high rates of effective protection (Gulhati 1989), dependent on receiving rationed foreign 
exchange at a price well below its scanty value and intermittently crippled by foreign-
exchange shortages (Adapted from Van Der Geest 1994:27). 
4.9. Chronology of Main Policy Agreements from 1983 (Adapted from Gulhati 
1989) 
1983 April llvlF stand-by agreement (12 months) may Paris club agreement on debt 
restructuring. 
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1984 March World Bank export rehabilitation (copper) and diversification loan 
May consultative group agreement on external aid. 
July IMF stand-stand by agreement (21 months) 
July Paris club agreement on debt rescheduling 
December London club commercial bank restructuring. 
1985 January IDAJWorld Bank agricultural rehabilitation project 
June consultative group agreement offoreign exchange auction and import liberation 
I.D.A industrial rehabilitation credit 
December Consultative group agreement on external aid. 
1987May Abandonment of foreign-exchange auction 
New Economic Recovery Program introduced 
1989 January Five-year plan for 1989-93 released 
August Policy framework Paper 1989-93 released. 
4.10. The First Phase Structural Adjustment in Zambia (1981-1985) 
Structural adjustment programmes in Zambia have taken a unique and a very erratic fasmon. The 
implementation of structural reforms, in Zambia, was, wholly fraught of structural inconsistency 
and incoherence. World Bank IMF policies in Zambia were once jettisoned by the Zambian 
government, in favour of a locally influenced economic-planning approach. Yet at a later stage, 
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Zambia re-adopted World Bank IMF aid. This approach had a great impact on the socio-political 
and economic life of the Zambians. At each and every phase they profoundly endured the pain. 
The Th1F IWB panacea, instead of curing its patient, it killed her. It should be realised in mind that 
in order to clearly explicate the impact of these IMFIWB policies, this study will consider all the 
phases of adoption of World Bank aid. Basically, the overall impact of S.A.P.S in Zambia, can only 
be explained when examining all the phases (that is the period before and "the period following the 
resumption of Zambia's relationship with the two, institutions, which had been severed between 
1987 and 1989" (Wallace 1997: 129). 
Zambia's relationship with the World Bank and the IMF goes to 1956 and 1965 respectively. 
However, the World Bank and Th1F argue that the imbalances that Zambia started to experience in 
the mid-1970s apart from being direct consequences of the ensuing shocks, were due to 
inappropriate policies, in conjunction with narrow tax bases and poor public enterprise 
performance, domestic pricing policies biased against agriculture and overvalued currencies, are 
some of the policies cited. 
However, in 1981 the Zambian government adopted a medium-term. adjustment programme to 
cover the period 1981-3, supported by an extended fund facility arrangement of S.D.R 800 million 
from the IMF. According to Jones the main objective of their programme (Th1F 1983) were, inter 
alia; 
1). To promote the resumption of a modest rule of economic growth through the stimulation 
and diversification of economic activity. 
2). To restore domestic financial equilibrium, particularly in public and parastatal enterprise 
finances. 
3). To achieve a sustainable external position over the period of the programme (Van Der Geest 
1994:28) 
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The purpose of this programme at the early stages of implementation, seemingly achieved fiscal 
targets but on the other hand the balance of payments and domestic credit targets were not met and 
the arrangements were cancelled in July 1982. 
Thus, during the year 1982, considerable arrears of external payments accumulated to fund the 
balance of payments deficit and hence, in 1983 April a further stand-by agreement with the l1v1F 
was conducted. The chief reason for this was to make and clear an avenue for an agreement on 
debt restructuring to be concluded with the Paris club in May 1983. In the 1980s the plight of the 
Zambian people was becoming worse and worse at every stage of implementation 1982, December, 
the prices of 50 commodities produced or marketed by public enterprises were decontrolled 
(leaving only the prices of maize, wheat flour, bread and candles to be determined by government) 
and a devaluation of20% and increase in interest rates occurred in January 1983 and form July the 
Kwacha was allowed to depreciate a further 15% against the SDR according to Jones (Van Der 
Geest 1994:28). 
According to Gulhati, the main target of the April 1983 stand-by was (Gulhati: 1989) 
1). Reduction in the current deficit by 10% in current prices, involving 13% reduction In 
imports and a 14% expansion of exports. 
2). External commercial payments arrears to be reduced by S.D.R. 30 million and arrears on 
rescheduled debt payments avoided. 
3). The Kwacha to be devalued by 20% and a flexible exchange rate policy introduced. 
4). Reduction in public expenditure, particularly subsidies, and the imposition of new taxes. 
5). Avoidance of general increase in Civil service pay and employment. 
6). Calling oflO% on wage increase (Van Der Geest 1994:29) 
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The government of Kaunda won the general and presidential election and a new finance Minister 
was appointed, amid serious negotiations with unions, because they had already started to feel the 
pain of structural adjustment policies. The economic status quo continued to worsen with the ever 
collapsing of copper prices at the international market. The overall imports also fell by 26%. The 
standby was suspended when the government failed to meet the targets for reducing payments 
arrears. A further standby was agreed upon by the Zambian government with the IMF in 1984, so 
for, the behavior depicted by Kaunda government, indicated that "African countries recovering 
from economic disaster have increasingly accepted that they must persist with the macro-economic 
policies demanded by the IMF IWB" (Harvey 1990: 130). At this time this was Kaunda's 
government belief. It is very significant to notice that putting the whole reform effort into different 
periodizations will in the end enable production of a valid analysis of the overall impact of the 
Zambian society. 
4.1t. The Intensive Reform Effort 1985-1986 
According to Harvey the new policy which was introduced in 1985 in Zambia, was sprung on the 
government by President Kaunda with very little internal debate or preparation (Harvey 1990: 130). 
Surprisingly, it was supported by the president himself and two of his stalwarts ministers and it was 
opposed publicly and consistently by the remainder of cabinet and the central committee of the 
ruling party, in almost daily speeches up and down the country (Harvey 1990: 131). Harvey noted 
that "in those circumstances, producers wont have been extremely foolish to invest significant 
resources in increased production in the expectation that the policy would be sustained and 
moreover it became rational to buy not only current needs for foreign needs as well, in the 
expectation that the availability of foreign exchange would be restricted when the policy was 
reversed" (Harvey I 990: 131). It should be noted that IMF /WB, required government to do other 
unpopular things such as restricting credit removing subsidies, increasing taxation and cutting 
government spending. Furthermore the first year of an adjustment was therefore extremely difficult 
politically, and the second year was often not much better. What was essentially imperative was 
persistence. 
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During the mid 1980s the relations of government of Kenneth Kaunda and the Trade Unions 
became very tense and uncompromising. The Unions in Zambia represents to a strong force that 
stands for the workers bloc. The ever sky-rocketing prices of consumer goods, ever-spiraling 
standards of living affected the lives of the Zambians and general political opposition mounted 
strongly during this period. During 1984 and 1985 the foreign-exchange situation became 
increasingly desperate as the commercial ban line of credit for all imports threatened and the 
government came under pressure to divert funds earmarked for the import needs of the main copper 
mining company, ZeeM, and relations with trade unions became worse following price increases at 
the end of 1984. Despite the fact that the Reform policy programme became unpopular in the 
country, the government went ahead with it with Kaunda and his two ministers supporting it. It is 
significant to outline the main focus of the reform policies of this period. According to Jones, the 
reform programme implemented during this period focused on three main objectives. 
1). reduction of distortions in the economy by decontrolling prices 
2). Improvement of incentives for greater production and diversification. 
3). Strengthening the government's capacity for economic management (World Bank 1986). 
According to (Gulhati 1989:3), Zambia was infected with a lot of policy distortions. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, it ranked amongst countries like Ghana and Zaire whose magnitude of policy and 
institutional distortions was high and in the SADe region. It should be noted that the intensity of 
reforms (which Gulhati defined in terms of stabilization and structural adjustment measures), and 
the magnitude of policy and institutional distortions by the end of 1970s, were high in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as shown in Table 14. As portrayed by other countries in SADe like Malawi, Zimbabwe 
Mauritius and Zimbabwe, have different situations altogether. But, whatever, the case may be, the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies in the region, had varying imparts with different 
severities also. But all in all at each stage of implementation or phase, the people would feel the 
pinch. IMFfWB policies became bitter pill to swallow in the Third World. This explains why the 
unions in Zambia in the 1980s expressed large scale dissatisfaction with the whole economic status 
quo, IMFfWB medicine catastrophically, annihilated its patient instead of healing her, it further 
handicapped her. The IMF /WB, is content that at least Zambia today is making some progress in 
privatization programmes. Recently "a consortium led by London listed Reunion Mining is believed 
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to have offered $10 million for Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines' Mufulira Division - well below 
the asset's estimated value", negotiations are still taking place, the deal was not finalised (Business 
Day 4/1/1999). 
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Table 14. Status of Policy and Institutional Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Intensity and duration 








Source: (Simon: 1995) 
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4.12. S.A.D.C Structural Adjustment Zimbabwe and Zambia - An Overview 
SADC is the heir to S.A.D.C.C. (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference). It is 
mainly comprised of Southern African countries. Just like the EEC (European Economic 
Community), has changed to EC (European Community), strikingly, S.A.D.C.C (Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference), per se, is now called SADC (Southern African 
Development Community). In line with global international economic trends, characterised by the 
irresistible hegemonic domination of IMFI WB, in global economic systems, most SADC states, 
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made some policy reforms by adopting structural adjustment programmes, in response to their 
economic CriSIS. It is worth recalling that before there was structural adjustment, there was 
international adjustment: the dramatic changes in international prices, interest rates, financial 
markets and trading conditions in the 1970s created a set of new realities to which all economies 
had to adjust. Structural adjustment took over and it gradually acquired the meaning of wholesale 
economic reform in developing countries under conditional programmes agreed with international 
and bilateral institutions. These structural adjustment programmes were not only to achieve 
international adjustment but to correct the policies and practices of post economic management 
where these were thought to be unsatisfactory -what was known elsewhere as PERESTROIKA. It 
is believed that there was a great deal to correct - numerous Sub-Saharan African economies were 
suffering from unsustainable external and domestic debts and deficits, inflation, low levels of saving 
and investment, period shortages of food and consumer goods, development -equitable growth and 
structural transformation was not taking place. 
The ideological origins of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) can be traced back to the free-
market and free-trade ethos derived from Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in the view of Simon 
(Simon, et ai, 1995: 1). In Adam Smith and David Ricardo's view "the present economic crisis in 
the Third World countries can be overcome only if they restructure their economies to become 
active players in a common strategy for world prosperity based on competition in the international 
export market (Simon, et ai, 1995: I). S.A.D.C. region is and has already commenced doing this. 
Before the arrival of adjustment, almost all governments in the Southern African development 
Community (S.A. D.C.) maintained food subsidy programmes, using state owned enterprises and 
controls over food marketing and external trade and government also provided input subsidies for 
agricultural and industrial producers and for health and education facilities (S.A.P.E.M, 1997: Vol. 
10, No. 12). However, in the rest of the SADC region (those countries in SADC that adopted 
structural adjustment programmes), adjustment has implied abandonment of these welfarist policies 
which were the hallmark of the "socialist model" of the 1970s. The main objective of structural 
adjustment is to remove government perpetrated economic distortions. These economic distortions 
encompasses fixed exchange rates, price controls or subsidies which, in alliance with exogenous 
factors, tend to exacerbate the economic crisis and in the first phase the major objective is to 
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contain or reduce inflation through implementation of demand management policies (World Bank 
Vol. 18 No. 12, 1990). It is argued that demand management policies are also intended to maintain 
internal and external balances and include measures designed to reduce or eliminate the government 
budget deficit and the balance of payment deficit and other measures include monetary policy 
reform, price liberation and wage. In most SADC states these wage freezes, precipitated 
insurmountable problems for the common people, especially, in the wake of ever-sky rocketing 
food prices, rent and rates. Prices of food went exorbitantly high and became unfavourable for most 
of the non-urban and urban population in middle and lower classes of the population. Hence food 
riots and workers strikes were all symbolic of the large-scale loathe, to E.S.A.P., by the majority of 
the people. In fact SAPs in the SADC region are seen as anathema by the citizenry, owing to the 
fact that their implementation, culminated in not only horrendous results socially but the SAPs, 
precipitated detrimental effects on the public rather than yielding or producing positive economic 
"spin-offs". The socio-political homeostasis of the S.A.D.C. region was wholly disturbed by the 
implementation of the SAP policies. 
It should not be forgotten that "reforms that are meant to change the structure of production 
(towards tradable goods) and consumption (towards controlled goods) and thus to achieve an 
outward - looking economy while promoting efficiency and flexibility constitute an important 
component of structural policies". Several questions are asked by many scholars about the 
S.A.D.C. region -Has poverty deepened during the adjustment phase in the S.A.D.C. region? If 
poverty has increased, has it been due to the impact of economic reform or would the situation have 
been the same without adjustment? Do the poor benefit from adjustment? How have households 
responded to the decline in their living standards, or in other words, what are the household's 
coping or adoptive strategies to adjustment induced impacts? According to the World Bank (1990) 
World Bank Development Report, a strong positive relationship exists between economic growth 
and poverty reduction. The World Bank has argued that "the rather weak economic performance of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, was largely caused by partial or inconsistent policy implementation (and that 
countries which performed well had good policies, characterised by macroeconomic stability and 
competitive export prices. Most of the empirical studies reflect that the record of adjustment 
programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa is a mixed bag, but with poverty levels having risen sharply 
during the adjustment period in most SADC states. For instance in Zambia whereas in 1980 the 
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poor constituted only about 50% of the population (ILO/JASPA, 1981) by 1993, the proportion of 
the poor has risen to about 80% G.R.Z 1993, Priority Survey Tabulation Report 1993, World Bank 
1946) and in Zimbabwe, the percentage of the poor has risen from 33% in 1990 to 60% in 1995 
(Zimbizi, et al, 1997). 
However, adjustment in part is conditioned by "factors including program design existing economic 
and social or political structures and the nature of poverty situation in each country (Alwang et aI, 
1996:1711, World Development vol. 24 No. 11,23,1996:1711-1723). 
In the SADC region seemingly, adjustment policies contribute to rising poverty levels for example 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises and civil service reforms lead to retrenchments thus 
worsening the unemployment situation and reduction of government spending, price liberation or 
subsidy withdrawal exposes large sections of the population to consumer price increases 
(S.A.P.E.M Vol. 10, No. 12, 1997). In the same breath, in most SADC states expenditure cuts 
were accompanied by imposition of user fees reduced people's access to services such as health and 
education (Chinemann and Sanders; Lugala, 1993) in Peter Gibbon (ed.) 307-357; Seshamani et ai, 
1993, Zimbizi, 1997). During the adjustment programme increases in agricultural input prices 
weaken the position of small-scale producers, most of whom previously depended on government 
support and as a result most of them do not benefit from the producer price rises while some are 
effectively driven out of the production process" (S.A.P .E.M Vol. 10, No. 12, 1997). However, the 
rich-poor gap tends to widen while the ranks of the old poor are argumented by the new poor 
Zambian structural adjustment saga is very stunning because of frequent policy swings or shifts it 
made in the adjustment process. Upon discovering that the populace has been hit hard by the SAP, 
in 1987 the government decided to abandon the programme so that it can try more endogenous 
approaches to economic recovery in the so called (N.E.R.P) (New Economic Recovery 
Programme). Later on Zambia returned to the IMFI WB fold. In Zambia, according to Mwanza 
economic confrontation began in the 1 970s and it zoomed into the 1 990s and as a result Zambia's 
capita income dropped from about US $500 in 1975 to US $290 in 1992. Poverty levels spiralled. 
In Zimbabwe, the economic strain in the country during the 1980s forced policy markers to 
implement economic reforms. The impact of these policy programmes on the citizenry was 
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indescribable, acute human suffering (huge retrenchments, ever-spiralling food pnces reduced 
access to free education and health). In a nut-shell, it can be said that SAPs in SADC, failed to yield 
positive economic spin-offs but rather they precipitated a proliferation of chains of suffering families 
in the region. 
However, albeit, all these economic set backs SADC leaders have not gIven up on efforts to 
ameliorate the economic conditions of their respective countries. According to Ross, "the Zambian 
economy is basically a mono-economy with copper mining contributing traditionally as much as 
90% to export earnings and 20% to GDP. Lower copper prices last year were the main factor 
leading to an 18% slump in export earnings to US $974,9m" (African Business, October, 1997 no 
225). Also, "two recent privatisation now signal the beginning of a major privatisation band-wagon 
which will have an immense impact on the economy" according to Ross, It is reportedly said that 
"the break-up and privatisation of Zambia's debt-laden mines has been a protracted affair, however 
it is estimated that privatisation will bring US $2,5 billion into the Zambia economy". This is a 
major amount of money when seen in light of the fact that the nominal estimate for GDP in 1996 
was US $3,87 billion (African Business, October, 1997 no 225), in the wake of increased, suffering 
precipitated by structural adjustment. "Hopefully, with the successful selling off of the marginal 
Kansanshi mine plus its exciting exploration play and the small but profitable Chibuluma West mine 
and Chibuluma South, the ZCCM privatisation band wagon is on its way and rapidly following in its 
wake, it is hoped, will be a general changing of gears in the Zambian economy and a speeding up of 
development" (African Business, October, 1997 no 225). A close examination of Zimbabwe, 
however, reflects that what should have been Africa is healthiest economies has became inflation 
ridden, debt --burdened and plagued by 50% unemployment rate and in a bid to placate the public, 
the government had to raise Zim dollar $ 2 bn through a 10-year 2] % loan stock in December to 
pay the one-off Z $50 000 gratuity per ex-combatant and a further monthly payment of Z $2 000 to 
each of the 50 000 to 70 000 ex-combatants for life" (The Economist 24 January to 30th 1998; 
African Business, October, 1998 no 229). One wonders if this would alleviate the impact of ESAP 
which the government implemented in 199 1-1995 or whether the newly adopted policy 
ZIMPREST has any impact on changing the suffering trends which have taken shape during ESAP 
implementation (Financial Gazette, January 1998). ESAP has caused untold suffering in both 
countries (Zambia and Zimbabwe), for instance in Zimbabwe the congress of Trade Union 
106 

that kills instead of curing. 
Table 15. Gross Domestic Production by Kind of Economic Activity in Prod~cer's Value at 
Constant (1970) Prices (In K' million) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 168 169 160 166 180 159 172 
2. Mining and Quarrying 470 495 391 399 433 433 469 
3. Manufacturing 152 160 163 163 180 173 182 
4. Electricity, Gas and water 59 76 81 85 91 97 98 
5. Construction 90 82 69 79 61 65 48 
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade 97 96 90 99 99 90 87 
7. Hotels and Restaurants 17 18 17 20 24 22 22 
8. Transport and Communications 60 61 63 57 60 60 58 
9. Financial Institutions and Insurance 49 41 45 41 40 44 36 
10. Housing and Real Estate 45 48 50 53 60 64 59 
11. Business services 32 32 31 39 38 38 39 
12. Community, Social and Personal Services 197 198 202 210 207 205 200 
13. Import Duties 20 16 15 17 20 16 13 
14. Less Imputed bank Charges 11 9 10 9 9 10 8 
15. Total GDP 1447 1484 1370 1418 1484 1454 1477 
(Source: Government of Zambia, 1987) 
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Table 16. Year-to-Year Fluctuations in Sectoral Peiformance of the Zambia Economy 
1977 1978 1979 t980 1981 1982 1983 Average Annual 
rate Growth (+) 
L Total GDP -4.8 +2.6 -8.0 +3.5 +4.6 -2.1 +1.5 -1.1 
2. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 0.6 0.6 -5.9 3.7 8.4 11.7 8.1 0.5 
3. Mining and Quarrying -6.6 5.3 -21.1 2.0 8.5 0.0 8.3 -0.5 
4. Manufacturing -10.6 5.3 2.0 0.0 10.4 -3.9 5.0 1.] 
5. Electricity, Gas and Water 23.0 29.0 6.6 5.0 7.5 6.6 6.6 11.2 
6. Construction -10.0 -9.0 -9.0 -15.9 -14.5 -6.5 -26.0 -8.9 
7. Wholesale and Retail Trade -10.0 -1.0 -7.0 10.0 0.0 -9.0 -3.4 -2.9 
8. Hotels and Restaurants -10.0 6.0 -6.0 17.6 20.0 -8.3 0.0 2.8 
9. Transport and communications -9.1 P7 3.2 -9.6 5.2 0.0 -3.3 -l.7 
Ie. Financial Institutions and Insurance -15.1 -16.3 97 -8.9 -2.5 10.0 -10.0 -4.8 
II. Housing and Real Estate 4.6 62 4.2 6.0 14.0 7.0 -7.8 5.0 
12. Business services -9.0 3.0 3.0 14.7 -.2.6 0.0 2.6 l.7 
13. Community Social and Personal services +05 0.5 2.0 4.0 -1.5 l.0 -2.5 0.3 
14. Import Ditties 0.0 -20.5 -6.0 12.0 17.5 -20.0 -18.0 -15.0 
IS. Less Imputed bank Charges -15.4 -18.0 11.0 -10.0 0.0 11.0 -20.0 -0.8 
Source: Economic Reports, Various Issues 
It should be remembered that the duration of the TNDP was disturbed by the implementation of 
(SAP). During the 1980s Zambian economic performance collapsed. The other problem was that 
Zambia's trading partners were also experiencing rising inflation as a result a great portion of the 
inflation pressure was due to rising import prices. The real GDP of the economy was trapped in a 
low-level stagnation, with output of goods and services Increasing in one year and falling in another 
but never assuming a rising trend as shown by (Table 15). Apart from this (Table 15) depicts that 
GDP, having declined by 5% between 1976- 1973 rose by 2% in 1978 and fell again by 8,4% 
between, 1978 and 1979. However, Table 16 reflects the fluctuations in sectorial performance of 
the Zambia Economy from 1977 to 1983 and the (Table 16) indicates a lot of decline in average 
growth. All this contributed to the whole scenario of economic malaise. 
By November 1986, the following measures had been implemented (World Bank, 1986; Gullati, 
1989). 
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By November 1986, the following measures had been implemented (World Bank, 1986; Gullati, 
1989). 
4.12.1. External Sectoral Adjustment 
"Restriction of the administrative allocation of foreign exchange and introduction of foreign 
exchange countries" (Van Der Geest, 1994:29). Restrictions on import licensing and prohibitions 
were removed. However, reform of the tariff system to rationalise the structure of protection 
began, including the establishment of a tariff commission and the reduction of maximum duties to 
100% and the extension of minimum duties of 15% to all imports except certain essentials and The 
Investment Act (March, 1986) provided tax incentives to encourage businesses which were export-
oriented, domestic inputs, or were located in rural areas. 
4.12.2. Price liberalisation and Decontrol 
Price liberalisation, is a main feature of IMFI WB conditionalities, together with decontrolling of 
prices (except roller meal and fertilisers). Price liberalisation and decontrolled to the rising of prices 
in all spheres of Zambian economy with the result that people could not afford to purchase some of 
the basics. This was an entrepreneur .- friendly measure yet it was not good for the consumers. 
Consumers were left at the mess of the business people. 
4.12.3. Monetary Policy 
Interest rates on deposit and lending were liberalised and a system of daily customs for Treasury 
Bills was introduced. The impact of the measure will be discussed later. 
4.12.4. Agricultural Reform 
Agricultural "producer prices were improved and a method of price setting based on border pricing 
and marketing and transport costs was introduced, and the government agreed to increase price 
margins to cover two-thirds of marketing costs by May 1986, and full costs by 1987. In the past 
the National Agricultural. Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) had the monopoly on maize and 
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fertiliser. However, this monopoly was obliterated by this reform policy. 
4.12.5. Rehabilitation of the Copper Industry. 
The copper industry was, per se, the backbone of the Zambian economy. However, because of 
faltering copper prices on the international markets and the rise of oil prices, the industry was beset 
with an array of serious and irresistible stumbling blocks, which consequently led to its debacle. It 
was, desperately, imperative to revitalise the industry and restore its mighty. However, the costs of 
doing so were to be felt later. However, significant measures to improve the copper industry were 
implemented, including the closing of uneconomic mines, the retrenchment of 4,000 workers and 
the introduction of improved management planning and control practices. 
The closure of the so-called uneconomic mines led to huge layoffs and retrenchments. Most miners 
were found in a desperate situation in which their families and their dependants suffered because the 
breadwinners were thrown out of employment. This led to breaking apart of some families as most 
of the ex-Zambian miner made an exodus to neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe and South 
Africa to work in mines. In essence poverty in Zambia was worsened than reduced. However, it is 
worth noting that in a bid to restore stability and strength of the mining sector, the Zambia 
government led by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, worsened the plight of the people of Zambia since most of 
them were left jobless and with the ever-spiralling standards ofliving most of the families just could 
not afford. In Zimbabwe after the commencement ofE. S.A.P.I, most of the mines were closed for 
instance, Kamativi mine and most miners lost their jobs and their economic livelihood. Most of 
these workers were Zambian immigrant workers who had left Zambia after the collapse of copper 
mining. However, it proved to be impossible to reduce the tax burden on ZCCM or meet its foreign 
exchange requirements to allow it to reverse the decline in output. 
Jone's "Zambian uneconomic miners", were a feature not uncommon in countries that accepted 
IMFfWorld Bank policies. The same phenomenon was rife in Zimbabwe after the implementation of 
World Bank! IMF policies. According to (B.Z. 5, issue No. 95/1, February 1995) "'the government 
finally closed the tin mine at Kamativi in mid-June after 40 years of operation" This was a classic 
example of Jone Stephen's uneconomic mines. With a population of 5,000, the closure of the 
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Kamativi mme marked the death-knell for the town. However, the WBI IMF policies of 
restructuring, as shown by the above, had profound adverse impact on the lives of the people in 
both Zimbabwe and Zambia. Instead of alleviating poverty, the IMFI WB policies deepened it. 
Instead of creating an affluentl output working aristocracy, the WBI IMF policies precipitated the 
destruction of that class and worsened the plight of their households and those that depend on 
them. The vaccine killed the patient while the doctor (IMFI WB), ponders what steps to take next. 
Rehabilitation of the copper mining sector was a fiasco in Zambia. 
4.13. Structural Adjustment's Auction System and Its Impact 
The foreign Exchange Auction System that was decided upon by the Zambian government as part 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme, had a severe impact on the lives of the ordinary 
Zambians, both socially and economically, since it implied "a massive devaluation of the Kwacha. 
For instance, the first auction resulted in at least 100% devaluation of the Kwacha. In 1986, the rate 
against the dollar rose to more than K8 in one week in July and K15 in early December: May be, 
the fundamental starting point is to define what foreign exchange Auction System is. In October 
1985, the Bank of Zambia announced the new system for determining the exchange rate of the 
currency. The Kwacha value would be determined by foreign exchange auctioning, under the 
auspices of a foreign Exchange Management Committee chaired by the General Manager of the 
Bank of Zambia, which would conduct weekly auctions and make allocations to government, the 
mining companies, the oil companies, Zambian Airways and Zambia-Tanzania pipelines. These 
institutions not included from bidding at the rate determined by the bidding process. The actual 
exchange rate would be determined by marginal bid, that is, the bid that would fully exhaust the 
weekly allocation of foreign exchange. Applicants were to submit their foreign exchange requests 
through their commercial banks. This process of foreign exchange auction system implied a lot of 
relaxation in the country's foreign trade policy and thus a lot of risk and costs. 
It should be noted that, the foreign exchange system was a distinct departure from the previous 
system of foreign exchange allocation. The Bank of Zambia's argument was that "the system was 
designed to reduce subjectivity and corruption and also implement fundamental adjustment 
measures in the light of the country's major disequilibrium in its external payments, and also to 
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distribute foreign exchange impartially on the basis of underlying forces of effective demand and 
through this exchange value of the currency could be established (Mwape, 1985). However, the 
system did not seek to increase the supply of foreign exchange but rather to allocate the little that 
was available in the market. 
As the Kwacha continued to fall, because of this IMF! WB advised auction system, inflation also 
accelerated and created economic uncertainty as business operations and planning became 
increasingly difficult. As level of inflation rose, the prices of daily consumables, goods, like food 
rose exorbitantly. Rents and rates also sharply rose to meet the inflation rates that were now 
common place. Moreover, because of limited inflows of foreign exchange, the exchange rate rose 
sharply against the Kwacha, thereby making the local manufacturing sector unable to bid for 
exchange because it could not raise necessary Kwacha cover (Kaunga, 1985; Mwanza, 1992:20). 
With such local manufacturing sector problems, the problems were abysmally felt by the working 
poor, who faced retrenchments from the local manufacturing companies and employment in these 
sectors were frozen. Towards the "end of 1985, the Zambian government regarded rising inflation 
as the main problem associated with the auction (Ndulo and Norton, 1987:73; Colclough, 1988)". 
The government is of ability to resolve the situation was crippled by the phenomenon of 
conditionality that accompanied the whole system of SAPS. Furthermore, "the fear of urban 
discontent and the bargaining power of domestic interest groups such as the Commercial Farmer's 
Bureau and the Trade Union Movement further constrained government auction. For instance, an 
attempt to reduce the maize meal subsidy in 1986 provoked food riots in the copper belt region" of 
Zambia. 
The collapse of the Kwacha as a consequence of inflation which was caused by Structural 
Adjustment's autcion system, profoundly riddled the finances of the members of the Commercial 
Farmer's Bureau, since that, per se, (inflation), resulted in the serious increase of prices of 
Agricultural inputs like seeds, fertilisers and other chemicals. Inflation which was precipitated by 
the foreign currency Auction System, gave birth to an aura of abysmal loath towards the Zambian 
government led by Dr. K. Kaunda. As mentioned before inflation provoked the Trade Union 
members since it directly affected them. Discontent and disagreement with government's IMF! WB 
led policies become very serious in the 1980s as compared to the 1970s. Strikingly, in Zimbabwe, 
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this time, its not the Commercial Farmers' Bureau but the Commercial Farmers Union, which 
suffers a lot of problem from the ruling party and government of Zimbabwe. The inflation which 
was precipitated by the implementation of E.S.A.P.I, in Zimbabwe, like in Zambia resulted in a 
critical rise of prices of farming inputs and raw materials. With the depreciation of the Zimbabwe 
Dollar the Commercial Farmers found it very expensive to purchase raw materials both externally 
and internally. Thus, they had to compensate this by freezing salary and wage increments for their 
workers. This culminated in a vicious circle, which manifested itself in the form of agricultural 
strikes and huge retrenchments from the Commercial farms. Yet these commercial farmers in 
Zimbabwe are facing a threat of land acquisition programme. Critics, however, argue that this is 
useless scapegoating, and ''whichever, way he turns, Mugabe is likely to find like Kaunda did, that 
his way is blocked" (Sunday Times, 22/02/98). These are some of the implications of structural 
adjustment programmes in the SADC region. They are both short-term and long-term. Some effects 
are manifested earlier but others can only be seen after a long time of suffering. 
According to Mwanza ''the unprecedented depreciation of the Kwacha (of over 900%) gave rise to 
a record inflation rate of over 60% in just 2 years. Major sectors of the economy such as agriculture 
and manufacturing which were to benefit from the structural adjustment programme were adversely 
affected" (Mwanza, 1992:20). Moreover, "contrary to expectations, capacity utilisation declined 
drastically since many local industries could not afford to import raw materials and machinery and 
as a result redundancies became prevalent" (Mwanza, 1992:20). As redundancies became rife, the 
plight of the ordinary Zambians worsened. Poverty ratios accelerated with uncontrollable rapidity. 
Thus instead of ameliorating the lives and standards of living of the Zambian people, IMFI WB 
policies worsened their lot. However, "an impression was created that commodities were in 
plentiful supply during the foreign auction system and on the contrary that was far from reality" 
(Mwanza, 1992:20). There was generally low purchasing power in the country. Hence, ''the 
majority of the people simply could not afford to purchase the commodities" Mwanza, 1992:20). 
The situation, in which generally, the Zambian people could not afford to buy products, was a 
successfully hopeless situation. The alternative of increasing wages, was also viewed a likely 
causation of a vicious inflationary spiral. In fact "to opt for such a move would have been 
disastrous in the wake of a systematic decline of productivity, in the major sectors of the economy" 
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(Mwanza, 1992:20). This economic status quo, precipitated a calamitous economic and social 
milieu in which life was wholly difficult for both the producer, the consumer and the worker and 
thus his dependencies. All in all it should be noted that, the foreign exchange auction system 
detrimentally and insidiously impacted on the lives of Zambians. This marked a complete shift in 
economic trends in Zambia, from the economic prosperity epoch of the 1970s to a novel era of 
economic and social hardship. Support and credibility of Kaunda's government started to sharply 
decline, in the wake of these hardships. The government of Zambia's' undoing was the excess 
funding of welfare state in the early stages of independence because state finances, were heavily 
eroded. So many problems were not anticipated during the period when the IMF -inspired Auction 
system was introduced. One of these problems was foreign currency owned by Zambians outside 
Zambia. One of the conditionalities of adopting a SAP was liberalisation and under this system of 
liberalisation holders of funds outside the country were authorised to bring in these funds either in 
cash or in kind and no question was asked about how people acquired that money. Under the 
Liberalisation policy, the owners of foreign currency abroad were allowed to purchase goods 
outside and bringing them to Zambia. The major problem with this system was that small companies 
and individuals brought in goods into the country and sold them at highly exorbitant prices, which 
were certainly unaffordable by the poor section of the Zambian population. Most of the Zambian 
population is constituted by the local peasants, thus these, could not afford the high prices charged 
and consumablesl daily basics and even luxuries just like in Zimbabwe. 
It was very shameful of government to fail to arrest the situation in which people were overcharged 
for goods by the small companies and concerns. It was not surprising, however, that these imports 
fuelled the depreciation of the Kwacha against foreign currencies. Some of the funds generated 
from the sale of these imports were used to purchase Zambia's precious minerals which were then 
smuggled out of the country, thereby depriving the country of the possibility of expanding the 
export base through the enhancement of non-traditional exports. The foreign exchange auction 
system worked against the objectives of the IMF I IBRD - sponsored structural adjustment 
programme. It had therefore to be abandoned if the Zambian economy was to undergo a genuine 
structural transformation and be saved from total collapse. 
One of the sad features of the foreign exchange auction system was the misery it precipitated for 
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the ordinary people. Zambia had an acute problem of malnutrition. This largely because the 
ordinary people could not afford to purchase their daily basic owing to the rapid skyrocketing of , 
prices and inflation. Most urban and rural households could not manage to purchase daily 
consumables because of the depreciation of the Zambian Kwacha, which calumniated into price 
rises in all sectors of the economy. The consumers were exploited by traders through excessive 
profiteering. During the time of auction system it was the traders and the marketeers who made 
huge profits at the expense of the standard ofliving of the end user and efficiency of the producer. 
Fertiliser and other agricultural inputs never came in time the planting season; inadequate funds 
adversely affected the transport sector leading to post-harvest losses. Furthermore, the devaluation 
of the Kwacha from K2.23 to US $1 down to K21.2 to US $1 caused escalating inflation and prices 
of maize, fuel and fertiliser were increased and others were decontrolled. Thus, small-scale 
subsistence agriculturally dependent household suffered as a result of the collapse of the Kwacha, 
which emanated from the foreign currency auction system. 
The World Bank had expressed concern about the implication of the budget deficit on the money 
supply in the economy dive to increase borrowing from the Banking sector. However, though this 
concern was fortified it should at the same time be observed that a large proportion of the deficit 
was in respect of subsidies on maize, which in turn, depended on the level of maize production and 
besides, it is not always correct that deficit financing necessarily fuels inflation. 
Thus, far, it should be noted that "Zambia has been carrying out structural adjustment programmes 
over many years and has thus acquired enough experience to be able to design its own structural 
adjustment programme" (ILO, 1994). Hence the establishment of the New Economic Recovery 
Programme, a Zambian-type home grown structural adjustment. It marked a breakaway from the 
IMFI lBRD sponsored programme. Given the above, it can be deduced, that structural adjustment 
in Zambia at every level and stage, had detrimental effects on the lives of Zambians in all sectors of 
the economy. Hence they decided to debar continuity of the programme by the introduction of 
home grown N.E.R.P. Chidzero, former Finance Minister in Zimbabwe once said ESAP in 
Zimbabwe was original and home grown. 
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4.14. Food and Adjustment in Zambia 
Food is one of those basic needs, which one cannot do without, therefore food prices should be 
kept at acceptable levels. Any attempts to raise food prices to unaffordable rates, will, "in toto", 
spark large-scale natural unrest. The standards of living for vulnerable groups can be affected 
drastically by any rise in food prices. In Zimbabwe, "there is no doubt that E.S.A.P is having wide-
ranging effects. The most dramatic of these was the protest against bread price increase of 
September 1993" (BZS, March/ April 1994:9). On 24 September, for instance, the Chronicle 
carried what reads like a war report. 
"Glen View yesterday turned into a battleground as hundreds of heavily-armed police fought 
running battles with resident in a bid to break the 15 day bread boycott In another incident 
demonstrators got violent in Mufakose and trucks delivering mealie-meal, beef and bread were 
barred from coming into the suburbs" (Britain Zimbabwe Society, March/April 1994:9). This 
reflects how serious the problem of food is in SADC. To touch Zimbabwe, at this level is not to 
miss the point but it is impart a sound comparative flavour to the Zambian case. When we 
experience such poverty indicators and social welfare barometers such as child welfare, it can be 
noted that structural adjustment profoundly impacted on the lives of people. For instance, the 
(Oxfarm, 1993) study announced that the number of children suffering from malnutrition in Zambia 
has risen from 1 to 20 to 1 in 5 over the past decade of adjustment (Oxfann - Action for Recovery, 
1993:2). This was a result of food shortages because the parents were now not able to afford the 
prices of food as a result of food policy changes in Zambia, which culminated in removal of 
government subsidy on food. It should be realised that "in Zambia, as elsewhere in Afiica" 
adjustment is a response to two macroeconomic imbalances: the balance of payments deficit and the 
budget deficit, removal or reduction of the budget deficit, in particular, often has strong 
implications for food policy, especially where a significant part of government expenditure is 
channeled towards subsidizing domestic food consumption" (Van Der Geest, 1994:84). The need 
to reduce spending and therefore food subsidies, accompanied by the desire to raise agricultural 
production through higher price incentives, both conflict with the long-held objective of maintaining 
consumer prices of food at "socially acceptable" levels. 
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In the same breath, it is clear, that in this context it becomes imperative to focus attention on food 
subsidies, to Pearce., to consider ways of intervening more effectively in food market which channel 
resources to the most deprived sections of the community and the appropriate choice for any 
government will depend not only on its objectives viz., household food security but also on the 
administrative and financial resources at its disposal and obviously, inevitably, any decision will 
involve a trade-off between conflicting goals. 
It is believed that the general maize subsidy in Zambia, which had been a feature of food policy for 
many years, became increasingly untenable. While the subsidy was successful in maintaining food 
prices at tolerable levels, its costs were spiraling and an attempt in December in 1986 to shift to a 
more selective policy failed due to popular reaction - food riots. In this scenario the government 
was put in a dilemma, to curtail its expenditure or to maintain the food subsidy; the desire to placate 
public opinion was a significant issue in the whole equation. Just, like her neighbour, Zimbabwe, the 
Zambian government also shoot dead people during Lusaka food riots and in other separate urban 
unrests in Zambia. In short, it should be noted that as part of structural adjustment programme of 
1986, structural changes in food subsidy systems sparked, untold suffering and unrests in the rest of 
Zambia, apart from Lusaka and Kitwe. 
Most countries m SADC, upon acquiring their independence, adopted socialist/ welfarist 
approaches to economic management. The opposite happened under structural adjustment, were 
market forces are allowed to determine economic purse. The objective of many food subsidy is to 
, 
redistribute income so that the poorest receive food at a lower price than would be the role without 
intervention, while the costs are borne by those more able to afford them. However, the food 
subsidy system was criticized because a substantial proportion of the benefits was received by those 
who were not the most vulnerable to shortage. Moreover, the high rate of inflation coupled with a 
shortage of government finance for development investment and the slow growth in employment 
opportunities, meant that the cost of providing the subsidy were borne disproportionately by the 
poor. 
During the structural adjustment era, the government of Zambia was caught between two fires. All 
over, the country unrests were common place. Owing to the ever-spiraling inflation ratios, the 
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Zambian currency became highly depreciated in value, so producers had to increase their prices for 
retailers. In turn retailers increased prices, which prices were a response to shocks in the economy. 
This is how unrests occurred. Most families had to cut food consumption to 2 meals a day. There 
was a growing tendency to purchase less expensive staff, which was not very nutritious than 
expensive nutrition. Resultedly, most communities suffered malnutrition. Access to education was 
reduced by expensive school fees. Lot of Zambians lost school opportunities in education because 
their parents could not afford the fees. 
According to Richard Pearce, the coupon system introduced in January 1989 has reduced the cost 
of consumer subsidies, it can therefore be seen as a success in terms of budgetary objectives 
although it has precipitated widespread urban unrest. The Zambian government was in a dilemma 
as whether to remove food subsidy or cut budgetary costs or to leave it. However, the government 
made an abortive attempt to extricate itself from this dilemma in late 1986, when it introduced a 
form of self-targeting. The intention was that only the relatively inferior roller meal would carry the 
subsidy, while the preferred breakfast meal was to be sold at an economic price. The whole 
purpose was to make a distinction between the inferior subsidized meal and the superior 
unsubsidized. Thus this change occurred at a time when the government had made some apparently 
successful efforts to raise domestic maize production through the substantial increases in real 
producer, prices, it was aware of the need to control the size and distribution of food subsidies. 
Just like in Zimbabwe, the introduction of the new scheme went badly wrong and culminated in civil 
disturbances. Thus in the light of the above facts it can be arguably said that the problems lay not 
so much in the design of the scheme itself, but in the manner in which it was introduced. It appears 
to have been implemented without proper attention being paid to problems of supply or to the 
demands for the different grades of mealie-meal which would follow the new structure of prices. 
The inescapable fact is, the new price fabric was expensive. Furthermore, the decision was made to 
channel subsidies through the millers, rather than through the marketing parastatal NA11BOARD. 
The millers appeared to have doubled that they would receive the subsidy payments they had every 
incentive to maximize production of breakfast meal rather than ensure that there were adequate 
supplies of the still-subsidized roller meal. Consequently, the rapid disappearance of roller meal 
from the retail outlets meant that the majority of consumers were faced with a de facto overnight 
abolition of maize-meal subsidy without any opportunity to adapt their consumption patterns. This, 
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per se, was a severe blow to the citizens of Zambia. The removal of food subsidy in Zambia, was 
itself a process of sowing the seed of discontent amongst the general population and a time bomb 
which exploded later in the 1980s. However, the civil unrest which resulted led to the government 
abandoning the scheme and returning to the status quo. Since the structural adjustment 
implementation, which saw the removal of subsidy, mass unrest, riots, demonstration and killing by 
state security agents, have become rife. This was a major challenge, which the new government of 
Frederick Chiluba was faced with. In Zimbabwe, eruptions of the same nature took place to such 
an extended that government was sufficiently disturbed to sent emissaries to Mabvuku - the then 
Minister of Industry and Commerce, Chris U shewokunze, and Irene Mugabe, :MP for Mabvuku 
North. During the recent bread riots, wrote a columnist after Ushewokunze's death, "Chris will go 
down in Zimbabwe history as the first political leader who stood in front of the people and instead 
of promising them that the government would bring down the price of bread, boldly told them that 
if it was too expensive, then they would rather not buy it" (BZS Marchi April, 1994: 10). 
Furthermore, "'Ushewokunze's press conference on 30 September repeated the now worn-out 
rationale about the withdrawal of subsidies to "channel resources to the productive sector" (BZS 
Marchi April, 1994: 10). However, according to Britain Zimbabwe Society, "with better 
coordination the demonstrations might have achieved more, but that in any case they should be 
taken as a serious warning -a violent nationwide uprising can easily bring down a government after 
all it happened to Kaunda" (BZS MarchiApril, 1994: 10). 
The withdrawal of the roller-meal scheme directly preceded a major government reassessment of 
economic policy. Since 1981 economic policy had broadly followed IMF guidelines, easing of price 
controls, gradual through substantial, devaluation of the Kwacha culminating in the introduction of 
auction system, and attempts to curb government expenditure on subsidies and the abortive attempt 
to reduce the maize subsidy in December 1986 was part of a wide economic strategy. Surprisingly 
and in a sudden new arrangement, in May 1987 co-operation with the IMF ceased, and the Interim 
National Development Plan was introduced. This led to the Kwacha price control reintroduction 
and revaluation. Nevertheless, the IMF's s economic strategy was only temporarily abandoned and 
the government adopted its own adjustment programme, which included a major devaluation in 
November 1988. Furthermore, the growing budget deficit and escalating rate of inflation made it 
necessary to reduce the unmanageable burden of maize-meal subsidies (Van Der Geest, 1994:86). 
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4.15. The Coupon System and Food Prices 
One of the aftermaths of structural adjustment programme, which detrimentally impacted on the 
lives of the people in Zambia was the coupon system. It was a system, which facilitated a gradual 
removal of subsidy element in the maize price and coincided with elimination of price controls on all 
other commodities. Urban consumption was subsidized through the distribution of food coupons of 
a given value, which could be exchanged for either quality of mealie-meal. It should not be 
forgotten that one of the main factors contributing to the breakdown of externally sponsored reform 
in 1987, was 1986 food price increase which provoked rioting in the main urban areas of the 
Copper Belt. However, the price increase, according to Stephen Jones, was an attempt to eliminate 
subsidies for more highly refined breakfast meal by increasing price by 120%, while retaining 
subsidies for less refined roller meal which was primarily consumed by the poor. This price increase 
was badly mishandled, because it sparked a lot of problems later. 
Within this coupon system, for rural households, with the exception of those headed by government 
workers, consumer subsidies were abolished and this impacted heavily on food consumption and 
resulted in discontent amongst rural households. Since there was no overt attempt to target the 
subsidy in urban districts, where all households were eligible to receive coupons, the system initially 
operated as a fonn of rationing programme, effectively restricting the quantity of subsidized mealie-
meal per household. Of significance, to notice is that, the subsidy for roller meal was supposed to 
be administered through the commercial millers but the arrangements for how this should be done 
were not significantly specified in advance and the millers were not confident that the subsidy would 
be paid, thus the result was that roller meal production stopped, leaving all urban consumers, facing 
the full price increase (Thomas and Wiedmann, 1988). Such full price increase, left to the urbaners 
culminated in large-scale discontent about the government and food prices spiraled to unaffordable 
levels. Urban food consumption was drastically affected. People dwelling in the urban areas of 
Lusaka, Kitwe, in fact the copper belt region, had to limit the number of meals they take per day to 
two most important meals that is breakfast and supper. Malnutrition levels amongst the children 
rose unlike in the 1970s. However, in the face of intense political pressure all subsidies were 
reinstated and the major millers nationalized and by 1987 maize subsidy bill was larger than the 
total government wages and salaries. It should be noted that the average of the food -coupon 
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system was limited; it was restricted to urban household and registration closed after two months of 
inception. Moreover, limits were put on the total number of coupons issued and on the maximum 
number in a household for whom coupons could be claimed. In July 1989, some modifications 
were enforced to the coupon system in a bid to enhance the targeting system. The system now 
improved some restrictions on the maximum annual household mainly for eligibility. 
According to Stephen Jones this income ceiling remained fixed, while the retail price increased 
more than tenfold from its level before the introduction of coupons until May 1990 - the value of 
the coupon had also fallen from 29% of the retail price to 15% and this had a significant impact on 
the level of subsidy: by 1989, the budgetary cost of consumer subsidies had to be reduced by two-
thirds. The impact of the effective price increase on the estimated 43% of urban households with 
incomes below the Poverty Datum -line is likely to have been severe and a further round of price 
increase in June 1990 provoked further riots which were followed by the implementation of a 
number of offsetting measures. 
Finally, "the conclusion of an evaluation of the coupon system (Pearce, 1990) was that "the manner 
of issuing coupons appears to have been designed with a view to minimizing expenditures, rather 
than ensuing food security, in particular the limited number of retail outlets covered. The lack of 
incentives for private retailers to participate in the scheme and the limited transferability of coupons 
which reduced the value of the income transfer to coupon recipients" (Van Der Geest, 1994:39). 
Furthermore, the current reform plan envisaged the elimination of all food subsidies (including the 
coupon system) by 1993 under the new government ofF. Chiluba. 
The coupon system did little to alleviate or stop price increase in food basics rather it led to the 
spiraling of the food prices such that there were no longer affordable to the common people. This 
kind of economic restructuring, brought more harm than good to the Zambian people, who at this 
stage now only dreamt of the glorious glamorous economic past of the 1970s when the copper 
prices on the world markets were good. All these food problems precipitated a chaotic and riotous 
scenario in which Zambia was at some stage reduced to a police state. Soldiers were used to ward 
off any insurgencies. People got killed. 
122 
CHAPTER 5 
5. SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN 
ZAMBIA 
According to A, M, Mwanza "the implementation of the Stabilization Programme and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) began in earnest in 1978 and the impact on the economy was so 
profound and far-reaching that it destabilized the very basics of the Third National Development 
Plan (I.N.D.P)" (Mwanza, 1992: 13). However, the social and economic impact of IMF and World 
Bank policies and programmes of different social groups in Zambia were adversely felt by women, 
children, peasants and the working class in general". According to Chakaodza, the elimination of 
subsidies and the decontrolling of prices resulted in the skyrocketing of prices and as a result most 
Zambians were not able to cope with the high cost of living. The ever spiralling of prices 
profoundly impacted on the people basically because the cost of living was also raised. Life was 
just too expensive and unbearable. Producers raised their prices the retailers did the same, so too, 
the other middlemen did likewise, so in the end the consumers abysmally suffered. 
The auction system and the coupon system, which followed, deeply eroded both economic and 
social livelihood of the erstwhile noble Zambians. In fact, those in the lower stratum of the 
Zambian society were affected severely. The majority of workers could not make ends meet owing 
to the fact that their wages had became consistently and constantly static. With static wages, the 
workers could not cater for the families and their dependents more adequately because the prices of 
daily basic sharply rose to unprecedented proportions. Prices of food were inflated everyday. 
Inflation took its toll as well. Consequences of the incessant inflation were so calamitous to the 
lives of Zambians. The big business that employed some people found it "inflation", wholly 
handicapping their economic viability, hence they either had to freeze wage and salary increases or 
left the country and opened the same industry in other neighbouring countries. This had a sharp 
impact on employment levels. Employment ratios did fall. 
However, many adjustment policies and programmes included wage restraints or a complete freeze 
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on wage and salary increases in the public sector. This was the case with Zambia. This heavily 
affected the teachers, nurses, doctors, clerical workers and administrators thus causing untold 
suffering in these categories of people. It has became a norm in Third World African post-colonial 
state, that when government is cutting down expenditure, it begins with the freezing of salary 
increases in the public sector and trimming the public sector. This is done in the belief that African 
bureaucracies are unnecessary big and bloated. Hence, there is need to trim them to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery and at the same time cutting costs. Most of the 
public sector gets privatized resulting in mass retrenchments and layoffs. According to Chakaodza, 
women in low-income urban and rural households, women, employed in the public sector and 
women cultivators suffered heavily from the impact of adjustment. Muntemba discovered, after 
carrying out a snap study in 100 households, that many households had stopped buying beef, 
chicken and bread during the adjustment period. However, the goods that no household reportedly 
stopped purchasing were consumables like meal ie-meal and vegetables. Mealie-meal was 
purchased at a lower rate. Inadequate food supply and consumption resulted in the acute 
deterioration of the children's health. During the structural adjustment epoch, child mortality rate 
increased largely because of increased prosperity in incidence of anemia, malnutrition, malaria and 
diarrhea. The situation was due to a complex of factors, including continuing decline in economic 
conditions, rapid inflation, decontrolling of prices deterioration in rural/urban terms of trade, 
population increase, urbanization and drought conditions affecting large areas of the country. 
According to OXF AM all these factors also resulted in malnutrition. 
Thus it can be safely argued that the IlVfF and World Bank policies and programmes were partly to 
blame for the rise in malnutrition and mortality during and after the adjustment era in Zambia. The 
majority of the peasantry and the working class were forced to live on bare minimum means. It 
should be pointed out that the devaluation of the Kwacha had a negative impact on local demand 
and this process had destabilizing effects on income distribution. It also resulted in large black 
marketeering because domestic inflation rose out of proportion and interest rate policy during the 
adjustment period made borrowing too costly, with the result that large numbers of companies went 
out of business, thus increasing the already high levels of unemployment. 
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As depicted in Table 17, the levels of inflation from 1970 up to 1990, drastically rose having a 
sharp impact on the exchange rate policy. In tum most producers found it very difficult to purchase 
goods abroad because of the serious depreciation of Kwacha, so the available options were to 
either close the industries or freeze wages. However, as from 1974 coming to the 1 980s when 
adjustment programmes were implemented, employment levels fell completely as shown by Table 
18 below. 
Table 17. Inflation and exchange Rate (1970-1991) 
Year US $fKwacha Urban C.P.I Annual Change in C.P.I 
Low Income High Income Low Income High Income 
1970 1,40 
1975 1,55 100,0 100,0 10,1 8,5 
1980 1,27 202,9 189,4 11,7 11,9 
1981 1,15 231,3 209,1 14,0 10,4 
1982 1,08 260,2 236,7 12,5 13,2 
1983 0,80 311,2 278,6 19,6 11,7 
1984 0,56 373,5 336,8 20,0 20.0 
1985 0,37 513.5 455,0 37,5 35,1 
1986 0,16 778,4 707,2 51,6 55,4 
1987 0,05 938,3 850,5 21,0 21,0 
1988 0,125 171,1 54,4 54,4 
1989 0,062 63,1 62,5 
1990 0,025 15.0 
1991 0,017 80 
(Jul;O (July) 
Source: 1) Bank of Zambia, CSO, Various Issues, 2) Colelough, 1988 
It should be noted that the combined effect of price decontrol, subsidy reduction and currency 
devaluation resulted in high inflationary pressures in the economy and contributed to economic 
instability as workers fought for compensatory wage increases at the time when formal sector 
employment was declining. The World Bank, was aware of the adverse effects of price changes on 
consumers and in order to the cushion the impact on the poor, it advocated a 3 year period for the 
elimination of the maize meal subsidy but also suggested a cross-subsidy under which the high 
prices for breakfast meal would subsidize roller meal (World Ba~ 1985). 
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Notably, a combination of inflation and unemployment gripped the economy during the early 1980s. 
For instance, by the end of 1983, wholesale prices of all goods had risen by 30% and consumer 
goods by 22%. The refonn programme failed to eliminate the inflationary pressure, inflation 
continued and rapidly accelerated. As depicted by 
Table 17 inflation accelerated during the early 1980s especially after 1983, being propelled by in 
part, the devaluation of the currency (Colclough, 1988) (Mwanza, 1992: 17). 
Table 18. Formal Sector Employment, 1964-85 (000 persons) 
Year Total labour Force Number of Employees Percentage labour Force 
1974 1430 386 27.0 
1975 1479 393 26.6 
1976 1527 370 24.2 
1977 1586 370 23.4 
1978 1641 367 22.4 
1979 1698 374 22.1 
1980 1 761 381 21.6 
1981 1824 374 20.5 
1982 1880 364 19.5 
1983 1938 365 ·18.8 
1984 1998 364 18.2 
1985 2060 362 17.6 
Source: Republic of Zambia, CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, OctoberlNovember 1985, Vol. 21, p.5. 
The main cause of rising unemployment were capacity under-utilization, labour retrenchment, 
foreign exchange shortages and fluctuations in the construction sector. In Zambia by 1986, some 
35% to 45% of urban households were living below the Poverty Datum Line. In the view of the 
same author, evidence further indicated that the rural income gap had narrowed down whereas in 
urban areas, the rich-poor gap had widened. In Zambia the collapse of urban income, was 
accompanied with a sharp contraction of the fonnal sector employment. Thus under the scenario 
"the prices and incomes commission argued that elimination of the maize subsidy was counter-
productive since it would reduce the incomes of the urban poor by 3 8,9%," (Odegaard, 1986). In 
other words, such a move would exacerbate income inequality and lead to a worsening of the living 
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conditions of the urban poor. 
When attention is given to the adverse impact of structural adjustment to the health of the Zambian 
people, it can be noted that the health sector suffered seriously as a result of this economic 
restructuring programme. According to Mwanawina, "the health sector was adversely affected by 
the government's excesses and economic mismanagement - the delivery of medical services had 
almost halted due to the shortages of drugs and equipment because of service deterred qualified 
medical personnel" (Adepoju, 1993:74). The situation in the health sector was aggravated by "an 
inadequate transport system, compounded by the poor state of roads" (Adepoju, 1993:75). The 
Ministry of Health estimated that its fleet of vehicles had been reduced to less than half due to the 
unavailability of space parts and poor maintenance (Adepoju, 1993:75). It should be noted that 
"there were acute shortages of drugs and medical supplies, the health infrastructure was in a state 
of despair, and morale of the health providers was at an all-time low owing to poor remuneration 
and working conditions, thus as a result there was an exodus of medical doctors, with the number 
of doctors dropping from 621 in 1991 to 537 in 1992" (Wallace, 1997:143). 
The whole essence of structural adjustment is cutting of expenditure on behalf of government. 
"Total government recurrent expenditure increased by 10% in 1989 in nominal terms and more than 
doubled {178%) by September 1990, an average annual increase of 98% for two years as depicted 
by Table 19" (Wallace, 1997:75). The president's expenditure more than doubled in 1989 by 120% 
while it marginally fen by 9% in 1990, giving an average increase in 1989 and decline drastically by 
55% in 1990, giving an average decline of 18% -this indicates a shift in government's priorities 
against health services, rather than the effect of a shortage of funds, according to Mwanawina 
(Adepoju, 1993:75). 
127 
Table 19. Impact of Structural Adjustment on Health in Zambia (Government expenditure on 
health) 
Year Total % President %3 Health %3 
Change (state house) Change Change 
1980 11)81,966 876 65,420 
1988 8,359,350 8,496 648,074 
1989 9,700,990 16 21,725 120 895.802 19 
1990* 26,946,453 178 52,659 -9 1,110,086 -55 
Average change 98 56 -18 
Notea: Percentage as a proportion of expenditure 
Source: CSO. Monthly Digest of Statistics (Series April/Sept. 1983; January/April 1986; AUgust 1990 and June 1991) 
Government Printers, Lusaka. 
Table 20. Major causes of morality among adults in hospitals (15 years 01' over) 
1987 1988 
Major Causes Number of % % 
deaths tota) change 
Number % total 
of deaths 
Accidents & injuries 541 6 531 5 -2 
Diseases of heart 1095 12 915 9 -6 
Malignant, neoplasa & leukemia 438 45 1058 10 142 
Respiratory disease 997 11 1228 12 23 
Pulmonary tuberculosis 1209 13 280 3 -77 
Genito-urinary system 115 1 555 5 38 
Senility!ill-defined causes, excluding new born 598 6 188 2 -68 
U1cers/appendicitis, liver disorder 184 2 343 3 86 
Non-infective gastro-intestinal disorders 445 5 572 6 29 
Malaria 896 10 1298 14 45 
Disorders of pregnancy! delivery puerperium 216 2 199 2 -8 
Disorders of skin/subcutaneous tissue 88 101 15 
Total Major 6822 73 7268 73 7 
9,283 10,120 9 
Source: CSO 1995 
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However, between 1987 and 1988 the total number of recorded deaths increased by 9% as shown 
by Table 20, attributable to an increase in Malaria cases. Because of the structural adjustment 
programme, which emphasized the cutting of government expenditure, drugs were in acute 
shortage. For instance the University Teaching hospital, Zambia's largest hospital, had an average 
of more than 20 deaths a day and at the hospital, patients slept on the floor and those who were 
fortunate to get beds had no bedding (Adepoju, 1993:75). 
If Zambia's most biggest hospital, the hospital did not have running water and most of the 
equipment was in poor working conditions. The hospital did not have steam for fertilizing 
equipment and sanitation was non-existence (Adepoju, 1993:75). Structural adjustment had a 
severe impact on Zambian health, to an extent that "in early October 1991, all the operation 
theatres were closed down, except one for emergency cases, as they had became a health hazard's 
to both medical personnel and patients and some specialized clinics were also shut, while elsewhere 
in the country, two or more general hospitals were closed for similar reasons (Adepoju, 1993:75). 
However, the new government of F. Chiluba, in 1992 had embarked on restructuring the health 
sector based on the principle that every able-bodied person residing in Zambia and earning an 
income, should contributes towards the maintenance of their health with emphasis on primary health 
care. Additional measures, including introduction of medical fees and legislation to allow the 
establishment of private dinics and hospitals were introduced in 1993 (Wallace, 1997:144). 
However, the quest for improving health care services is ongoing. 
When specifically evaluating the impact structural adjustment on education in Zambia, it can be 
noted that education also' abysmally declined. According to Mwanza "as in the case of health 
sector, funding for education also declined steadily - expenditure on the education sector increased 
in 1989 by 66%, then drastically fell in 1990 by 20%, giving an average of 44% as shown by 
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Table 21. Thus, this, viewed against a marked increase in total expenditure averaging 97%, again 
indicated a shift in government priorities rather than the effect of an across-the-board monetary 
squeeze resulting from the restructuring exercise. 
Zambia got its independence earlier than Zimbabwe, most people went to work in the Zambia 
Copper belt. The copper belt was a major employer. With the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes which advocated for a free-market approach to economic management, it 
was' very difficult to effect such a shift. The fundamental problem was that, at independence 
Zambia created a welfare state of some nature. Socialist principles were used as guidelines in the 
management of state affairs. With the IMFI World Bank, packages which advocated cuts in public 
spending, the public service of Zambia saw many people being retrenched. Even in the private 
sector, many people lost their jobs so they had to migrate to neighbouring countries in search of 
greener pastures. Most people in the mines lost their jobs. The education and health standards, and 
even the nutrition levels collapsed drastically. The government could no longer afford to sustain 
such services. Hence, the so-called IMF-strikes became commonplace. These largely came from 
workers, tertiary students, and the intellectuals. However, it should be borne in mind that structural 
adjustment policies have caused suffering as discussed above. Privatisation of government 
companies, caused many people to be retrenched hence, their economic-livelihood was robbed. 
Just like what happened to Zimbabwe after the implementation of structural adjustment 
programmes, there were job losses in the public sector and in the private sector. The health and 
educational standards, steadily deteriorated and strikes also became commonplace. So, looking at 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, it can be seen that structural adjustment programmes had negative results 
on the populace. The World Bank believes by implementing these programmes the socio-economic 
lives of the people in the SADC can be improved, like what briefly happened to the Asian tigers. 
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Table 21. Government expenditure on education 
Year Total % Change Education % change 
1980 1,081,966 120,377 
1988 8,359,350 474,539 
1989 9,700,990 16 936,756 66 
1990 26,946,453 178 2,274,239 -20 
Average change 97 44 
Source: (CSO, 1993) 
It should always be remembered that in 1993, Zambia had a population of 8 million, with a growth 
rate of3%, thus funding of the sector both capital and current expenditure should have increased in 
order to maintain educational standards according to Mwanawina (Adepoju, 1993:76). However, 
as a result of SAP in Zambia, which emphasized on expenditure cutting this did not happen. The 
sector suffered. The government had set its aims, which, inter alia, were providing learning 
materials school desks and equipment, and reduction of illiteracy in both rural and urban areas. 
These objectives were not achieved due to financial constraints. In fact there was a huge disparity 
between the objectives and output. Just like her neighbour, Zimbabwe, the conditions of service for 
teachers deteriorated terribly and the educational infrastructure was severely run down to the point 
that where pupils sat on floors without textbooks and other facilities according to Mwanawina. 
Illiteracy was growing very fast. The non-existence of capital expenditure meant that classroom 
facilities lagged well below environment figures resulting in large classes and overcrowding, 
particularly in primary schools (Adepoju, 1993:76). In Zimbabwe, a system of shifts was adopted. 
Some pupils would attend in the morning up to 10:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. All this was a response to 
an acute shortage of educational resources, which shortages were an aftermath of budget cuts in the 
sector. 
As far as secondary schools were concerned, places were only available to less than 20% of those 
who completed their primary education, while higher education was available to an even smaller 
proportion. According to Jacob Mwanza (Wallace, 1997: 144), "the education sector - with an 
adult illiteracy rate of over 30% .has experienced similar problems to those observed in the health 
sector - dilapidated physical infrastructure; lack of equipment; shortage of qualified teachers; poor 
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conditions of service, and hence low morale with a staff exodus; high teacher-student ratios; and 
donour dependence". Faced with this problematic past, the new government of Chiluba, which 
took power from K. Kaunda, in the wake of mass food riots and large scale labour unrest, has 
envisaged in its policy measures to rehabilitate the crippled education sector. For instance in 1993, 
the government of community participation in education and private sector involvement in 
education. Progress in reversing the effects of adjustment in education, has proved to be slow and 
highly demanding in terms of prompting the government to introduce corrective measures. In 
1994, a further impetus was given to decentralization as district education management boards and 
school management boards were asked to take full responsibility for teachers, pupils education 
infrastructure, school furniture and learning materials. But the fundamental question is whether 
such measures will redress the adverse impact precipitated by the implementation of structural 
adjustment by the Kaunda regime. Most of the qualified Zambian teachers and lecturers, went to 
neighbouring big-currency countries during that time, these were South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Botswana. In these countries, they obtained very good salaries and working conditions. This 
mass exodus heralded a new era in the history of Zambian education, in which mere temporary 
teachers were engaged to work in government schools. This had a tremendous impact on 
production of good results, from the students. 
When revisiting structural adjustment impact on employment, it is clear that labour was sharply 
affected by the reform programme. Labour force, constitutes around 30% of the total population, 
it proliferated rapidly at an average rate of 17% in the 1980-90 period as depicted by Table 58. In 
face of an ever-worsening economic crisis, the capacity of the productive sector too generate more 
jobs decreased over the years according to Mwanawina (Adepoju, 1993:76). Government of 
Zambia, however, reacted to two problems by absorbing more people and the Zambian Civil 
Service became the largest component of total formal employment as shown by Table 22. 
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Table 22. Formal employment by sector 1988-90 
1988 1989 1990 o/oehange 
1989-1990 
Agriculture, forestry & fisheries 37,380 37,860 39.000 14 
Mining & quarrying 56,810 56,340 56,810 0 
Manufacturing 49,940 50,340 50,940 1 
Electricity & water 8,720 8,820 8,940 1 
Construction 29,830 29,350 29,060 -1 
Distribution, restaurants & hotels 29,840 30,140 30,740 1 
Transport & communication 25,020 25,320 23,650 -2 
Finance, insurance, real estate & business services 23,360 23,780 24,180 1 
Community. social & personal services 105,610 109,440 111,630 2 
TotaJ 369,390 371,840 376,950 1 
Source: CSO 1990 
It should be noted that the "maginalization of capital 1988-90 epoch, spending over the years 
seriously inhibited increased employment in the fonnal sector" according to Mwanawina. 
Unemployment stood at over 60% for the whole period of 1985-90 as shown by Table 23. 
In the private sector, producers were facing serious problems of forex. Goods from abroad became 
so expensive because qf the depreciation of the Kwacha against major currencies like the US $ 
dollar, as depicted by Table 24, which reflects a gradual fall of the Kwacha against major 
currencies. 
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Table 23. Population and labour force 1980-90 
Year Pop. % Urban pop. Labour force 
(million) As % of total (formal sector) 
1980 5.68 40 1.65 
1985 6.72 45 1.99 
1986 6.95 46 2.70 
1987 7.15 48 3.74 
1988 7.35 49 3.78 
1989 7.57 50 3.82 
1990* 7.79 51 3.86 
*Provisional 
Source: CSO, (po.cit) 
Table 24. Exchange Rate, Kwacha to US $ 
1964-72 1973-75 1976 





































Source: IMF (1990) futernational Financial Statistics, Washington DC: IMF; futernational Financial Statistics Yearbook (Series 
1983, 1987, and 1888) Washington DC: IMF. 
It should be noted that "'the poor economic performance of the 1980s, unfortunately has continued 
in the 1990s and making matters worse, the labour force has continued to grow at a fast rate -about 
4% annually - current economic reforms, before yielding intended results, are likely to add to the 
pool of the unemployed; . already in the first half of 1994 a total of 3,669 workers were declared 
redundant" (Wallace, 1997: 145). 
5.1. ExternaJ debt probJem and adjustment 
Structural adjustment programme in Zambia has thrown Zambia into a deep pool of debt. Zambia 
has become one of the most indebted countries in the Third World. Economic problems confronting the 
African continent in general and Zambia in particular include economic instability, declining 
employment opportunities worsening terms of trade, inadequate export earnings and low - capacity 
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utilization in almost all sectors of the economy. The poor econOIlliC growth and persistent 
imbalance of payments positions are exacerbated by the continued existence of a combination of 
certain structural distortions and inherent in the economy. As a result the provision of essential 
public services and maintenance of infrastructure such as health education, communication, 
agricultural marketing facilities, provision of credit and extension services have adversely been 
affected, amidst a general situation of extreme poverty. It can be noted that the inadequate supply 
of foreign exchange has been a major constraint in the implementation of key social and economic 
programmes and projects both at the national and Sectoral levels. 
However, the nature of the economic crisis confronting Zambia today reflects a certain dimension 
of despair when account is taken of increasing dependence on external funds in the financing of 
government and private investment and consumption and the difficulties are often compounded by 
the fact that access to external aid has, over the years, increasingly became conditional not only 
upon the mere undertaking but also fulfilment of prescribed World Bank and IMF - monitored 
structural reforms and performance criteria. Unfortunately the mining sector after the 1 970s did 
not perform well thus Zambia had to rely on borrowing. As a consequence of foreign borrowing is 
the huge total external debt, which has, became a serious constraint on economic growth and 
development. 
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Table 25. Total Debt Outstanding and Disbursed (ITS $ Millions) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Public & Public Guaranteed 
Long-tenn 2146 3 159 3767 4374 4194 4093 
Office creditors 1501 2542 3 179 3758 3671 3517 
Multilateral 397 732 987 1235 1198 1218 
ofwhlchffiRD 346 370 460 555 508 501 
ofwhlchIDA 2 105 190 260 254 253 
Bilateral 1105 1810 2 192 2524 2482 2298 
Private Creditors 644 617 587 615 523 570 
Suppliers 288 217 214 138 188 202 
Financial Markets 
Private Non-Guaranteed 87 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Long-term 2232 3 159 3767 4374 4194 4093 
IMF Credit 447 801 858 991 940 900 
Net Short-tenn 586 676 1018 1089 1364 2220 
Total Debt 3266 4636 5643 6458 6498 7213 
Source: World Bank, October 1990 
Table 25 above indicates how Zambia's foreign debt rose from US $3,3 billion in 1980 to US $7,2 
billion in 1989. However, such a high level of indebtedness provides an important measure of the 
severity of Zambia's economic crisis; that the country's external debt exerts great pressure on the 
economy is evidenced by the extremely unfavorable debt ratios. The total debt to gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratios were 522,52 and 133,95% respectively in 1989, rising from 201,03% and 
84,09% respectively in 1990. Table 26 below indicates Zambia's debt ratios (Mwanza, 1992:33). 
Table 26. Zambia, Debt Burden Ratios 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Debt Outstanding to Export Rates 20l.03 534.19 763.84 720.17 522.53 516.81 
Debt Outstanding to GDP Ratios 84.09 205.82 339.04 312.99 162.57 136.95 
Debt/Service Exports 25.35 15.87 48.99 24.01 14.19 12.09 
Public and Publicity Guaranteed L.T. 17.68 10.12 17.88 14.88 14.14 10.63 
Private Non-Guaranteed L.T. 2.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Totallong-tenn Debt Service 10.12 17.88 14.88 14.14 10.63 
Source: World Bank, October 1990 
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Total service payments mounted to US $170 million in 1988 compared to the level of US $88 
million recorded in 1985, respectively an increase of 100% over the 3 years period. As shown by 
Table 27 although debt service arrears fell from US $ 1,64 million in 1985 to US $0,231 billion in 
1986, they rose rapidly to the high figure of US $1,88 billion in 1987. F or a country undergoing 
economic restructuring these numbers/ratios of debt represent serious implications for the country's 
on going structural adjustment programme and other growth oriented effort. However, scarce 
financial resources are being committed to repayment and servicing of debt, which payments she 
always reschedule because of inability to do so. Finally, it should be noted that the heavily indebted 
countries in SADC and other regions should derive collective strengths fr6m the realization that the 
debt crisis that confronts them is the concern of both borrowers and lenders; needless to say that 
the stability of the international monetary system depends on the extend to which the debt burden of 
the Third World is handled. 
Table 27. Payment Arrears (US $ Million) 
Total Ext. Debt Arrears of Whit 1644.2 231.3 1875.: 
Official Creditor 582.1 86.2 668.3 
Multilateral 455.1 31.6 486.1 
Bilateral 127.0 54.6 181.6 
Private Creditor 103.5 35.6 139.1 
Financial 59.9 16.1 76.0 
Supplier 43.6 19.5 63.1 
Rescheduled Debt 135.9 109.4 245.2 
Bilateral 116.4 102.7 219.1 
Financial 19.4 6.7 26.1 
Short-term Debt 822.7 822.7 
Source: Bank of Zambia, 1987 Annual Report. 
5.2. Political costs of reform (Structural Adjustment) in Zambia 
It should be noted that the Zambian case is a clear testimony of the need for the reform -minded 
governments on the donor community (especially the IMF/IBRD) to take accounts of the social, 
political, ideological and economic fabric of the country in which to introduce the SAPs. 
Apparently ThlIFIIBRD, SAPs tend to be similar for all situations, irrespective of the obvious 
differences with little regard to factors such as the capacity or willingness of the government to 
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implement them, the strength of domestic interest groups and the existing structure of the economy. 
Allast, M, Mwanza argues that, in that regard the Zambian case is an example of how not to 
implement a SAP. 
Structural adjustments have had serious consequences for governments. For the government of K. 
• Kaunda, it was catastrophic. This is because of the political response that SAPs generally provoked 
from well-organized interest groups (Hawkins, 1991; Nelson, 1989; Haggard, 1985 and 1989). 
In Zambia evidence indicates that the domestic interest groups were largely responsible for the 
failure of the adjustment programme during the late 1980s (Hawkins, 1991; Levi and Mwanza, 
1987; Mwanza, 1990). The re-imposition of the maize meal subsidy after the 1986 food riots, the 
abandonment of the IMF programme in 1987 and the re-imposition of the maize meal subsidy and 
reduction of the maize meal price after the June 1990 food riots are aU indicative of the strength of 
urban interest groups. The Zambian government had been trapped between two forces: the 
interests of the international donors and the military and the strength of urban interest groups. 
Because workers were adversely affected and the business people, they became a strong threat to 
the government. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions was at the forefront of all protest against the 
government. Thus as inflation and unemployment increased, so too did the militance of trade union 
movement which was joined by restless urban-unemployed, petty traders, the intelligentsia, the 
commercial farmers and the businessmen. As an aftermath of all this, the NTh/ill - Movement for 
Multi-Party Democracy was formed and it won the elections in October 1991. 
When the new government took over, it received some pledges from the donor community largely 
because they thought a new wind of change has come to the SADC regions. The most significant 
question is can a multi-party democracy fully implement an llVIFI IBRD type adjustment 
programme? If, as indicated above, the implementation of SAP evokes a reaction from interest 
groups, what will prevent the new government from quickly loosing popularity? In a country with 
such a degree of urbanization (51 %) the level of interest groups participation and articulation tends 
to be high; thus, in that case, SAP implementation seeks to build alliances around the programme. 
In Zambia case the state must quickly build and support new constituents while in the meantime, 
compensating the losers in order to blunt the immediate possibility of Anti-SAP mobilization. 
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Finally, it is believed that there is evidence that the practice of structural adjustment is inherently 
undemocratic since it relies on a large degree of coercion and if that be true, the prospects for 
democracy with SAP are rather bleak in Zambia and the SADe. 
5.3. Lessons: The Zambian Experience 
The lessons, which have been drawn from the Zambian experience with adjustment, are varied and 
manifold. It should be noted that Zambia has not yet succeeded in reversing the trends of declining 
investment and per capita income and ending fiscal and monetary instability. The major problem 
with the Zambian economy is that it is a mono economy, which means it relies heavily on one sector 
for its earnings. It should be noted that the increases in real GDP during the 1987 and 1988 can 
be explained largely by a combination of high copper prices which together with reduced debt 
service (caused by the effective loan default) relieved foreign exchange constraints and the impact 
of favourable weather on agriculture. However, while some progress has been made in moving 
towards a more rational and flexible structure of price incentives, no alternative engine of growth 
for the economy emerged. The reform activity in Zambia has assumed a cyclical fashion. 
The IMFI WB policies have sparked a spate of hardships to some classes of the society in Zambia. 
A political stalemate was reached. The government was facing a threat from the labour unions and 
the business. At the same time, the need to please IMFIWB was there. In general the retreat from 
reform never unqualified and so a number of reform measures have survived each backtracking or 
stabilization failure. However, the legacy of failed reform has included some increase in the 
political consensus on the need for reforms, greater Zambian participation in their design and 
learning from past policy design and implementation errors. However, the failure itself may make 
the next stage of reform more difficult because it weakens the political regime, democratize the 
public service, discredits certain policy instruments, reduces the credibility of government policy 
commitments, and worsens the debt and reserves position. It is believed that three main factors 
may explain this cyclical obstacles; inadequate external responses; and weaknesses in policy design 
and implementation. 
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5.3.1. Internal Political Obstacles to Reform 
The reform programme from IMFIWB was met with a lot of urban unrest, hence according to 
Stephen Jones, "the most obvious barriers to reform was the threat of unrest from the urban poor 
who had become progressively dependent on food subsidies as the government sought to protect 
them from the national real income declines caused by terms-of-trade loss from the mid-1970s" 
(World Bank, 1994). In Zambia a proof to many countries the urban workers had considerable 
influence in the changing events during structural adjustment. Shockingly the reform programme in 
Zambia was only supported by the President and only 2 Cabinet ministers, otherwise all ministers 
within the ruling UNIP, were opposed to reforms. It should be noted that in Zambia the technocrats 
who attempted to carry through market-based reforms enjoyed protection from the President but 
were otherwise politically marginal and were under constant threat from the Party bureaucracy 
which paralleled the structure of government. Politicians interfered with the implementation of 
policies. 
Bates and Collier (1991) concluded that during the 1980s in Zambia there was a basic political bias 
in favour of short run consumption interest and a lack of understanding of benefits accruing from 
reforms such as devaluation of the part of those who stood to gain from the reform. According to 
Kydd (1988) this was partly the result of a failure by the external promoters of adjustment to 
explain and justify the policy prescriptions: the IMF and CG (Consultative Group) members made 
only desultory efforts to convince the Zambian political elite about the validity of their prescription" 
(IMF, 1995). 
5.3.2. Inadequate External Responses 
According to Stephen Jones "the stability, unpredictability of the response of aid donors in 
providing support to the reform programme despite the forming of the Consultative Group of 
bilateral donors and the coordination between creditors in the Paris and London Clubs, can also be 
blamed for failure of the reform efforts" (Van Der Geest, 1994:40). It should be understood that 
bilateral assistance failed to increase in support of reform until 1986, at the time, when commercial 
bank credits, were being reduced (Gulhati, 1990). Donor aid did not dwindle after 1986 and even 
the amount of debt rescheduling was also adequate: by the mid 980s it was already clear that the 
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volume of external debt was considerably in excess of Zambia's capacity to service it. The other 
problem was that the IMFI World Bank were apparently unable to exercise sufficient influence over 
bilateral donors and foreign creditors to ensure the level of external support envisaged as necessary. 
Finally, one of the chief obstacles was that the default on World BankIIMF debt put severe 
limitations on the procedure of how multilateral agencies were able to operate: the first priority of 
reform efforts had to be to resume the flow of payments of external obligations. The foregoing, 
however, were some of the stumbling blocks towards reform efforts in Zambia, during the time of 
Kenneth Kaunda. 
5.3.3. Weaknesses in Policy Design and Implementation 
(i) Weaknesses in policy design categorically falls into five fold classes. Firstly insufficient 
attention was paid to the problem of managing transition to a desirably reformed economy, 
compared to that accorded to diagnosis of the problems, according to Stephen Jones. As 
noted by Kydd (1988b), in the context of agricultural reform: 
"The thrust of the World Bank's 1983-5 analysis of Zambia agriculture was to demonstrate 
some of the deficiencies of existing policies and to convey some notion of what the sector 
might look like, in terms of crop mix, with less distorted i.e. more free market policies. But 
the focus on an assessment of the structure of protection for each crop shed only limited 
light on the question of appropriate policies" (Van Der Geest, 1994:40). 
(ii). Inadequate attention was given to the political and social effects or impact of reform, 
especially in the context of the elimination of subsidies. According to the World BankIIMF 
the economic resources programme involve removal of subsidies over a period of 3 years 
(1984 - 1987). No review of subsidy elimination was included in the programme and no 
significant attention was paid to developing alleviating measure for the poor before 1986 
and systematic identification of vulnerable groups and assessment of the impact of reform 
on the only began during 1990 (Prices and Incomes Commission, 1990). Furthermore, 
insufficient attention was also given to the possibility of compensating vested interests who 
stood to lose from reform and were able to block key measures. 
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(iii). The refonn programmes were generally perceived to be externally imposed and insufficiem-
attention was paid to their "localization". However, "it could be that the process of 
fonnulating the N.E.R.P was around in promoting the policy learning process as it was 
entirely internally generated and required extensive policy analysis (Bates and Collier, 
1991). Thus, this event may have been significant and useful towards the development of 
more effective refonn policies. 
(iv). It is believed that the policy refonn attempted appears to have been too complex and 
ambitious in seeking to achieve simultaneous radical refonn in almost every sector of the 
economy, given the limited implementation capacity of government (Van Der Geest, 
1994:41). The 1989, Policy Framework sought to continue this trend: in fact this 
programme is even more complex as it incorporates additional measures to alleviate the 
impact of refonn on the poor (Republic of Zambia, 1990). 
(v). Finally, it should be concluded that insufficient attention was given to the fonnulation of 
targets and projections of assistance required to the extreme vulnerability of the economy to 
foreign - exchange shocks. According to the World Bank, only in 1989 Policy 
Framework was a financing mechanism contingent on copper prices proposed (World Bank, 
1989). According to Jones if copper prices exceeded the projection, a proportion of the 
surplus would be allocated to reduce the financing gap and to increase reserves; but the 
main error on the side of policy implementation was continually to delay carrying out 
fundamental adjustments in relative prices, particularly exchange-rate devaluation. 
The Zambian government badly managed the refonn programme. Kayizzi-Mugerwa noted "the 
excessive attention that was paid in macroeconomic policy to the preparation of long-tenn plans, 
for a period of more than 10 years, the country was saddled with plans that had little or no impact 
on what was actually happening in the economy which represented a waste of Zambia's limited 
economic analysis capacity (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1990). In the same breath, the process of financing 
retrenchment in particular was implemented in a manner (emphasizing the cutting of recurrent 
departmental charges without significant reduction in the public-sector workforce) which was 
extremely damaging to government effectiveness. 
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Finally, however, it should be noted that the fiasco of the structural adjustment reform effort was 
that inadequate attention was given to the need for a stable policy environment in order to boost 
investment and business confidence. The lack of productive investment in the country, contributed 
to an aura of uncertainty, which in tum generated lack of confidence in the reform programme. 
5.4. Recommendations and Conclusion 
(i). Democracy should be looked at in a more broader perspective in Zambia. Measures should' 
be taken to effect a political culture of public participation in economic development. It 
should be realized that multi-party politics, per se, do not offer long-term solutions to 
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economic problems of any society but rather is the content of the policies and programmes 
that matter more. 
(ii). Diversification of the economy is of paramount importance, if economic growth is to be 
achieved in Zambia. The government should shun excessive reliance on copper exports. 
There is need to expand the agricultural sector and the manufacturing one. This will 
generate employment and in tum reverse the negative inputs of structural adjustment 
programme in Zambia with increased efforts by government to privatize copper mines, 
agriculture might provide some employment to the people. For instance in 1996 "Cyprus 
Amax of the US bought 80% of Kansans hi copper mines from ZCCM on terms which could 
ratchet up payments of $48 million over a number of years" (African Business, October, 
1997, No. 225) 
(iii). It is necessary to promote regional cooperation and integration through such bodies as 
SADC and PTA. Trade amongst countries in the PTA may boost their economies. 
(iv). An important issue in the whole adjustment saga is how it is implemented. It should be 
noted that some of the policies advocated by IMF are desirable for example no-one quarrels 
with the idea of paying farmers more as Chern suggests or introducing multi-party 
democracy. However, it is essential that the IMF and the World Bank and other donors 
design aid programmes which focus more closely on low-income groups and the African 
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must make a commitment to 1l<;;1_L/U:1~ or so who make the 
of the population but how to help 
_,..,~ .... ,., it can be noted that Zambia's macro-economic oeJITormam:e did not improve 
after the implementation of IMFlWorld Bank Structural Adjustment it fell as 
depicted by At independence the economy was 
UL/Jl<;;h.LLl..-;). in Copper price fluctuations 
malaise, Real GDP per capita collapsed 
Zambia's Macro-Economic 
1986 1987 
Real GDP (%increase) 0.9 2.2 
Real GDPper (%increase) -2.7 -1.4 
Real GDP (% increase) 5.0 -0.7 
Growth Rate • -19.9 24.3 
Non-metal Growth -16.7 9.8 
Rate • -18.2 13.3 
Real Growth Rate b -29.4 3.0 
Gross Domestic Investment (% GDP) 23.8 13.9 
Government Deficit (% GDP) -28.6 -10.9 
interest) 11.8 2.7 
Consumer Prices C (% increase) 52.4 44.4 
(% increase) 93.1 54.3 
Commercial Bank Rate (%) 33.S 18.4 
Debt Service 
b Jmports of good and non-factor services deflated 


















































d As percentage and "''''"',,,,,'''. it does not include reduction of arrears. 
Source: World Bank (1989, 
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The foreign exchange auction system precipitated calamitous results for Zambia. Inflation rose 
drastically and prices generally skyrocketed, acutely as shown by the Table 29. The fundamental 
problem was that with huge unemployment and retrenchment that occurred as a result of structural 
adjustment reform, people could not afford the prices of goods. Food, clothing, rent and fuel all 
went up, culminating in separate but well organized yet catastrophic upstarts across the country, in 
Lusaka, Kitwe and the Copper belt region. The government of Kaunda lost popularity. It should 
be noted that inconsistencies inherent in consumer subsidy for maize as shown by Table 30 overleaf 
sparked problems. The people did not accept increases in prices of maize. Just Like in Zimbabwe 
in 1998, when the government announced that it will increase prices, the people did not want such a 
move so, they resorted to strike. The Z.C.T.U the official organ of workers, also resisted tax 
increases by the government. In both countries structural policies, have left an everlasting mark, in 
terms of socio-economic development. The socio-economic fabrics have been left fragile and 
volatile. 
Economists from the World Bank have focussed a 2% increase or rise for the economy of 
Zimbabwe but still they argued that without improving governance systems in Zimbabwe, and 
without making transparent, the policy making process, the economy is going to collapse. They 
further argued that its, because of the Land Policy, high tax regime and adventurous costly military 
expeditions to the D.R.C. (Business Report, 14/0111999). 
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Table 30. Nominal Consumer Subsidy for Maize 


















Source: Kumar (1988) 
As shown by Table 31 below, the external debt of Zambia increased and repayment was postponed. 
External debt crippled Zambia's economic livelihood and investor confidence. A highly precarious 
economic situation was created. The social life of people considering employment, health, 
education and labour was impacted on. According to Mwanza, "a rather disheartening aspect of 
SAP, implementation was that in Zambia, the policy package appears rather contradicting and the 
policies not mutually sustainable" (Mwanza, 1992:45). Imagine, for example, that the objective is 
to reduce inflation and control government expenditure -experience shows that accompanying 
measures such as price decontrol and devaluation will further strengthen inflationary pressures and 
make it difficult to control spending, at least in nominal terms. Domestically, currency devaluation 
and interest rate decontrols further increase the cost of borrowing and reduce investment, indeed 
investment does not flourish under conditions of extreme instability and uncertainty that so often 
accompanies the implementation of SAPs. 
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Table 31. Structural adjustment and External Debt 
External debt 
~$mn unless otherwise indicated) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total external debt of which: 4637 5707 6599 6832 6739 7223 
Long-tenn debt 3159 3792 4428 4415 4196 4786 
Short -tenn debt 677 1057 1179 1476 1643 1488 
Use ofI~ credit 801 858 991 940 900 949 
Public disbursed debt of which: 3159 3792 4428 4415 4196 4784 
Multilateral 733 980 1234 1210 1244 1420 
Bilateral 1803 2212 2562 2580 2319 2824 
Private creditor of which: 624 601 632 626 633 540 
Commercial banks 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Debt service of which: 139 317 153 164 177 178 
Principal 72 230 90 96 112 115 
Interest 68 141 63 68 65 62 
Total external debtlGDP (%) 229.4 414.6 373.7 205.8 154.2 216.2 
Debt service ratio(%) 16.1 50.1 17.0 13.1 12.4 12.8 
Short tenn debt/total external debt (%) 14.6 18.5 17.9 21.6 24.4 20.6 
Concessionalloans/total external debt (%) 26.9 25.8 26.9 26.7 23.9 29.6 
Variable interest rate loans/total external debt (%) 10.7 11.3 10.4 9.1 8.6 9.2 
Interest in arrears on long-tenn debt 170 157 356 521 803 813 
Maturity of over one year. Total debt service as a proportion of exports of goods and services. 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables. 
Adopted from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
According to Mwanza, "this case study has to conclup.e with a somewhat bold assertion that 
multilateral or bilateral donors rarely, if ever, practice altruism unless they have interests to protect; 
for the poor countries evidence indicates that unless the SAP project undergoes a radical 
restructuring itself, it will not provide a meaningful solution to the economic crisis" (Mwanza, 
1992:45). It is difficult for a poor country to bail itself out of economic problems within a global 
framework. It is believed that structural change requires time and is of unknown duration but the 
painful effects of SAP policies are felt almost immediately; any SAP has to include measures to 
soften the blows of change which are often manifested by rising inflation and unemployment and 
thus creation of poverty in the copper giant. 
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CHAPTERS 
6. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND LONG TERM POLICY PERSPECTIVES 
(ZINIBABWE AND ZAMBIA) 
According to Rolph Van Der Hoeven and Fred Van Der Kraai, "most participants agreed that, 
when they were started in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the early 1980s, Structural adjustment policies 
were intended to deal with the continent's external crisis as quickly as possible by bringing about 
internal and external balances enabling the various countries to return to a more traditional 
development pattern in which foreign donors would provide support through project lending and 
inflows of capital" (Van Der Hoeven and Van Der .Kraai, 1994: 181). However, as Toye indicated 
"in order to 'sell' the concept of policy-based lending within the World BaIJk, adjustment policies 
carried high expectation which were often not justified given the weak institutional capacities of 
many Sub-Saharan African countries and the ambiguous theoretical underpinnings of the 
functioning of their economies" (Van Der Hoeven and Van Der Kraai, 1994:181). The 
fundamental problems which most African countries in the SADC faces is in their weak 
infrastructural and institutional capacities. Such weaknesses, however, in terms of their effect to 
the success SAPs in the region, were underestimated. 
In the VIew of Hussain for policies to be more effective and to contribute to long-term 
development, a distinction should be made between stabilization and adjustment policies and that 
stabilization should precede adjustment. In majority of cases policies for stabilization culminates 
oftenly in economic contraction. Hussain also argued that adjustment policies could not be 
effectively implemented if they were not complemented by proper investments in infrastructure by a 
building up of human capital and by an enabling political environment:, more specifically he stated 
that adjustment was not enough to bring about significant changes that would benefit the poor. In 
all countries in the SADC region were the adjustment policies had been implemented the poor 
people always found themselves to be vulnerable. Their plight never, changed but it was abysmally 
aggravated. The social impacts of adjustment programmes were mostly felt by the poor in the 
society. If we examine both Zambia and Zimbabwe, mostly the poor rural and urban people 
suffered. So in any future adjustment policy adoption poverty concerns, should be taken into 
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account when designing structural adjustment policies and programmes. 
It is important to realize that "in order to encourage long-term development, social action 
programmes public expenditure measures, environmental sustainability and appropriate foreign 
investment and Sectoral lending, especially for small holder agriculture, for human resources and 
for infrastructure, are aU important. In order for long-term development to take place, most 
"adjusters" in the SADC region should make a colossal endeavor to obliterate huge sums of debt 
they owe and reduce aid inflow. Van Der Hoeven, like many African researchers and scholars 
agree that SAPs should lead to equitable long-term growth in a situation in which African countries 
are less vulnerable than they are today. To Okeyo the most significant question was namely how 
the masses cope with adjustment and it is up to African countries to come forward with solutions 
which should not only be of a macroeconomic nature but more attention needed to be given to the 
interface of adjustment policies and to capabilities of institutions to carry forward the necessary 
changes as well as to unravel the effect of negative external shocks" (World Bank, 1994). 
Structural adjustment programme in SADC should take a long-term development paradigm and 
sturdy measures should be taken to eschew chances of the programmes impacting negatively on the 
people, which so far has been the case with most SADC countries including Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
In both countries the first phases of structural adjustments have been implemented and majority of 
the people are critically enduring the social effects of adjustment. Both countries have now entered 
second phases. In Zimbabwe, the novel-second phase has been dubbed ZIMPREST (Zimbabwe 
Programme for Economic Social Transformation). This programme is a new programme hoped to 
redress ESAPI, ills and problems. But surprisingly it has started on a more fragile and harmful 
angle and premise so that its very doubtful that on a long term it will remedy the impacts of the first 
phase. In Zambia, the Chiluba government has taken over and adjustment is in the second phase. 
With its increased efforts to privatize most of its copper mines Zambia's second phase of 
adjustment is likely to do better. However, it should be noted that all adjustment efforts should be 
long-term in orientation than short-term. The adjustment policies should have a long-term flavour in 
terms of yielding positive "economic spin offs". 
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6.1. The role of the World Bank in African Long Term Development - Policies in SADe. 
According to Robert Cassen and associates, "although the IMF is not an aid-giving institution, no 
discussion of policy dialogue can be complete without an account of the central influence of the 
findings on economic policy-making in deficit countries" (Cassen R and Associates, 1986:74). It is 
argued that although there is no formal requirement in practice a fund programme is vitally a sine 
qua non for countries wishing to negotiate a SAL from the World Bank. "With its command of the 
consessional lending facilities of IDA (now much diminished) its mandate to deal with long-term 
development strategy, its international and country - specific capacity for research, and policy 
analysis and its research, and policy analysis, and its experience of policy dialogue in donor 
consortia and consultative groups, the World Bank was ideally placed to establish a facility 
providing balance of payments lending in support of long-term adjustments for low-income 
countries", argues Cassen and Associates (Cassen and Associates, 1986:80). It should be noted 
that the World Bank's approach to adjustment is guided by the institution's overriding objective: 
the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of people's Hving standards (Van Der Hoeven and 
Van Der Kraai, 1994: 166). 
Focus in the SADC should be given to the whole issue of addressing and redressing the impact of 
structural adjustment. The World Bank should focus on the long-term development needs of the 
recipient countries. To all countries that has implemented SAPs, the consequences were 
calamitous, poverty has deepened, unemployment worsened because of huge retrenchments, 
inflation rose sharply making prices of goods totally unaffordable by the citizenry. So the primary 
focus of the bank should be now to address these issues on a long-term perspective lest, the level of 
suffering deepens. The people's living standards should be ameliorated on a long-term basis. 
Adjustment lending has always been poverty-focussed albeit the fact that it worsens it. Recipient 
countries already have reduced people's lives to poverty because of the World Bank's structural 
adjustment policies with their conditionalities, which handicapped individual country's livelihood to 
select programmes of poverty alleviation which best suits them. 
As adjustment lending has become increasing poverty-focussed, attention has been given to safety 
nets and to restructuring public spending according to Ishrat Hussain. In majority of cases nutrition 
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programmes, labour intensive public works and targeted food subsidies were all used as safety nets. 
According Ishrat Hussain, the restructuring of public expenditure has taken the form of maintaining 
or increasing the share of expenditure on social services, particularly basic social services. This 
approach, in toto, has led to large-scale suffering of the people in the SADC region. Reduction of 
public expenditure on education, health, and welfare resulted in poverty in the region. So on a long-
term basis, any plan to restructure the economy should take cognizance of the likely detrimental 
impacts which these programmes would have on people, especially the poor in the society. 
In the view oflshrat Hussain "social funds and social action programmes were originally established 
to protect those adversely affected by adjustment, but they can also operate as wholesale financing 
mechanism that target the poor" (World Bank, 1995). These programmes can increase political 
support for stabilization programmes if they are run properly. The Bank has supported 19 of these 
interventions in t 7 countries, including t] in Sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases these programmes 
channel resources to small, demand-driven sub-projects proposed by local groups (usually a NGO) 
or a local government agency when these projects are implemented, they require the support of 
local government, private sector groups and NGOs. 
It should be noted that the reviews of public expenditure undertaken by the Bank staff in 
collaboration with African governments focus on intersectoral and intrasectoral tradeoffs and 
contribute to the restructuring of public expenditures. However, it should be noted that possible 
imbalances between capital and recurrent spending, analysis of social safety net programmes for 
cost-effectiveness and coverage of target groups, and the impact on the conditions of the poor are 
issues that enter the policy dialogue between the Bank staff and governments. 
In the future the Bank is strongly encouraged to consider environmental issues because the Bank 
loans have not seriously considered environmental issues. However, a 1989 study of adjustment 
lending operations found that there was no conclusive evidence that policy changes associated with 
adjustment lending were necessarily related to environmental degradation (World Bank, 1989b). 
The study apparently concluded that adjustment had a positive impact on the environment. It is 
believed that using a partial equilibrium approach it demonstrated that there were many potential 
complementarities between major adjustment policies and environmental goals - primarily through 
152 
measures designed to improve efficiency and reduce wasteful use of resources: for example, 
changes in producer prices for agricultural export taxes may have important consequences for soil 
production and erosion. It should be noted that there are arguably several reasons for the lack of 
consideration of environmental issues in adjustment. Of crucial importance is the inadequacy of the 
understanding of the mechanism through which adjustment affects the environment. However, the 
heightening of awareness of environmental issues and the building of in-house capacity to assess the 
impact of these issues are slowly and gradually enhancing the Bank's understanding. 
Finally, it should be noted that "a serious misconception exists that the World Bank is assisting 
African countries through structural adjustment lending only. Adjustment lending accounts, an 
average, for only 30% of the Bank's total lending to Sub-Saharan Africa (although in 1993 it was 
be only around 22%), while 70% goes to investment and sectoral lending" (World Bank, 1994). In 
1991-92 more than 80% of total lending was allocated for investment in small holder agriculture, 
human resources development and infrastructure. Thus in the coming years, the Bank expects an 
even stronger thrust in the field of the environment and in combined population -- agriculture -
environment -related projects, according to Ishrat Hussain. In short, in future, the Bank will have to 
consider, manifold factors, which are completely long-term for adjustment purposes. There should 
be a drastic shift: of paradigm as far as SALs are concerned, to a more long-term approach 
especially when looking at SADe region. 
6.2. Policy Options for Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Structural adjustment programmes have been arguably thought by the recipient of IMFI WB funds 
as viable penacea, to their economic ills. Little did these "adjusters" knew that, structural 
adjustment would not yield immediate economic 'spin offs' but rather they precipitated untold 
suffering in the SADe region. Thus the adoption of SAPs, as instruments of economic healing, was 
their undoing. If Zambia and Zimbabwe are to be carefully examined nothing, much has been 
achieved. Adjustment programmes have negatively and detrimentally impacted upon the lives of 
the citizenry in SADe. The implementation of structural adjustment policies. heralded a novel 
epoch, in the history of the SADe region, in which budgetary deficits, unemployment, inflation, 





Structural adjustment in Zimbabwe culminated in the rising of inflation. In 1992 the high inflation 
rate because of the combination of ESAP and the worst drought of the century, but in 1995, 
Zimbabwe had another serious drought and they will became more common as global warning 
produces that effect in this part of the world. Considering 1995, inflation did reach a monthly peak 
of 26,3% and since then, Zimbabwe has not been able to control its inflation. There has not been 
any major statistical change in inflation percentage as shown by the table below Table 37. 
Table 37. The monthly rates/rom January 1995 are: 
INFLATION 
Mar-96 23.7% 
Jan-95 20.8% Apt-96 24.3% 
Feb-95 24.3% May-96 24.7% 
Mar-95 21.6% Joo-96 22.5% 
Apr-95 209% Jul-96 22.0% 
May-95 29.20% Aug-96 17.7% 
Joo-95 19.9% Sep-96 20.6% 
Jul-95 21>6% Oct-96 20.2% 
Aug-95 23.7% Nov-96 13.9% 
Sep-95 23.00/, Dec-96 16.4% 
Oct-95 22.4% Jan-97 15.9% 
Nov-95 26.3% Feb-97 19.1% 
Dec-95 25.8% Mar-97 20.0% 
Jan-96 27.9% Apr-97 22.4% 
Feb-96 26.3% May-97 20.8% 
Source: (African Business: 1997: No 225) 
Given all these socio-economic and political hardships, which structural adjustment has bred for 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, one wonders if the new transformation which the countries are currently 
implementing under the aegis of the WBIIMF are viable panacea to ward off the impact of the first 
phases of the programmes. Attendent policies have been propounded by manifold scholars. These 
require serious attention from the World BanklIMF however, they are more endogenous. But it 
should be recognized that whatever, approaches are adopted there is no way SADC, can isolate 
itself from global economic trends. SADC leaders have already, quite interestingly reflected the 
region will not lag behind global economic patterns. 
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Table 35. Central Government Revenue and Expenditure (SADC) 
Total Current Total Expenditure 
Revenue (% of (% of GNP') Overall Surplus/Deficit (% of GNP) 
GNP) 
1980 1993 1980 1993 1980 1989 1991 1994 
!Botswana 36.6 . 56.1 36.5 40,2 -0.2 27.1 114.0 11.2 
Lesotho 17.1 27.1 22.7 32.1 -3.7 " -0.3 " 
Malawi 20.7 " 37.6 " -17.3 -6.0 -1.9 " 
!Mauritius 21.0 22.6 27.4 22.2 -10.4 -1.5 0.0 -0.3 
!Namibia " 34.9 " 40.2 " " 7.5 4.7 
South Africa 24.6 28.3 23.1 32.6 2.5 -7.5 0.3 -9.2 
Iranzania 17.6 " 28.8 " -8.4 " " " 
iZambia 27.0 " 40.0 " -20.0 -4.6 -55.0 -7.3 
Zimbabwe 24.4 31.8 35.3 36.2 -11.1 -9.1 -6.9 " 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1995 and 1996 
The most important question is what SADC countries should do to export their way out of 
poverty? Boutros Boutros Ghali, the fonner UN Secretary General noted that external debt is a 
millstone around the neck of Africa. For African nations excluding the Arab North external debt 
jrunped from 29,2% of GNP in 1980 to 108,8% by 1992 (Oxfam, 1993). If we look at Zimbabwe, 
Structural Adjustment, per se, caused serious inflation. Inflation rose from 20,3% in 1991 to 
45,8% in 1992, and went down to 27,3% in 1993 and 22,3% in 1994 and it rose again to 22,6% in 
1995 as shown by Table 36 below. 







Source: (Business Day 1998) 
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It should be noted that the economic crisis of Zambia and Zimbabwe were also characterized by the 
disintegration of the productive and infrastructural facilities. In the case of Zambia agricultural 
output, and particularly food production, was severely reduced. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
industries have increasingly been operating much below their expected capacities. At the same 
time, the physical infrastructure, social services and welfare, especially education, health and 
sanitation and housing have increasingly deteriorated. It should be noted that the overall 
assessment of "SAPs led to the conclusion that, despite their acclaimed aims of stimulating 
economic growth, through the achievement of fiscal and external balances and forces of supply and 
demand, these objectives could not be achieved without addressing the fundamental structural 
malfunctioning of the countries' economies in these countries. Thus need for alternative policies 
have became more urgent than it was in the past decades. It is the belief of this study that if the 
proposed options below can be taken seriously by both the WBIlMF or respective adjusters. Then, 
it may be possible for Zambia and Zimbabwe to export their way out of poverty and economic 
hardships, they are currently experiencing. The fundamental question is can Zimbabwe and Zambia 
export their way out of economic decomposition they are currently in? What are some of the policy 
considerations, in this light? 
6.2.1. Economic Diversification 
As mentioned earlier in this study "the Zambian economy is basically a macro-economy with copper 
mining contributing traditionally as much as 90% to export earnings and 20% to GOP. Lower 
copper prices in 1996 were the main factor leading to an 18% slump in export earnings to US 
$974,9m" (African Business, 1997 October, No. 225). Zambia, according to the foregoing relies 
heavily on its copper industry. This makes the economy highly vulnerable and fragile. There is need 
for economic diversification in Zambia. Zambia's excessive unoptional reliance on copper mining 
sector is its tragedy. It should be noted that there is need for Zambia to diversify its economy by 
boosting production in food, beverages, tobacco, cotton, paper, textiles, clothing, plastics, chemical 
and furniture. The African Review believes that "Strong reliance on copper exports has left the 
economy vulnerable to world market conditions. Copper mining is the key sector of the economy, 
accounting for virtually all foreign exchange earnings" (African Review: 1997). 
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Economic diversification is not only instrumental in facilitating economic growth but it will go a 
long way into creating employment to the Zambian people. Thus, those who have been retrenched 
under the structural adjustments ofKaunda and his two ministers will be able to be re-born in tenns 
of jobs. Agriculture when handled properly, especially commercial agriculture has a great potential 
of generating wage employment for people. The economic sector has to be diversified so as to 
generate employment for the people who are falling victims of the adjustment measures. The rate of 
employment in the country has continued to decline (377,000 in 1990 to 334,000 in 1995) while the 
gross per capital consumption has fallen from K792 to K427 in 1990-1995. Worse still, poverty 
has became rampant, with 76% of total population of over 8,5 million people living in extremely 
poor conditions, according to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) (SAPEM Vol. 10 No.5, February 
1997). Agriculture and the manufacturing-sector-expansion are some of the alternative avenues to 
consider in the pursuance of economic growth and improvement of people's lives given the 
catastrophic consequences of early structural refonn bids. When we examine Zimbabwe, it has 
multifarious economic sectors mainly agriculture and mining. What is essential for Zimbabwe is the 
ability to foster commercial farming of other products other than tobacco. The government of 
Zimbabwe, however, has a different perspective, whether it is economical or political, the economy 
will telL 
The Zimbabwe Government's decision to designate 5 million hectares (12,355,000 acres) of land 
divided between 1,770 of the most highly productive farms in the country was confinned at the 
Zanu PF conference in Mutare last December" (Africa Today, vol. 4, No.3, 1998). One of the 
major problems likely to be created by this, is unemployment, in a cash-strapped nation where the 
majority, who have been deeply affected by (E.S.A.PJ) want jobs. These commercial farms have 
been a major source of employment and life for majority of strong-politically disadvantaged 
Zimbabweans. But with their expropriation by the government, one wonders where these 
employees will go. The whole saga is seen as a body blow to the country's most important industry 
(Commercial farming mainly tobacco, is Zimbabwe's largest export earner) (Africa Today, vol. 4, 
No.3, 1998). Commercial farming brings in 40% of the country's foreign exchange and 
contributes 30% of its production and the sector provides employment for 327,000 farm plantation 
workers many of whom -will lose their jobs once (and they are estimated 100,000 once some of the 
highly productive farms on the governments' list are appropriate, next July or thereabouts (Africa 
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Today, vol. 4, No.3, 1998). The President of the Commercial farmers Union Nick Swanepoel is 
convinced that "acquisition and redistribution should be linked with increased agricultural 
productivity sustainability and the eradication of poverty" (Africa Today, vol. 4, No.3, 1998). Any 
land reform programme should be targeting elimination of poverty in the country, which the 
economic reform programme has caused, but at the same time economic land reform should be 
commensurate with global international economic trends. Economist John Robertson believes "the 
move is against current world economic theory and trends" (Africa Today, vol. 4, No.3, 1998). 
He maintains that "small holding may feed people but are much less profitable than large 
commercial farms and do not deliver wealth as major exporters. Europe only has 3-4% of people 
on the land and this is commercially viable" (Africa Today, vol. 4, No.3, 1998). 
The land reform is a sensitive issue, which needs to be addressed with caution if economic growth 
and sustainability is to be a priority given the blow E.S.A.P. created on the lives of people. 
However, Zimbabwe has a rich mining sector with all sorts of international upmarket minerals like 
platinum, which has been recently discovered. It is highly problematic to say that in the case of 
Zimbabwe, reforms can yield fruitful results because, the government spending is just unnecessarily 
too much and that is totally detrimentally to the economy. For instance, two major unforeseen 
incidents where government expended money, is government's purchase of 50 new, Mercedes 
vehicles worth Z$ 66 million and the War Veteran Compensation of Z$50,000 each and a monthly 
payment of Z$ 2000 each (Sunday Times, 2211/98). Even the World Bank/ThlIF government 
seriously concerned with such activities, which apart from alienating support for the government 
from the majority of working class, destroyed the validity of the Zimbabwean Dollar (it depreciated 
sharply). 
In all cases Zambia and Zimbabwe economic diversification is still very essential for economic 
growth and poverty-elimination in the two countries, whose economies profoundly declined, in the 
wake of natural disasters, changes in global political economy and gross-economic mismanagement 
by the post-independence bureaucrats and leaders. Because there is increasing global campaign 
against tobacco, commercial farmers have turned to flowers and Zimbabwe has became the world's 
number 4 in supplying flowers to Europe, following Israel, Colombia and Kenya. According to 
Colin Stoneman "in 1993/94 7,000 tons worth Z$ 290m (US$ 35m) were supplied, mainly during 
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the winter. The flower-fanning sector is highly profitable and labour intensive employing 30 people 
per hectare (BZS issue No. 9511 February 1995). What is essential in the way of diversification, is 
to foster flower-agriculture since tobacco has faced titanic problems at the international market. 
6.2.1. Popular Democracy and Institution Building 
It is widely believed that there can be no political democracy, critical economic democracy and 
there can be no economic democracy without the transfonnation of political economic, social and 
cultural institutions. There is therefore greater need for democratization of the decision making 
process that allows for greater participation of the people in production, distribution and exchange. 
It is significant to notice that the foregoing requires a restructuring and transfonnation of 
institutions. Chakaodza believes that democratization of the decision-making ought to be at 
national, provincial, district and grassroots levels so as to generate the necessary consensus and the 
support of the people. Most African governments have failed this criteria., they did not wish to be 
transfonned and democratize. Zambia was a one-party state under Kaunda for 27 years and 
Zimbabwe is a de facto one party state although they claim there is democracy. Political activity in 
Zimbabwe is not democratic therefore, Zimbabwe is not democratic therefore Zimbabwe will not 
and cannot do well on the democratic score. The advent of Chiluba in power, scored the creation 
of multipartism, which is essential a factor in democracy. But the most important question is how 
far successful and willing are African leaders to democratize their institutions? According to a 
review on the performance of the government this in 1996, by the Economics Association of 
Zambia (EAZ), there was on the part of the government, lack of a process of consensus building an 
issue of national significance, a serious indictment on the MMD's state policy of upholding the 
principle of good governance and consultations with all segments of society (SAPEM vol. 10, No. 
5 February 1997). Democracy, is the challenge, which Zimbabwe has escaped always. Opposition 
politics is strongly and violently handicapped by the government through the instrumentality of 
(C.I.O.). They simply are nasty! Thus in Zimbabwe, in practice there is no democracy as long as 
the ruling Zanu (PF) party is there. Yet, democracy is the most needed element of development to 
take place in the SADC region. 
162 
6.2.2. Tourism 
Both Zimbabwe and Zambia have an excellent Tourism potential. The only problem is that Zambia 
neglects this sector and if it is to make efforts along these lines then this means repairing some of 
the neglected infrastructure such as roads, hotels, game park facilities airports, city transport and 
national transport. Victoria Falls provides a very good site for tourists so Zambia has to develop 
such areas in order to attract foreign currency. Zimbabwe has realized this potential and has a 
specific Ministry, which deals with this sector. What is necessary for Zimbabwe is to expand the 
sector and democratize participation in this industry. 
6.2.3. Public Investment Programme 
However contrary to conventional wisdom, increasing the budget deficit in the short run is not a 
bad idea after all. It should be noted that both the Zambian and Zimbabwean governments might 
want to embark on a programme of spending on public works, building roads, sewers, schools, 
hospitals and housing - this has the effect on employment and increasing spending power thus 
increasing demand, for goods and services and therefore for labour. These Public Investment 
programmes are very necessary in both cases because a lot of people have lost jobs under structural 
reforms for instance ZCTU estimated that 30,000 workers have lost their jobs, and a lot more are 
still to loose their jobs. The only way to cater for these people is through these public works 
programmes, despite the fact that government has to cut expenditure. It is believed that if the two 
governments cannot maintain a level of expenditure which is sufficient to reduce the level of 
unemployment, they must endeavour to fill the gap by spending more themselves. 
However, it should be noted that some project largely financed by the private sector have started 
for instance, in Zambia, "the R 400m Beitbridge Bulawayo Railway (B.B.R) project is being 
financed by Nedcor Investment Bank (R 300m) and a R 100m contribution from the Zimbabwe 
government in the way of existing line. BBR will operate the route on a 30 year concession and 
transfer it to the Zimbabwe government after that period" (African Business January] 998: no 228). 
This is expected to generate some employment for the locals thus alleviating poverty to some 
extent. In the case of Zambia, it should be clearly understood that 35 years ago when K, Kaunda 
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led his people to independence he implemented his programme of "humanism" a kind of ultra-
altruism that brought health, housing and education to all. Funds were channeled into social 
programmes at the expense of industrial and commercial development. Government became cash-
strapped or bankrupt" (Afucan Business January 1998: no 228). What efforts is Chiluba 
government making in a bid to lift the country from the last 35 years of economic stagnation and 
find a place in the global capitalist order? Zambia has became one of the most privatized country in 
the region. 
The World Bank's strategic adjustment programme (SAPs) of the privatization of state assets is a 
very big part - seeks to correct the situation with the helping capital-based economics. But it is a 
heart breaking journey, now seven years down the road with little or no deliverance in sight only 
about 400,000 by Zambia's 5 million workers have a job and are at risk of loosing the jobs because 
of privatization process" (Afucan Business January 1998: no 228). Privatization has only provided 
jobs to a few elites otherwise the majority are suffering. Public investment programmes are very 
vital especially in poverty-ridden and cash-strapped countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia, because 
people can secure employment to sustain their lives. In these political and economic climates surely 
people have to be working to survive because inflation has became high, prices of food skyrocketed 
and rent so the only way to survive is to, inter alia, work in these inflation-ridden and debt-ridden 
econorrnes. 
6.2.4. Poverty Reduction Programme (P.R.P) 
Most critics of Afuca always wonder if Afuca can be able to export its way out of poverty? Afuca 
as a whole has the highest levels of poverty of any developing region in the world. According to 
World Bank (1994), Afuca alone is home to 32 (or 68%) of the 47 poorest countries in the world 
(SAPEM voL 10, No. 8 May/June 1997). The Comparative Research Programme on Poverty 
(CROP) and the University of Botswana held a 4 day (8-11, October) workshop on "THE ROLE 
OF THE STATE IN POVERTY ALLEVIATION" with participants from allover Afuca 
(Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Afuca, Namibia, Egypt, Tanzania, Uganda, the 
Netherlands, Sri Lanka and Norway). However, the presentation made reflected that "poverty is 
likely to remain on Afucan continent because of poor policy-coordination and implementation: lack 
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of serious government commitment to redistribute resources particularly land; and inadequate 
support from the private sector and the donor countries" (The Role of the state in Poverty 
alleviation -article by R Kamidza.) (SAPEM vol. 10, No.5 February 1997). 
Most of the participants in the whole debate blamed the leaders in Africa for paying lip-service to 
the qualitative redistribution of resources, particularly land which support rural economy supporting 
over 50% of the total population. For example 18 years of independence on the subsequent 
amcndmcnt of thc constitutional obligation of thc willing buycr - willing scller clausc, Zimbabwc is 
still using the land question as a political tool to drum-up support and sympathy when socio-
economic and political events are unfolding against the ruling elite (SAPEM vol. 11, No.2, 1997). 
Accordingly the above weakness implies that Africa is likely to enter the new miJlennium as the only 
continent where over 50% of its citizens are living below poverty datum line. 
Finally, the workshop strongly "recommended countries to develop the necessary political will, 
infrastructure and strategies that effectively integrate every citizen into the mainstream of economic 
development. It is therefore imperative, for the state to immediately resuscitate its role in poverty 
alleviation strategies including meaningful distribution of resources particularly land in order to 
complement efforts to eliminate poverty by the non-governmental organizations, the donor 
communities, the private sector and various communities. All these are some of the discussion 
which governments are making to find out the strategies for developing the poverty-ridden Africa. 
It should be noted that reducing poverty should be a priority for Zambia and Zimbabwe. This can 
be, achieved by reimposing price controls on certain selected basic commodities, which constitute 
the livelihood of the ordinary people. Subsidies to peasant farmers output should be reintroduced 
to enable them to acquire the necessary inputs and increase productivity. He also argues that in EU 
and USA, farmers are heavily subsidized by their respective governments. Majority of 
Zimbabweans live in rural areas relying on subsistence farming, but in the wake of ESAPs, it has 
became increasingly difficult to purchase and undertake their production activities largely because 
of high prices and inflation. Governments should reinstate the subsidies on farming, to reduce 
poverty in the region. 
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It is noteworthy that Zimbabwe initiated an adjustment programme in 1990, after a decade of 
attempting independent adjustment. Without the assistance of the Brelton Woods Institution's Pacts 
recent investigation (ILO, 1993) established adverse effects on the poor of the adjustment package 
which included 
1. 
(i). A full employment, 
Oi). severe cuts in health and education expenditure of at least 20% In recurrent 
expenditure, 1990-1992 
(iii). Worsening priority ratios (i.e. sharper fall in preventive health and primary and 
secondary education than for the sector as a whole) 
(iv). A faU of 10% in the availability of nurses per person and worsening pupil-teacher 
ratio 
(v). Rising charges for health and education 
(vi). Cuts and eventual elimination of maize subsidies. 
2. Worsening condition of the poor as evidenced by 
(i). A household survey (urban) showing a rise in the number of people below the 
poverty line from 23% to 43%, with a decline in income of over 50% for the bottom 
quartile, 
(ii). A fall in the use of health care facilities, and rising (BBA) (birth before arrival) and 
the deaths among (BBA), 
(iii), Rising drop-out, rates and absenteeism from school and a fall in '0' level candidates" 
Reported by F, Stewart at a seminar, (Van Der Hoeven and Van Der Kraai, 
1994:115). 
Given the foregoing, there is need for direct poverty alleviation programmes (PAPs) such as the 
Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA), Social Action Programmes (SAPROGs) and Social 
Safety Nets (SSNs). It is interesting that PAPs are often created as a follow-up to SAPs which 
themselves produce the consequences which PAPs are expected to mitigate", confirms, Venkatesh 
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Seshamani. According to Venkatesh Seshamani, in Zambia the new government elected in October 
1991 began a rapid enforcement of SAP policies in January 1992, commitment to a PAP still 
remains by and large at the rhetorical level. 
6.2.5. Development of Human Resources 
The success of anything largely depends on the manpower used. Qualified human resources is a 
pillar to the success of any programme. Improving human capital means a better-educated and 
better trained workforce, capable of lighting the growth of these two countries. In this Computer 
Age, where technology has gone so high, the objectives of government can only be achieved by 
increasing the number of the educated people in the country. It is argued that "countries that tend 
to invest more money in improving their workforce than in investment such as factories or machines 
tend to have a fairer distribution of income. The SADC must improve its human capital. 
6.2.6. Regional Integration and Co-operation 
Zimbabwe and Zambia fall within the Southern African region. They are both members of the 
Southern Africa. Development community (SADC) and the PTA (preferential Trade Area). They 
should endeavour to enhance their trade with the countries in the region and eschew dependence on 
the (DCs) developed countries. Regional integration necessitates export-reorientation involving the 
widening of the existing narrow range of exports and export markets and refocusing on Sub-
Saharan African markets. Furthermore, Zambia and Zimbabwe and other member states of SADC 
and PTA should work towards the achievement of a stable exchange rate mechanism. The 
development of the greater economic unity in the SADC region more likely yields greater economic 
spin-offs. Alongside regional integration the two countries if trade is going to yield economic 
'spin-offs' they have to foster a state-friendly and market-friendly environment. One would argue 
for the creation of monopolies to cater for market imperfections. Commercialization strategies 
should be designed and implemented in both countries. 
"At the same time, there is need for a new kind of work ethnic that includes decision-making based 
on economic reality, accountability incentives and consumer output", argues Chakaodza. 
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Commercialization and privatization should be used as instruments of change and productivity 
growth in the public sector. Zambia under the new government of Chiluba has made great strides 
in the privatization process. Almost 75% of the Zambia economy have been privatized; this has 
gone a long way into boosting the economy of Zambia. Most of the copper mines are undergoing 
privatization. According to African Business "Zambia's economy is based almost entirely on 
copper. The nationalized industry, however, has never been able to ride the market-driven storms, 
and growth has consequently been stunted. Two recent privatizations now signal the beginning of a 
major privatization bandwagon which will have an immense impact in the economy" (African 
Business, October 1997, No. 225). At least there is a lot of effort being made in the direction of 
privatization, in Zimbabwe as well so many organizations including the (DMB) Dairy Marketing 
Board have been commercialized. Fostering a market-friendly environment is one of the basic 
fundamentals of economic development. 
It should be noted that in the SADC the following reforms should be implemented. These are land 
reform, monetary and fiscal reform and exchange rate reform. These reforms have to be 
implemented carefully. 
6.2.7. Low Budget Deficits and Exchange Rate right 
Before the collapse of the Asian economies in the late 1997, the Asian economic saga was deemed 
a structural adjustment success story. Realistic real exchange rates and strong fiscal discipline, 
were the cornerstones to the success of the Asian economies. Maintaining budget deficits at low 
levels assist greatly in curbing inflation and goes a long way in eschewing balance-of-payment 
problems. According to the World Bank keeping a realistic exchange rate pays off in foreign 
exchange and external competitiveness. What does this mean in practice? For trade reforms, the 
gains in efficiency should not be at the expense of lower tax revenues" (World Bank, 1994). 
Furthermore, for the financial sector reform, the emphasis should be protecting the solvency of the 
system to avoid costly public bailouts, and for public blessing - raising revenues and lowering 
subsidies. The World Bank further argues that "to balance refonns that could weaken public 
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finances such as 
be reduced and tax 
on health, education and infrastructure, 
(World Bank, 1994). 
must 
6.2.8. Foster Competition at and Abroad 
Before the collapse the success of the Asian adjusters was "',,"_""'''Ul 
foreign and (competition in the foreign and domestic 
improved productivity Hrrnxn'n <>"",.,,...,,rn1,"''' prior their fiasco, they 
competitiveness in 
Zimbabwe should 
According to the 
increase competition 
enterprise" (World Bank, 
6.2.9. Government Resources 
adopt export-led strategies. 
strategies 
top priority is to 
and the divestiture of public 
In Zambia and Zimbabwe u£n,,,"rn 
Democratic values of accountability and 
are still and technology is still feeble. 
not come true, even after so 
"'''.J.v,,,'''' .... by a minority ruling oligarchy, many a decades of self-rule. The state .. <4' ..... "' .. "". 
to further and explore their selfish-ends. 
legitimacy from having fought the war 
corruption and nepotism. There is gradual 
"'"',,,"",.,., ....... "' .... + integrity has been "r"Tnl"l .. t1 
a vanguard party. All in an 
may not 
it is not clear that can do 
sector .... ';ula .... H should be devoted to countries 
and basic social services, running the 
and protecting the environment", argues the World 
like in Zimbabwe, often 
even if they engage in systematic 
state machinery, 
the 
According to the 
1"' ..... ' ... 11,"" Zimbabwe 
"Scarce public 
alone: providing 
institutions of a market 
should be a lot decentralization via the privatization route. World argues that 
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"reforms that reduce government intervention in areas where markets work, even imperfectly, 
should have high priority - for example, abolishing agricultural marketing boards rather than trying 
to make work better, lowering tariffs across the broad rather than granting special exemption and 
selling off public enterprises rather than pouring money and talent into them (World Bank, 1994). 
It is significant to notice that, according to the World Bank Policy Research Report, no formula 
exists that will guarantee sub-Saharan Africa rapid economic growth and a prosperous future, but 
most policymakers agree on few key ingredients: 
(a) Macro-economic policies that promote stability 
(b) Agriculture policies that helps farmers 
(c) Trade policies that boost exports and liberalize imports (World Bank, 1994). 
6.2.10. Getting Macroeconomic Policies Right 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the SADe region at large should endeavour to eschew overvalued 
exchange rates, keeping inflation and budget deficit low - this sounds very difficult to these 
governments if not boring. For instance the Zimbabwean government just finds it easier to offer its 
War Veterans each $50,000 gratuities and a monthly payment of $2,000 until death takes its 
course, the government just purchases 50 Mercedes Benz cars worth around $55 million. Is this 
cutting government expenditure or simply forgetting about it? There is need in these countries for 
broader commitment to structural adjustment reform than mere acceptance to implement the SAPs 
in the region. These countries should focus on basically three things keeping budgetary deficits and 
inflation low, establishing fully convertible currencies and competitive exchange rates, and 
increasing public savings (World Bank, 1994). The World Bank argues that given the complexity 
of devising additional policies to stimulate private savings, raising public savings is that most viable 
option in the short run. Since Africa is trapped in a vicious circle of low growth and low savings, 
measures should be taken to ameliorate the economic status quo. 
6.2. t 1. Incentives for Farmers 
In the Zimbabwean case farmers are the backbones of the country's economy dating back from the 
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pre-colonial and colonial periods. After the attainment of independence the farmers continued to be 
the pillars of the economy. When looking at Zimbabwe, one wonders how the future of the 
economy is going to be like. In 1995 3 white farmers who were contesting the constitutionality of 
the 1992 Land Acquisition Act in High Court, following designation of their farmers for takeover 
had their case dismissed by High Court judge Godfrey Chidyausiku in November 1994, after a 3 
months examination. In this case the judge maintained that it was constitutional for the government 
to takeover land in the "public interest" (BZS 1995 February Issue No 95/1). The Land Reform 
programme, far from giving farmers incentives to boost the much-nccdcd production, is going to 
discourage them and the economy will suffer. 
However, "in tandem with macroeconomic reforms, adjustment programmes should pursue 
agricultural reforms that reduce the taxation of farmers, facilitate their access to inputs and ensure 
the timeliness of payments to them" (World Bank, 1994:186). In most farming areas roads are 
increasingly becoming very poor so there is need to foster development of infrastructure. 
According to the World Bank, farmers are likely to respond more rapidly to improved investment 
incentives if rural infrastructure is good. If property rights are secure, if public and private 
institutions are strong, if appropriate technologies are available, and if input factor, and provident 
markets work well (World Bank, 1994:186). Furthermore, policy reforms and investments need to 
go hand in hand, and the investment agenda should not push the tasks of farming marketing systems 
and reducing taxation off center stage (World Bank, 1994: 186). 
6.2.12. Export System 
According to the World Bank "because exports arc so beneficial, governments considering the 
sequence of policy reforms should consider the needs of exporters carefully, indeed, they would do 
well to apply an "export first-rule" (World Bank, 1994: 188). Zambia and Zimbabwe should do. To 
enhance the export system governments of Zimbabwe and Zambia should provide appropriate 
infrastructure, facilitating flexible labour markets and exporters access to credit, ensuring the 
enforcement of contracts and the orderly formation and dissolution of business, assisting in 
marketing and promotion, and establishing special export zones with tax and infra<;tructure 
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advantages - there are some of the mechanism that have worked in other regions and that are 
beginning to be used with some success in Africa (World Bank, 1994). 
6.3. Conclusion and Recommendations (Zimbabwe and Zambia) 
In the SADC region colonialism, robbed the indigenous people of political and economic 
independence. Thus Zimbabwe in 1980 joined the World Bank and became a member, but already 
Zambia was a member because she had attained self-rule earlier. However, "the post-colonial 
government was faced with a conflict between the need to redress the inherited social imbalances 
and the pressure from international agencies for more freedom in the economy for market forces", 
according to (Kadenge, 1992). It should be alluded that seven of the twelve SADC countries have 
undergone structural adjustment and the key objective of SAPs - which have became a critical 
feature of economic policies in Africa since the mid - 1980s - is to commit member states 
individually and unilaterally to implementing trade liberalization policies and macro-economic 
reforms that affect exchange rates policies and tariff reductions according to Development Bank of 
Southern Mrica (Development Bank of Southern Mrica, Vo!' 14, no. 3, 1997). Significantly, it 
should be noted that SAPs have served to influence intraregional patterns, SADC countries which 
have not embraced SAPs (particularly Southern Mrica) have higher tariff levels than those 
undergoing such structural adjustment, and as a result a country like South Mrica has greater 
access to regional markets than it permits these countries to its markets and this is partly the cause 
of the unsustainable pattern of trade in the region, with South Mrica's ratios of exports to imports 
standing at 7,4% in 1995 (DBSA vol. 14, no. 3, 1997). 
According to Davie "worse, the impact on the majority of the population has been disastrous with 
the poorest sections hit particularly hard. Indeed life has became so difficult that UNICEF has 
called for new policies, or Adjustment with a human face and the intention is that a kind of safety 
net be made available to the very poor so that the child mortality rate is reduced, and the impact on 
education, and health be less drastic" (Davie, 1991). 
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It should be noted that "these palliatives are however, rather meagre considering the rapid rise in 
unemployment and the steep drop in real wages that resulted from SAP, - there is now an 
abundance of evidence, including from the World Bank itself, that living standards have fallen 
drastically in Africa (the E.e.A. say 75% in the 1980's) as a result of SAP" according to Kevin 
Davie. In both Zimbabwe and Zambia the life of the citizens has been catastrophically devastated 
because, health standards have gone down, the spiral of poverty is ever-skyrocketing, 
unemployment is the order of the day, inflation and high prices, all these facets are in 1010, 
symptomatic of a state of political and economic malaise in both countries. 
For instance in Zambia there has also emerged a phenomenon known as "IMF RIOTS" in many 
countries due to harsh economic conditions, Zambia has been one of the worst hit. President 
Kaunda was forced by the IMF to remove subsidies on mealie meal which led to doubling of prices 
and sparked off the worst rioting in the country's history. 
In the recent meeting held in Windhoek, Namibia on the World Economic Forum, many African 
leaders pleaded with the IMFfWB to cancel their debts so that they can concentrate on developing 
their standards of living rather than debt serving (Business Day, 15 May 1998). If we look at 
Zimbabwe since the implementation of IMFfWB policies inflation has calamitiously destabJized the 
Zimbabwean dollar, and the government has been depending on the IMFIWB for stabilizing the 
dollar to eschew the Asian type crisis. Recently "there has been a lot of hullabaloo following the 
release of a $3,3 billion balance-of-payment rescue package by the International Monetary Fund 
board on June 111998 and this has somewhat stabilized the Zimbabwe dollar against the US unit 
around the $17.95 and $18.05 margin" (Financial Gazette, 9 July/1998). But all in all, it is 
significant to realize that "foreign aid without an underlying commitment to transform this sleeping 
giant called Zimbabwe is simply money down the drain on the part of donors and a recipe for 
economic disaster for Zimbabweans" (Financial Gazette, 9 July/1998). 
In Zambia, the IMF policies have crippled the social and economic livelihood of the people and they 
resort to large scale riots which the government ofKaunda dealt with ruthlessly and drastically, but 
all in all the state of suffering gave rise to the emergence of organized labour since they had 
endured the irresistible scourge of retrenchments and unceremonious lay-offs. The MMD emerged 
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and ousted the erstwhile authoritarian regime of UNIP led by Kenneth Kaunda. However, the 
novel government, led by the MMD, still just like the government of the de-facto one party state of 
Zimbabwe is doing, relies on IMFIWB loans for economic revitalization and financial support. 
Prowse blame the IMFIWB for the problems in SADC, criticism even goes further on beyond the 
policies of the Bank - Exports complain about the nature of the Bank's bureaucracy, poor morale, 
legions of useless advisors and presidential failure - in short the glossary publications of the bank, 
and its high international profile do not impress those with close insight into the Bank and its real 
policies as opposed to its rhetoric according to a symposium held at Soweto College of Education 
in South Mrica. Given all, these problems which the SADe region countries are facing ( 
Zimbabwe and Zambia) South Africa should learn and find out whether or not to adopt the 
IMFIWB policies! As pointed out earlier, Zimbabwe and Zambia should also, for purposes of 
economic sustainability and growth and poverty alleviation, try to look at alternative policy options 
which include, exploiting their tourism, minerals and developing their human resource, among their 
policy option mentioned earlier. To crown, it all however, it should be noted that the impact of 
World BanklIMF policies on Zimbabwe and Zambia, have been so far, calamitous and detrimental 
to the socio-economic livelihood of the vulnerable citizenry. IMFIWB's role in the SADC has, 
sparked off, an array of social and economic hardships, which in turn have made life, in toto, 
complex and difficult in both countries. IMFIWB policies, have not yielded much positive 
economic spin-offs so far, rather, they have zoomed these countries into economic and social 
doom. It is high time the IMFIWB should alter their modus operandi, and consider the so-called 
Clinton's partnership gospel, with recipient developing countries. 
SADC region, in order to export away economic and social insurmountable hardships, precipitated 
by IMFIWB policies, should consider harnessing its wealth of resources and enhance intra-regional 
trade and maximise regional co-operation. It is worth noting that twelve years ago one of the key 
issues within the development debate was the demand for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), this has revolutionary changed "we hear a chorus of consent demanding that poor 
countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa adjust their economies and leading actors in this shift of 
emphasis are the so called - Bretton Woods institutions" (Dixon, Simon and Norman, 1995: 1). 
According to the same authors, the "ideological origins of SAPs can be traced back to the 
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free-market and free-trade ethos derived from Adam Smith and David Ricardo, whose line of 
thought believes that the present economic crisis in Third World countries can be overcome only if 
they restructure their economies to become active players in a common strategy for world 
prosperity based on competition in the international export market" (Van Spengen W, 1995: 1). 
However, contemporary social and economic conditions in Zimbabwe and Zambia, reflect a state of 
utmost suffering and untold hardship, as a result of implementing IMFIWB policies. 
It is significant to notice that in the implementation of economic structural adjustment programmes, 
the following points should be taken into account according to Hideichiro Hamanaka: (IMF. 1997) 
.:. There isa need for good governance 
. ... . 




.:.. . There is a need ·for more local responsibility. taking into account the institutional capacities 
and the absorptive capacity of borrowing countries 
. . . . 
• :. There is aneed for a resu1t~oriented culture, replacing the approval culture. that has 
. ..
predominated forso long. (Countries should take result oriented approaches) 
.:. There is a need for paying· due attention to the diverse situation of countries, in terms of 
poverty; culture, history and different development experiences-:- in other words,there is a 
need for country and region specific policies 
.:. There is a need for encouraging flows and development of the private sector 
(Wail ace, L, IMF 1997) 
In the same breadth, the East Asian experience should be carefully noted. According to the 1993 
World Bank Report called The East Asian Miracle, the following points were noted 
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·:. Domestic saving are critical for development 
.:. Human resources, among others are important when, or even before. development really 
takes place 
. . 
·:·Good govemanceand responsible administrations are· necessary: and 
.:. If is vital to have a medium- long - term growth strategy - or in otherwords, consistency 
overtime 
(Wallace IMF 1997) 
The above points should be taken into consideration if successful implementation of the SAPs is to 
take place and eschewing the negative impacts on the citizens of the adjusting SADe states. Given 
the above South Africa should learn and analyse, how the SADe adjusters have suffered upon the 
implementation of the IMFIWB policies, although it is believed that GEAR, the brain-child of 
Trevor Manuel, has been formulated locally with some expertise and advice from external forces. 
In Africa the parastatal - sector, was playing a very crucial role in terms of gross domestic 
investment and employment as shown below, but with the implementation of WBIIMF structural 
adjustment, all this was completely shattered because, in the spirit of privatisation, which the IMF 
preaches, retrenchments, layoffs and forced-retirements have became the order of the day in the 
parastatal sector. Thus, the people have been impoverished by these policies. 
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Table 38. The Contribution of African Parastatals 
••• in GDP I 
Africa latin America Asia 
... in Employment 
Africa latin America Asia 
... in Gross Domestic Investment 
Africa latin America Asia 
Source: Ahmed Galal and Mary Shirley, Bureaucrats and Business: The Economics and Politics of 
Government Ownership, World Bank Policy Research Report, Statistical Appendi .... (Washington: 
World Bank, 1995), pp. 268-97 
Given the problems and difficulties which have been precipitated by the SAPs, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia should try to resort to intensive exploitation of their indigenous resources since both 
countries have got reasonable agricultural, industrial and manufacturing bases supported by viable 
service industries, as shown by the diagram below. These sectors have been very viable sectors in 
terms of the GDP percentages (See appendix for Zimbabwe, Zambia and other SADC members' 
economic profile) 
1 1991 data for all three panels 
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Table 39. Structure of production of SA DC economies (as a % of GDP) 
Country Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
Year 1970 1991 1970 1991 1970 1991 1970 1991 
Angola 
Botswana 33 5 28 54 4 39 41 
Lesotho 35 14 9 38 4 13 56 48 
Malawi 44 35 17 20 13 39 45 
Mauritius 16 11 22 33 14 23 62 56 
Mozambique 64 15 21 
Namibia 10 28 4 62 
South Africa 8 5 40 44 24 25 52 51 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 41 61 17 5 10 4 42 34 
Zambia 11 16 55 47 10 24 34 37 
Zimbabwe 15 20 36 32 21 26 49 49 
Source: World Bank (1993) 
It is essential to notice that the structure of the economy has been drastically impacted upon by the 
Th1F IWB policies especially in the service industry production levels went down as Th1F IWB 
emphasised cutting of government expenditure. Yet, this had a sharp impact on the lives of the 
common people because standards of the service industry profoundly declined. 
Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of various regional organisations, thus this means, they stand a 
flexible chance of expanding their economies and enhancing the standard of living of their people 
but unfortunately SAPs frustrate the SADe's trade integration agenda in two critical ways: (This, 
detrimentally affects Zambia and Zimbabwe too, since they are SADe members). 
(1). Many countries have reduced their tariffs to levels, which may be lower than might be 
appropriate under a viable economic integration scheme. The result is an inability to provide 
a meaningful regional preference and in addition, other SADe countries may also be forced 
to reduce their tariffs, irrespective of their national trade and industrialisation policies and 
negative effects such as liberalisation may have on their economies (DBSA, Vol. 14, No.3, 
1997). 
(2). If any third state is able to obtain access to the market of a state which has lowered tariffs to 
an inappropriate level in terms of the region's agenda, and through it to the rest of the 
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region, where is the rationale for creating a preferential trade area? Creating an PTA for 
SADC, as envisaged in the trade protocol, appears to be superfluous if no special disposition 
is to be made in favour of states in the region (DBSA, Vol. 14, No.3, 1997). 
Table 40. Membership of regional organizations 
Country SACU CMA SADC COMESA Lome SAPs 
Angola X X X 
Botswana X X X 
Lesotho X X X .X X X 
Malawi X X X X 
Mauritius X X X X 
Mozambique X X X X 
Namibia X X X X X 
South Africa X X X X 
Swaziland X X X X X 
Tanzania X X X X 
Zambia X X X X 
Zimbabwe X X X X 
Source: World Bank (1993) 
To crown it all, however, it should be realised that Zimbabwe and Zambia, had very viable 
economies, prior-adapting IMFIWB SAPs, and the standards of living of people were very high. 
But with the adoption of economic structural adjustment programmes, the socio-economic and 
political milieu of these countries changed drastically. Thus it is significant to note that Economic 
Structural adjustments programmes were, ab initio, profoundly detrimental to the lives of the 
citizens of Zambia and Zimbabwe, owing to the fact that, their implementation, sparked off, a 
plethora or an array of insurmountable hardships and complexities, ranging from , ever-
skyrocketing prices of food, rents, school fees, sharp decline in female students involvement in 
secondary schools, malnutrition, large-scale lay-offs, retrenchments, forced-retrenchments, regional 
trade frustration, every-day IMF linked strikes, deterioration in health standards, and to increase in 
mv contraction because of prostitution. 
However, albeit, the fact that IMFIWB, policies have sparked off innumerable problems for 
Zimbabweans and Zambians, there is also a strong need for a political and economic willingness on 
the part of government officials to improve the lives of people and redress the ills precipitated by 
economic structural adjustments. The econOmIC messianic promises of improving African 
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economic life turned to be a fiasco, thus, it is high time the World BankiIMF, consider to change 
their views about facilitating economic life in the region, there should be a complete paradigm shift 
from viewing the SADe adjusters as simple recipients of aid and conditionalities to viewing them as 
economic partners whose local geo-political, socio-economic situations, should be respected and 
considered by the developed world, because, the region also has a viable economic resource base 
which if exploited profitably, then the region (SADe) will be able to curve a strategic niche, in the 
ever-changing, global economy and enter the novel millennium without many economic problems. 
All in all, SADe governments should have the political will to undertake these reforms in ernest 
taking into account the ever-changing global socio-economic trends. 
Recently "in a surprising move, Zimbabwe is set to make far reaching trade liberalization proposals 
to its regional partners, including offering zero-tariff trade with South Africa (Business Day 
41111999). The proposal includes an "immediate reciprocal free trade" agreement with South 
Africa in footwear, textiles and clothing is to form part of Zimbabwe's opening offer to free trade 
negotiation within the SADe this month. This will help improve regional trade, if any 
deal/agreement will be entered into (Business Day 4/111999. However, it seems that the SADe is 
so fractured at present that it appears to be more trouble than it is worth and to integrate South 
Africa's economy into the sub-Sahara Africa means being dragged into the continent's seemingly 
endemic internecine warfare, economic decline and mercantile political opportunism (Finance Week 
18112/1998). Improving regional trade is a strong recommendation but regional integration needs 
champions which unfortunately the SADe does not have. For instance, one of the things that 
carried the process of European economic integration for many years was leadership - two 
Frenchmen businessmen Jean Monnet and Schuman played a leading role. SADe has no 
champions of such stature. A glance at SADe reflects that it has a market of 173 million 
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Thus SADC integration offers a potentially big market. So trade liberalization - the creation of a 
SADC common market is a necessary goal. It is significant to note that "after the Lome 
Convention expires in February 20.0.0, the EU intends to replace it with Reciprocal Economic 
Partnership Agreements, to be negotiated between Brussels and trade blocs in, among other many 
places SADC, the Pacific, the Caribbean and West Africa" (Finance Week 18/1211998). These are 
global economic changes, so if SADC is to be globally competitive, economically, then free trade is 
the way forward towards greater socio-economic development. 
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Finally, it that economic structural adjustment 
impacted on many SADC 
Zimbabwe. Thus, in order to ward SOC:lo-ieCQlnOlmIC hardships 
adjustment policies many options should be as mentioned 
have detrimentally 
including Zambia and 
Dltaltea by the 
SADC leaders should have the political will to implement economic development rather than 
pursuing confrontational policies which always lead to labour upstarts just like in Zimbabwe 
the ZCTU recently was at loggerheads and ultimately on a major strike over tax 
increases (SSC on Africa January programmes are 
causing problems government because this means n~tl~"'nf"h''Y'I''''r'lt 
workers on a scale. To this end therefore, it can be that structural 
programmes precipitated an avalanche socio-economic problems for both Zambia and 
0I"L"""" region as whole. 
In any future with SADC, the should ,,,v' ..... ,, operandi, in terms of 
giving aid for socio-economic development to region. should be as 
partners in development rather than aid The UVfFlWB should cancel the debts 
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Table 41. Membership of IMFIWorld Bank. Membership and Quotas in Africa South of 







Wage earners at a mine 
20 
14 
Rural elite (teachers, health workers and agricultural workers) 
Rural business person 
42 low income urban households 
(Kadenge) 1992 
Table 44. Rural Elite 
Awareness Attitude 
+VE -VE +VE -VE 
1. Removal of Price Control 80% 10% 0% 100% 
2. Removal of Subsidies 80% 10% 10% 40% 
3. Reduction of Duty 80% 10% 90% 10% 
4. Forex Allocation and Devaluation ofZ$ 80% 10% 80% 10% 
5. Introduction of School Fees 80% 10% 60% 10% 
6. Introduction of Hospital Fees 80% 10% 30% 50% 
7. Firing Procedures 80% 10% 30% 50% 
8. Mining Wages (Removal) 80% 10% 30% 50% 
9. Reduction of Civil Servants 80% 10% 40% 50% 





2. of Subsidies 52.3% 5% 42.1% 
3. of Duty 42.9% 52.3% 33.3% 
4. Forex Allocation Devaluation of Z$ 42.9% ,52.3% 23.8% 52.4% 
5. Introduction 71.4% 23.8% 33.3% 52.4% 
6. Introduction of Hospital 66.6% 19% 76% 
7. 52.3% 42.9% 57.1% 
8. Mitring (Removal) 42.9% 28.6% 
9. ,Reduction of Civil .4% 23.8% 52.4% 28.6% 
10. Parastatals 47.7% 52.4% 
(Kadenge) 1992 
f Table 46. Mining Community 
/ 
-VE +VE 
L of Price Control 10% 0% 90% 
2, Subsidies 0% 30% 10% 10% 
3. Reduction 0% 90% 80% 0% .: Forex Allocation Devaluation of Z$ 0% 90% 0% 80% 
III( s. Introduction of 10% 80% 30% 70% j , 
'j 
of Hospital Fees 10% 80% 20% 80% 
7. Firing 52.3% 90% 90% 
8. Mining 0010 90% 0% 90% 
9. Reduction of Civil 10% 80% 30% 60% 
10. Parastatals 0% 90% 60% 
1992 
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Table 49. Composition of the Service 1980-83 (Officers: Established posts) 
711 7 
(Source: Public Service Review, 1989) . 
Period: July -1993 - June 1994 
Size of Service 
Target for Abolition 
Balance carried forward 1992/93 
Total target for abolishing 1993/4 




Voluntary Obligatory Other 
Retirement education abolition 
BALANCE 
JULy 8 8 
AUGUST 112 112 
SEPTEMBER 1,064 1,064 
OCTOBER 24 24 
NOVEMBER 10 10 
DECEMBER 857 902 




















































MAIN TARGETS OF ESAP (1991 - 1995) IN ZIMBABWE 
o A reduction of government deficit from about 10% of GDP in 1990 to 5% by 1995; 
o Complete liberalization of the foreign rate and trade regime by 1995 
o Elimination of subsidies. reduction of social expenditures and levying of cost recovery rates 
. . on social services 
o Rationalization of some public enterprises and privatization of others 
o Liberalization of prices, interest rates and the exchange rate by 1995 
o . Deregulation· of the economy 
o ·Liberalization offoreign investment regulations> and 
o Deregulation of the labour market by allowing for free collective bargaining and wage 
flexibility and by abolishing certain restrictions on retrenchments. 
(Source: Peter Gibbon 1995) 
Table 51. Zimbabwe's economic outlook today 
Years 1996 1997 1998 
GDP % per year 7,3 3,5 1,5t02,0 
Inflation 21,6 18,9 27,0 
Prime lending rate % 
Per year 32,5 30,5 35,0 
Z $fUS$ (year end) 10,9 18,5 20,0 
Trade-weighted exchange 
Rate index (year end) 94,6 60,0 54,0 
(April 1998 = 64) 






Table 52. Fees Introduction 
Rural Areas 
High Density Areas (Urban) 
Low Density Areas (Urban) 
Boarding Fees (primary) 
Boarding Fees (Secondary) 
Source (Ministry of Education, 1994). 






. '.' .. ' .' ......... '. ...... ..... . ..... .... .... .... . .... . 
5. Development of a technologically advanced ~ning sector into the mainstay of the economy,. thereby laying the . 
. .' . . . '.. 
.• ground for an almost irreVersibl~extemal dependence. And since mining uses capital-intensive techniques, the 
sectof.would not be relied on to generate the empI~yment that the country yearned for. 
. .' '. . . . ". '. . . '. . . . . .' ::.,' 
6. Traditional agriculture was marginalized by a combination of taxation and agricultural. poli~ies; which were 
. titled in favour of expatriate fanners and.the mining industry (Lucembe 1974): .. ' 
. .' '.' . 
7. . Economic activity was concentrated in the line-of.:·rail· provinces, Laying the ground for vast regional inequalities 
after independence .. 
8. At independence, the wage structures were characterized by huge differentials their piecemea1adoption meant 
that income disparities were to continue to flourish. 
9. African education and other social infrastructure were largely neglected 
Adopted from (Blomstron and Lundahl 1993: 146 
NB: These issues precipitated serious and economically detrimental problems after independence. With 
the collapse of copper mining and early economic policy mismanagement Zambia had an economic 






THE GROWTH AND COLLAPSE OF THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY FROM 1964-1990 
THE SEARCH FOR DIVERSIFICATION IN ZAMBIA. 
Zambia: gross domestic product (million Kwacha) and copper dependence 
. _ ....... ___ .0."0 • 
Year GDP % GDPC % CU C/GDP C/G CIX 
1964 1,618 449 644 45 53 91 
1965 1,915 18 518 15 686 40 71 91 
1966 2,172 13 572 10 588 44 64 94 
1967 2,449 13 628 10 619 39 60 93 
1968 2,632 7 650 4 660 38 58 95 
1969 3,123 19 758 17 755 48 59 96 
1970 2,695 -14 634 -16 686 36 58 96 
1971 2,697 0 614 -3 636 23 36 94 
1972 2,962 10 656 7 701 24 19 92 
1973 2,934 -1 627 -4 683 32 29 94 
1974 3,132 7 648 3 709 32 53 93 
1975 3,056 -2 614 -5 648 13 13 91 
1976 3,187 4 620 1 712 17 3 92 
1977 3,035 -5 573 -8 659 11 91 
1978 3,067 2 573 0 654 12 88 
1979 2,973 -8 529 -8 584 18 90 
1980 3,063 4 551 4 609 16 5 94 
1981 3,352 6 554 1 560 14 1 94 
1982 3,155 -3 523 -6 592 11 93 
1983 3,108 -2 498 -5 576 15 4 92 
1984 3,084 -1 479 -4 551 14 6 88 
1985 3,279 6 487 2 480 16 8 85 
1986 3,346 2 434 -11 460 18 13 83 
1987 3,503 6 465 7 483 14 7 85 
1988 4,216 5 470 1 422 10 2 85 
1989 4,210 0 451 12 11 88 
1990 441 17 
...-- ,,-,..~~ 
Source: Republic of Zambia (a); Republic of Zambia (b); 1986; JMF, International Financial 
Statistics, various issues. 





Copper production in thousands of tons. 
Contribution of copper to GDP (per cent) 
Contribution of copper to government revenue (per ceht) 
Contribution of copper to exports (percent) 
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Table 54. Status of Policy and Institutional Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Intensity and duration 








Magnitude of policy and 
Institutional distortions 




























Table 56. Year-to-Year Fluctuations in Sectoral Performance of the Zambia Economy 
1977 1978 1979 t980 1981 1982 1983 Average Annual 
rate Growtb (+) 
L Total GDP -4.8 +2.6 -8.0 +3.5 +4.6 -2.1 +1.5 -1.1 
2. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 0.6 0.6 -5.9 3.7 8.4 11.7 8.1 0.5 
3. Mining and Quarrying -6.6 5.3 -21.1 2.0 8.5 0.0 8.3 -0.5 
4. Manufacturing -10.6 5.3 2.0 0.0 10.4 -3.9 5.0 1.] 
5. Electricity, Gas and Water 23.0 29.0 6.6 5.0 7.5 6.6 6.6 11.2 
6. Construction -10.0 -9.0 -9.0 -15.9 -14.5 -6.5 -26.0 -8.9 
7. Wholesale and Retail Trade -10.0 -1.0 -7.0 10.0 0.0 -9.0 -3.4 -2.9 
8. Hotels and Restaurants -10.0 6.0 -6.0 17.6 20.0 -8.3 0.0 2.8 
9. Transport and communications -9.1 P7 3.2 -9.6 5.2 0.0 -3.3 -1.7 
IC. Financial Institutions and Insurance -15.1 -16.3 97 -8.9 -2.5 10.0 -10.0 -4.8 
II. Housing and Real Estate 4.6 62 4.2 6.0 14.0 7.0 -7.8 5.0 
12. Business services -9.0 3.0 3.0 14.7 -.2.6 0.0 2.6 1.7 
13. Community Social and Personal services +0.5 0.5 2.0 4.0 -1.5 1.0 -2.5 0.3 
14. Import Ditties 0.0 -20.5 -6.0 12.0 17.5 -20.0 -18.0 -15.0 
IS. Less ImE!;!ted bank Char~es -15.4 -18.0 11.0 -10.0 0.0 11.0 -20.0 -0.8 
Source: Economic Reports, Various Issues 
Table 57. Inflation and exchange Rate (1970-1991) 
Year US $/Kwacha Urban C.P.I Annual Change in C.P.I 
Low Income High Income Low Income High Income 
1970 1,40 
1975 1,55 100,0 100,0 10,1 8,5 
1980 1,27 202,9 189,4 11,7 11,9 
1981 1,15 231,3 209,1 14,0 10,4 
1982 1,08 260,2 236,7 12,5 13,2 
1983 0,80 311,2 278,6 19,6 11,7 
1984 0,56 373,5 336,8 20,0 20.0 
1985 0,37 513.5 455,0 37,5 35,1 
1986 0,16 778,4 707,2 51,6 55,4 
1987 0,05 938,3 850,5 21,0 21,0 
1988 0,125 17l,l 54,4 54,4 
1989 0,062 63,1 62,5 
1990 0,025 15.0 
1991 0,017 80 
203 
(July) (July) 
Source: 1) Bank of Zambia, CSO, Various Issues, 2) ColeIough, 1988 
Table 58. Formal Sector Employment, 1964-85 (000 persons) 
Year Total Labour Force Number of Employees Percentage Labour Force 
1974 1430 386 27.0 
1975 1479 393 26.6 
1976 1527 370 24.2 
1977 1586 370 23.4 
1978 1641 367 22.4 
1979 1698 374 22.1 
1980 1 761 381 21.6 
1981 1824 374 20.5 
1982 1880 364 19.5 
1983 1938 365 18.8 
1984 1998 364 18.2 
1985 2060 362 17.6 
Source: Republic of Zambia, CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, OctoberlNovember 1985, Vol. 21, p.5. 
Table 59. Impact of Structural Adjustment on Health in Zambia (Government expenditure on 
health) 
Year Total % President %3 Health %3 
Change (state house) Change Change 
1980 11)81,966 876 65,420 
1988 8,359,350 8,496 648,074 
1989 9,700,990 16 21,725 120 895.802 19 
1990* 26,946,453 178 52,659 -9 1,110,086 -55 
Average change 98 56 -18 
"Only up to September 
NoteiJ : Percentage as a proportion of expenditure 
Source: eso. Monthly Digest of Statistics (Series April/Sept. 1983; January/April 1986; August 1990 and Jillle 1991) 
Government Printers, Lusaka. 
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Table 60. Major causes of morality among adults in hospitals (15 years 01' over) 
1987 1988 
Major Causes Number of % % 
deatbs total cbange 
Number % total 
of deatbs 
Accidents & injuries 541 6 531 5 -2 
Diseases of heart 1095 12 915 9 -6 
Malignant, neoplasa & leukemia 438 45 1058 10 142 
Respiratory disease 997 11 1228 12 23 
Pulmonary tuberculosis 1209 13 280 3 -77 
Genito-urinary system 115 555 5 38 
Senility/ill-defined causes, excluding new born 598 6 188 2 -68 
Ulcers/appendicitis, liver disorder 184 2 343 3 86 
Non-infective gastro-intestinal disorders 445 5 572 6 29 
Malaria 896 10 1298 14 45 
Disorders of pregnancy/ delivery puerperium 216 2 199 2 -8 
Disorders of skin/subcutaneous tissue 88 101 1 15 
Total Major 6822 73 7268 73 7 
9,283 10,120 9 
Source: CSO 1995 
Table 61. Government expenditure on education 
Year Total % Change Education % change 
1980 1,081,966 120,377 
1988 8,359,350 474,539 
1989 9,700,990 16 936,756 66 
1990 26,946,453 178 2,274,239 -20 
Average change 97 44 
Source: (CSO) 
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Table 62. Formal employment by sector 1988-90 
1988 1989 1990 o/oehange 
1989-1990 
Agriculture, forestry & fisheries 37,380 37,860 39.000 14 
Mining & quarrying 56,810 56,340 56,810 0 
Manufacturing 49,940 50,340 50,940 
Electricity & water 8,720 8,820 8,940 1 
Construction 29,830 29,350 29,060 -1 
Distribution, restaurants & hotels 29,840 30,140 30,740 1 
Transport & communication 25,020 25,320 23,650 -2 
Finance, insurance, real estate & business services 23,360 23,780 24,180 1 
Community. social & personal services 105,610 109,440 111,630 2 
Total 369,390 371,840 376,950 1 
Source: eso 1990 
Table 63. Population and labour force 1980-90 
Year Pop. % Urban pop. Labour force Unemployment 
(miHion) As % of total (formal sector) % 
1980 5.68 40 1.65 62 
1985 6.72 45 1.99 64 
1986 6.95 46 2.70 64 
1987 7.15 48 3.74 64 
1988 7.35 49 3.78 64 
1989 7.57 50 3.82 63 
1990* 7.79 51 3.86 62 
*Provisional 
Source: CSO, (po.cit) 
206 
Table 64. Exchange Rate, Kwacha to US $ 
1964-72 1973-75 1976 




























Source: IMP (1990) International Financial Statistics, Washington DC: IMP; International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Series 
1983, 1987, and 1888) Washington DC: IMP. 
Table 65. Total Debt Outstanding and Disbursed (ITS $ Millions) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Public & Public Guaranteed 
Long-term 2146 3 159 3767 4374 4194 4093 
Office creditors 1501 2542 3 179 3758 3671 3517 
Multilateral 397 732 987 1235 1198 1 218 
of which IBRD 346 370 460 555 508 501 
of which IDA 2 105 190 260 254 253 
Bilateral 1105 1810 2 192 2524 2482 2298 
Private Creditors 644 617 587 615 523 570 
Suppliers 288 217 214 138 188 202 
Financial Markets 
Private Non-Guaranteed 87 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Long-term 2232 3 159 3767 4374 4194 4093 
IMF Credit 447 801 858 991 940 900 
Net Short-term 586 676 1018 1089 1364 2220 
Total Debt 3266 4636 5643 6458 6498 7213 
Source: World Bank, C>ctober 1990 
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Table 66. Zambia, Debt Burden Ratios 
1980 1985 1986 1987 
Debt Outstanding to Export Rates 201.03 534.19 763.84 720.17 
Debt Outstanding to GDP Ratios 84.09 205.82 339.04 312.99 
Debt/Service Exports 25.35 15.87 48.99 24.01 
Public and Publicity Guaranteed L. T. 17.68 10.12 17.88 14.88 
Private Non-Guaranteed L.T. 2.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total long-term Debt Senrice 10.12 17.88 14.88 14.14 
Source: World Bank, October 1990 
Table 67. Payment A"ears (US $ Million) 
Total Ext. Debt Arrears of Whit 1644.2 231.3 
Official Creditor 582.1 86.2 
Multilateral 455.1 31.6 
Bilateral 127.0 54.6 
Private Creditor 103.5 35.6 
Financial 59.9 16.1 
Supplier 43.6 19.5 
Rescheduled Debt 135.9 109.4 
Bilateral 116.4 102.7 
Financial 19.4 6.7 
Short-term Debt 822.7 


























Table 68. Zambia's Macro-Economic Performance 
1986 1987 1988 1989* 1990 
estimate 
Real GDP (%increase) 0.9 2.2 6.3 0.1 0.9 
Real GDP per capita (%increase) -2.7 -1.4 2.9 -3.5 -2.8 
Real Non-mining GDP (% increase) 5.0 ..Q.7 8.8 -1.0 0.4 
Export Gro'Wth Rate a -19.9 24.3 33.2 22.1 -ll.5 
Non-metal Export Growth -16.7 9.8 24.7 -13.9 33.5 
Import Gro'Wth Rate a -18.2 13.3 15.2 15.1 8.7 
Real Import Growth Rate b -29.4 3.0 9.4 24.1 0.9 
Gross Domestic Investment (% GDP) 23.8 13.9 12.3 8.7 14.8 
Government Deficit (% GDP) -28.6 -10.9 -12.1 -9.3 -8.0 
(excl. foreign interest) 11.8 2.7 -7.1 -6.1 -4.5 
Conswner Prices C (% increase) 52.4 44.4 54.3 124.6 n.a 
Money Supply (M2) (% increase) 93.1 54.3 61.6 50.2 40.0 
Commercial Bank: Lending Rate (%) 33.5 18.4 25.0 35.0 n.a. 
Debt Service (accrual)d 109.9 99.7 79.2 56.5 65.8 
a Exports fob, and imports c.i.f. in current US $. 
b Imports of good and non-factor services deflated by manufacturing unit value. 
c Index with 1980=100 
d As percentage of exports of goods and services; it does not include reduction of arrears. 
Source: World Bank: (1989, 1990) 
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Annual Increase in Consumer Prices 
Year All Food etc. Clotbing Rent and Housebold Otber 
Low~lncome 
1000 680 99 106 44 71 
1981 14 15 7 9 26 5 
1982 12 14 10 3 19 14 
1983 20 21 11 10 36 23 
1984 20 19 15 32 30 18 
1985 37 36 43 26 47 47 
1986 52 50 54 31 104 63 
1987 43 45 58 13 57 41 
1988 56 58 72 42 24 49 
1989 125 131 104 84 147 205 
Higb-Income Group 
Weigbt 1000 360 98 195 79 268 
1981 10 13 8 2 20 6 
1982 13 24 9 3 15 14 
1983 18 20 13 9 27 18 
1984 21 17 15 35 22 16 
1985 33 38 44 9 46 36 
1986 58 55 51 45 81 69 
1987 54 62 55 46 78 41 





















Table 'fIUI'TIII"," Consumer Subsidy for Maize 


















Source: Kumar (1988) 
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Table 71. Structural adjustment and External Debt 
External debt 
($mn unless otherwise indicated) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total external debt of which: 4637 5707 6599 6832 6739 7223 
Long-tenn debt 3159 3792 4428 4415 4196 4786 
Short-tenn debt 677 1057 1179 1476 1643 1488 
Use ofI- credit 801 858 991 940 900 949 
Public disbursed debt of which: 3159 3792 4428 4415 4196 4784 
Multilateral 733 980 1234 1210 1244 1420 
Bilateral 1803 2212 2562 2580 2319 2824 
Private creditor of which: 624 601 632 626 633 540 
Commercial banks 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Debt service of which: 139 317 153 164 177 178 
Principal 72 230 90 96 112 115 
Interest 68 141 63 68 65 62 
Total external debtJGDP (%) 229.4 414.6 373.7 205.8 154.2 216.2 
Debt service ratio(%) 16.1 50.1 17.0 13.1 12.4 12.8 
Short tenn debt/total external debt (%) 14.6 18.5 17.9 21.6 24.4 20.6 
Concessionalloansltotal external debt (%) 26.9 25.8 26.9 26.7 23.9 29.6 
Variable interest rate loansltotal external debt (%) 10.7 11.3 10.4 9.1 8.6 9.2 
Interest in arrears on long-tenn debt 170 157 356 521 803 813 
Maturity of over one year. Total debt service as a proportion of exports of goods and services. 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables. 
Adopted from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
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